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Allez, Marchez Braves Citoyennes: 
A Study of the Popular Origins of, and the Political and Judicial Reactions to, the 
October Days of the French Revolution 
 
Abstract 
 
On October 5, 1789, several hundred women first converged on the Parisian municipal 
government,  then marched undeterred on Versailles to demand the king’s aid in relieving 
the dire bread shortage in the city. By the end of the next day however, the women 
returned triumphantly to the capital not only with bread, but with the entire royal family, 
the National Guard, and National Assembly’s promise to relocate to Paris as well. This 
revolutionary journée is referred to as the October Days, and this thesis seeks to address 
its spontaneous and premeditated origins. I argue that although the journée was not the 
result of an overarching conspiracy, its themes and actions had precursors in the early 
months of the Revolution and the years before. Also, by undertaking a quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of  the ensuing judicial investigation of the movement, I have 
attempted to provide a grounding for the October Day’s most important primary source 
through which some of the journée’s most controversial aspects can be examined. 
Finally, I argue that this judicial inquiry significantly contributed to the polarization of 
the National Assembly as le peuple forced the political elites to take sides over the 
investigation. Thus, between October 5, 1789 and October 1, 1790 le peuple continued its 
struggle to reinforce the sovereignty with which it had been endowed. 
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A Note on Translations: 
 
 All direct quotes within the main body of this text are in English. All translations 
from French are my own unless otherwise noted. Some of these quotations have 
untranslatable gender implications, while the charisma of others cannot be fully captured 
by their English equivalents. Consequently, the limits of English sometimes compromise 
the important effect of revolutionary rhetoric. Therefore, although I have tried to maintain 
the integrity and nuances of the original quotation in my translation, I have always 
included the original French in my footnotes as well. 
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“So many great questions, arriving concurrently, on which 
we must form opinions! So many issues clustered together 
which have to be studied!” 
 
 
National Assembly Deputy Jean-Andre Périsse,  
as quoted by Timothy Tackett in Becoming a 
Revolutionary, p 244. 
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Introduction 
 
O generous heroines! It’s to you that the French owe this second 
revolution that is going to decide the glorious fate which has been reserved 
for their lofty destiny! After having contributed to the salvation of the 
Nation by your civic offerings, that which we were lacking the most was 
served by your courage. May you be forever able to gather the fruit of 
such a noble devotion.1 
Les Révolutions de Versailles et de Paris 
(October 1789) 
 
 With this opening salvo, Les Révolutions de Versailles et de Paris dedicated its 
very first issue and entire paper to the “dames françoises.” The women had collectively 
offered a monetary donation to help the fledgling nation in September, but it was their 
actions on October 5 and 6, 1789, which the newspaper praised the most. This “second 
revolution,” the first being the July 14 attack on the Bastille, resulted in the king and 
ultimately the National Assembly’s relocation from Versailles to Paris. The heart of the 
national government was moved from its somewhat detached Versailles location to the 
center of the most politically vocal French city where it was more susceptible to the 
scrutiny of le peuple.  On October 5, 1789, hundreds of tenacious citoyennes marched 
through the rain to Versailles in order to ask the king for bread and present their 
grievances to the National Assembly, and on October 6 the women returned to Paris not 
only with bread, but with the king himself, several military units, and a host of immediate 
and far reaching consequences.  
 The most prevalent revolutionary and historiographical debate about the October 
Days concerns the nature of its origins. The question of whether the October Days was 
                                                        
1 “Du Samedi 3 Octobre au _ du même mois,” Révolutions de Versailles et de Paris, Issue N°1, Les 
archives de la Révolution française, Bibliothèque Nationale Française, http://gallica.bnf.fr/ 
ark:/12148/bpt6k42479n/f3.chemindefer, p. 1-2 (“O généreuses Héroïnes! C’est donc à vous que les 
François devront cette seconde révolution, qui va décider le sort glorieux qui étoit réservé à leurs hautes 
destinées ! Après avoir concouru au salut de la Nation par vos offrandes civiques,  il ne nous manquoit plus 
que la servir par votre courage. Puissiez-vous recueillir à jamais le fruit d’un si noble dévouement.”). 
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the result of a conspiracy or spontaneous popular propulsion is central to comprehending 
its aftermath and significance. Therefore, in order to draw conclusions about this issue, I 
will trace its thread through three distinct phases, starting in the summer of 1789 and 
ending in October 1790. These three sections concern the origins of the journée, the 
judicial response and investigation of this question, and this debate’s political 
consequences for the National Assembly and the Commune.  
  In the first section I will argue that nearly every aspect of the October Days had a 
precursor in the early months of the Revolution and the years before. Therefore, I will 
give an account of the events of the journée itself in order to point up similarities between 
this movement and those which took place in the preceding months. This account will be 
multi-dimensional; not only will it serve as a narration of what occurred, but it will also 
explore the motivations of the participants of all parties involved. This, of course, lends 
itself to a discussion of key people, the political climate/agenda, the bread crisis, and the 
conspiracy rumors that the people and the court commonly believed. Since the October 
Days began in Paris and ultimately affected it the most, I will examine these issues from 
the capital’s point of view, rather than from that of the provinces who faced different 
situations and problems. Most importantly, I will analyze the various motivations of and 
precursors to the movement in order to address this controversy over the spontaneous or 
premeditated origins of the journée. I will conclude that the October Days contain both of 
these dimensions in a paradoxical duality. The movement was premeditated in the sense 
that the ideas, themes, and actions all appeared earlier in the Revolution or even years 
before. However, it was also spontaneous in the sense that it was not the result of a 
conspiracy or one politically planned agenda, but rather it was a sudden manifestation of 
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popular sentiment and driven by le peuple. Finally, I will argue that the October Days is 
mainly distinguishable from earlier demonstrations because of the sheer number of 
people involved and the sense of legality added to the movement by the direct 
participation of the National Guard. 
 The second section will address the investigation which the National Assembly 
ordered to discover the “auteurs” behind the “crimes” of October 6. The National 
Assembly had provisionally charged the Châtelet, an ancient royal court, with the power 
to try crimes of treason and thus assigned it the task of uncovering this supposed 
conspiracy. The resulting Procédure criminelle recorded the testimony of 395 individuals 
which the Châtelet heard over the course of seven months. Although frequently cited in 
various historians’ arguments concerning the conspiracy or spontaneity of the journée, no 
one has published a detailed overarching study of the investigation, leaving references to 
individual testimonies weak when taken out of the context of the investigation as a 
whole. Therefore, I will quantitatively and qualitatively analyze the Procédure criminelle 
in an effort to provide this grounding of individual depositions within the investigation as 
a whole. By analyzing the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of each 
witness, I will draw a general picture of the witness pool and conclude that, on a whole, it 
was conservatively inclined group in comparison to the actual participants of the journée. 
By evaluating the depositions, I will suggest points of error within the investigation itself, 
such as the procedure and actions taken by the judges, which shaped its overall 
conclusions. Additionally, I will explore the content of the testimonies to form 
conclusions on controversial topics such as if there were men disguised as women and if 
Mirabeau and Orléans were the “auteurs” of a conspiracy. Moreover, I will argue that the 
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sketchy evidence which the judges attempted to collect while trying to denounce 
Mirabeau and Orléans as conspirators actually does more to exonerate them than 
incriminate them. 
 In the third section, I will address the political reaction to the Châtelet 
investigation. Although both the Commune and the National Assembly had originally 
ordered the investigation, within only a year each had turned its back on the Procédure 
criminelle. In April 1790, after a confrontational meeting between the Parisian Comité 
des recherches and the Châtelet, word leaked out that the Châtelet was collecting 
information beyond the events outlined in the denunciation (those concerning the 
violence of October 6). In fact, it sought to implicate Orléans and Mirabeau, two very 
popular deputies, in a conspiracy that stretched back to July. Many districts and left 
leaning newspapers, both representative of le peuple, voiced their outrage against this 
transgression. Therefore, the memory of the October Days produced a highly volatile 
political issue on which many representatives were ultimately forced to take a side. The 
pressure of popular opinion deepened the division among the representatives in the 
National Assembly by forcing the left to renounce the investigation while the right urged 
for its further consideration. With this polarization of political positions, the left even 
went beyond rejecting the idea of a conspiracy behind the October Days; it denounced the 
Châtelet as being part of a counter-revolutionary conspiracy itself! As a result of its 
relocation, the governing body was directly exposed to the opinions of le peuple of Paris, 
and this immediate effect catalyzed the journée’s long term effect of gradually increasing 
division among the center political parties. Therefore, the consequences of the October 
Days come full circle since the deputies were forced to reconcile their positions with 
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Parisian popular demands, some of which were about the Châtelet investigation and the 
journée itself. 
    From October 1789 to October 1790, the populace and the political elites 
frequently revisited the debate over the spontaneous or premeditated origins of the 
October Days. After detailed analysis and some historical distance, it is reasonable to see 
the journée as a synthesis of both. The actions of le peuple were guided by prior 
knowledge and drew on themes and actions of the past while the journée itself was 
initially a truly popular and rather spontaneous movement. However, the failure of any 
group to see it as such drove the political and judicial struggle over its contested origins 
down a track of absolutes at whose beginning and end le peuple ultimately held the 
switch. 
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Section I: The October Days 
 
Men accomplished the fourteenth of July, women the sixth of        
October. Men took the royal Bastille and women took the king  
himself, [and] put him in the hands of Paris, that is to say those  
of the Revolution.2 
        Jules Michelet, 1853 
 
 
With this simple yet powerful comparison, the great nineteenth-century historian 
Jules Michelet decisively penned his assessment of the October Days. In a single flourish, 
Michelet reduces the relative importance of the traditional revolutionary hallmark, the fall 
of the Bastille, in light of the collective achievement of several hundred Parisian women 
three months later. The glory of the women’s actions, Michelet concludes, lay in their 
spontaneous, popular, and unguided impulses.  In other words, the journée was a 
movement driven by the women of the popular classes for the greater economic and 
political good of le peuple. But one is left to wonder if this conclusion stems more from 
the Romantic inclinations of Michelet than from the historical realities of the October 
Days themselves. This section seeks to provide a background for the movement, to 
clarify the events of the journée, to identify the motivations of the various participants, 
and to examine the defining, though much debated, characteristics of the October Days. 
 The major historical controversy of the journée concerns its spontaneous or 
premeditated origins. Consequently, any analysis of the October Days is founded upon 
the individual historian’s stance in this over-arching debate. Although disagreeing on the 
origins and scale of a plot, historians such as Henri Leclercq, Georges Lefebvre, and 
                                                        
2 Jules Michelet, Les Femmes de la Révolution (1855 ; Project Gutenberg, 2006). Etext #18738 
http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/18738, Chapter V (Les Femmes du 6 Octobre). All translations into 
English are my own unless otherwise cited. The original French quote is included in the footnote for 
anything I have translated. (“Les hommes ont fait le 14 juillet, les femmes le 6 octobre. Les hommes ont 
pris la Bastille royale et les femmes ont pris la royauté elle-même, l’ont mise aux mains de Paris, c’est-à-
dire de la Révolution.”). 
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Marc de Villiers have all asserted that the journée was the result of a conspiracy, while 
other historians such as Louis Gottschalk and Margaret Maddox, Barry Shapiro, and 
Michelet have argued that the initial propulsion of the movement was spontaneous and 
popular. However, if one makes a distinction between the themes and specific events of 
the journée on the one hand, and the movement’s initial impetus on the other, a third 
argument emerges – the movement was both spontaneous and premeditated. This 
paradoxical argument has been advanced by George Rudé, Albert Mathiez, and David 
Garrioch, and I will build upon their work along with that of Olwen Hufton to further 
contribute to this conclusion.3 
 I will argue that the themes of the journée were in no way new. In fact, the 
sources of anxiety which ultimately led to the movement, such as the bread crisis and 
rumors of aristocratic conspiracy, were clearly present in July 1789, if not before. 
Moreover, the events which comprise the journée as a whole had their origins in previous 
revolutionary activity and even in the activities of daily life. In this way, the October 
Days were neither spontaneous nor ground-breaking. Its ideas were already part of a 
collective consciousness and the events themselves had precedents. 
 However, I will also argue that the October Days were spontaneous in the sense 
that they were spurred by popular action without cohesive organization or an agenda 
imposed by a political group. The consistent actions and demands of the women at the 
Hôtel de Ville, the château, and the National Assembly on October 5 reveal their 
motivations to be based upon economic necessity and their concern that counter-
revolutionary forces might be influencing their good king and insulting the fledgling 
                                                        
3 For a brief summary of these historians’ focal points and the nuances which differentiate their arguments, 
see the Appendix.  
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nation. The October Days were, at least initially, not motivated by any other factors 
beyond popular sentiment which manifested itself in spontaneous action. 
 This section will also examine the October Days in relation to other previous 
events to conclude that the radical differences between the journée and preceding 
revolutionary activities are the sheer number of participants and the involvement of the 
National Guard. Thousands of people were immediately affected within the thirty-hour 
period of the journée. These individuals were from a wide variety of backgrounds: from 
the Flanders troops to the politicians of the National Assembly, and from the nobility of 
the court to the poissardes of the Parisian markets. The participation of the National 
Guard on the side of le peuple legitimized the movement and revealed the Commune’s 
increasing lack of control in Paris.  
 Although the numerous factors contributing to the October Days make it difficult 
to conclude what truly happened, one must sort through the evidence and nuances of 
various arguments to provide a coherent narrative. Only then can the effects of the 
October Days be accurately examined.  
    ---------------------------------- 
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Chapter 1: The Foundations of the Journée 
-Paris at the Beginning of the Revolution- 
 At the start of the Revolution, the population of Paris was 650,000.4 Of these 
inhabitants approximately 10,000 were clergy members, 5,000 belonged to the nobility, 
and 40,000 were bourgeois.5 The 595,000 remaining citizens comprised the group of the 
menu peuple, who were the “shopkeepers, craftsmen, and day laborers” of the city.6 The 
menu peuple lived mostly in the northern area of Paris and in the faubourgs of Saint-
Antoine and Saint-Marcel.7 There was also a concentration of wage-earners near Les 
Halles, the central markets, which was often a hub for revolutionary activity.8 Due to 
their participation in popular revolutionary activities such as the October Days, the menu 
peuple quickly became the Parisian image of le peuple which revolutionary and popular 
authorities gradually accepted as the legitimizing force or the guardian of “an infallible 
general will.”9 However, in the summer and fall of 1789 this relationship was just 
developing and political leaders were hesitant, to say the least, to completely accept 
popular actions as originating solely from valid grievances of le peuple.  
 Nevertheless, the Parisian municipal government which was erected after the fall 
of the Bastille operated on the principle that sovereign authority must be derived from the 
districts which represented le peuple. Initially, the Parisian districts had been formed to 
elect representatives for the Estates General, but they surpassed their initial purpose. By 
refusing to dissolve, the districts perpetuated the belief that they were able to act as the 
                                                        
4 Sigismond Lacroix, ed., Actes de la Commune de Paris pendant la Révolution, series I, vol I (New York: 
AMS Press, 1974), viii. 
5 George Rudé, The Crowd in the French Revolution (Westport, CT: Oxford University Press, 1959), 12. 
6 Rudé, The Crowd, 13. 
7 Rudé, The Crowd, 234. 
8 Rudé, The Crowd, 17. 
9 David Andress, “Nation, People, and Mob: Political Mythology and Social Prejudice in the French 
Revolution,” http://userweb.port.ac.uk/~andressd/myth.htm (accessed September 2006) 1. 
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legal organ of le peuple.10 Thus, the districts were called by the Comité permanent to 
elect deputies for the Assemblée des représentants which would become the main body of 
the Parisian municipal government.11 Jean Sylvain Bailly, the mayor of Paris, also asked 
the districts to design a new administration plan for the city.12 Therefore, the first 
revolutionary government of Paris was inextricably tied to the will of le peuple via the 
districts who were the “true active force of the Commune” and the “only source of 
authority.”13 
 Le peuple often superseded legal and formal political means to express their needs 
and opinions in the form of crowds. This means of political persuasion (or intimidation 
depending on one’s point of view) was already being used in June 1789 to scare the court 
and nobility of Versailles.14 Crowds were everywhere in Paris, regardless of whether they 
had a conscious structure or were the natural result of teeming marketplaces. Minor 
incidents could easily escalate into major crowd disturbances under such conditions.15  
 There was no stereotypical organized “revolutionary crowd.” Each crowd had its 
own distinct composition as did any other crowd under the ancient regime. The main 
difference from old crowds was that revolutionary crowds held longer protests and had 
more power in persuading the susceptible newly formed government. Thus, historians 
refer to revolutionary crowd demonstrations as journées to stress this increased length of 
                                                        
10 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: vi. 
11 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: xii. The Comité permanent was organized by the Electeurs of the city 
on July 13 and consisted of mostly city officals and Electeurs who were charged with reorganizing the 
administration of the city. At the end of July, it evolved into the Comité provisoire. Lacroix, Actes de la 
Commune, I: xi. 
12 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: xiii. 
13 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: xv. 
14Georges Lefebvre, The Coming of the French Revolution, trans. R.R. Palmer (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1947), 101. 
15David Andress, “Dismantling the ‘Revolutionary Crowd’: Collective Violence and Parisian Politics, 
1789-1791,” http://userweb.port.ac.uk/~andressd/dismantl.htm. 3. 
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time and the greater influence that revolutionary crowds held over political and popular 
opinion.16 Revolutionary crowds were more than a purely reactive phenomenon; they also 
showed support for governmental measures. The crowd, acting like the chorus in a Greek 
tragedy, functioned as the voice of le peuple. For example, at a ceremony in which 
National Guards took an oath of loyalty, les dames des Halles of Versailles and of Paris 
“assembled to sing their praise over and over again” and these actions were “celebrated 
by an immense number of people” and “excited the sweetest emotion.”17 Another group 
of citizens submitted to the Commune a “Mémoire” of the Bastille in order to praise the 
patriotic example of Stanislas-Marie Maillard, who participated in the attack on the 
fortress.18 
 The Assemblée des représentants recognized the power of these crowds and 
became increasingly disturbed as their activity grew more frequent and violent 
throughout the summer. Even children had taken to forming their own crowds, arming 
themselves and pretending to be revolutionary patrols.19 The Commune was more than 
happy, therefore, to receive a decree from the National Assembly ordering the Commune 
to take judicial action against individuals who disturbed public order and peace.20 As a 
result, the Commune took appropriate measures by asking four districts to help police the 
Palais-Royal which was often the site of revolutionary agitation.21 As early as August 6, 
                                                        
16 Andress, “Revolutionary Crowd,” 4. 
17 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune , I: 340-241 (“se sont réunîtés pour chanter à l’envi les louanges” and 
these actions were “réputés par un peuple immense”; “ont excité la plus douce émotion”). 
18 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I:157. 
19 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune , I: 251. 
20 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 67. 
21 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 98. According to Siméon-Prosper Hardy, who meticulously recorded 
his daily observations of the Revolution in his journal, there were 10 instances of unrest or significant 
demonstrations at the Palais-Royal during July alone. See July 1 (p. 584), July 2 (586), July 3 (589), July 6 
(599), July 9 (606), July 10 (615), July 12 (627), July 13 (630), July 19 (670), July 31 (715) in 
ValérieGoutal-Arnal, “Mes loisirs, ou journal d’évènements tells qu’ils parviennent à ma connaissance: les 
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the Commune even reported that Lafayette had to plead with a crowd to respect the 
judicial procedures and not unlawfully persecute an accused man.22 The extent and 
frequency of popular crowd participation nearly paralyzed the municipal government by 
the end of September.  
-Popular Concern for the King and his Actions- 
 One constant concern of the revolutionary crowds was the political position of the 
king. Through the October Days, Louis XVI is constantly referred to as “our good king” 
by a variety of sources. Yet, le peuple were often afraid that the king was being 
influenced by counter-revolutionary forces such as the aristocracy. Immediately after July 
14, Lafayette gave a speech in Paris proclaiming that the king had been “deceived” 
before the fall of the Bastille, but had since been exposed to the truth.23 Le peuple were 
further reassured of the king’s good intentions upon his visit to the city on July 17. 
During this appearance, his Body Guards did not enter with him as a display of respect 
and trust towards Parisians.24 Although the crowd shouted “Long live the king and the 
nation” upon the king’s exit,25 Bailly’s speech revealed the suspicion of bad influences 
that nevertheless prevailed. While presenting the keys of Paris to the king, Bailly 
proclaimed: 
These are the same [keys] that were presented to Henry IV; he had conquered his 
people, now it is the people who have conquered their king … This is the most 
beautiful day of the monarchy; it is the occasion of an eternal alliance between 
monarch and people.26 
                                                                                                                                                                     
débuts de la révolution Française relates par le libraire Parisien Siméon-Prosper Hardy,” 4 vols. PhD diss., 
Université Paris IV Sorbonne, 1994. 
22 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 113. Gilbert du Motier, marquis de Lafayette was the head of the 
Parisian National Guard and was also an influential deputy in the National Assembly.  
23 Louis Gottschalk and Margaret Maddox, Lafayette in the French Revolution: Through the October Days 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), 110. 
24 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 125. 
25 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 129 (“Vivent le roi et la nation”). 
26 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 127. 
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Hardy’s belief in a rumor that the king punched his valet whom he suspected of 
conspiracy against Paris and the National Assembly illustrates the tendency of le peuple 
to believe that bad influences surrounded their good king.27 The king later showed his 
support of the newly formed Parisian National Guard by pledging to send them 6,000 
guns and thereby gained further praise from his Parisian subjects. 
 
                                     
These pewter medals were made to commemorate the October Days. The top medal was the first one made 
and its caption, “La Nation a conquis son Roi, arrivée du Roi à Paris le 6 octobre 1789” (The Nation 
                                                        
27 Goutal-Arnal,“Mes loisirs, ou journal d’évènements tells qu’ils parviennent à ma connaissance: les 
débuts de la révolution Française relates par le libraire Parisien Siméon-Prosper Hardy,” 677 (July 21). 
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conquered its king, the arrival of the King to Paris on October 6, 1789), clearly refers to Bailly’s July 
speech with the intent of mirroring the joyous occasion. However, as the origins of the October Days 
became increasingly controversial, the engraver simplified the description to “Arrivée du Roi à Paris, le 
6octobre 1789” to avoid any negative connotations of the word “conquis.”28 
 
These actions did little to quell the popular suspicion that the influences of the 
court and additional opposition to the Revolution from abroad were corrupting the king. 
Many politicians requested that the king remove his troops (especially the foreign ones) 
from Paris, which were the cause of much tension.29 In July, the National Assembly sent 
Mirabeau and a deputation of 24 representatives “to address the king on the withdrawal 
of troops.”30 However, the actions of the National Assembly did little to reassure 
Parisians that the king was not being manipulated. In fact, 32 deputies sent a note to the 
king in reaction to an August 30 attempt to march on Versailles, requesting that the 
National Assembly be relocated to Soissons or Compiègne. The National Assembly could 
then be at least 20 leagues away from Paris and beyond the reach of the city’s active 
crowds.31 The king, with his “passive courage” refused the request, thereby avoiding an 
inevitable protest from Paris.32 These events served to strengthen le peuple’s belief it was 
their duty to protect the king from counter-revolutionary pressure. 
                                                        
28 Photographs: “Image 41: La nation a conquis son roi. Arrivée du roi à Paris le 6 Octobre 1789,” Imaging 
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revolutionary purposes. In 1789, there were 45,000 foreign troops in the royal military forces. Georges 
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31 Albert Mathiez, “Étude critique sur les journées des 5 & 6 octobre,”Revue Historique, vol. 67 (1898): 
273. The August 30 attempted march on Versailles was organized at the Palais Royal in hopes of 
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32 Mathiez, “Étude critique,”  67: 277 (“courage passif”). 
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 In fact, le peuple had valid reasons for concern. A group called the French 
Regeneration proposed a plan for the king’s flight from Versailles, and Favras was later 
prosecuted for his involvement in the plot.33 Mathiez believes that the king seriously 
considered fleeing Versailles in September due to increasing political pressure 
concerning the constitution.34 It is at least certain that some of the king’s close advisors 
strongly urged him to leave Versailles for a more politically favorable location (usually 
argued to be Metz). 
 The last major crowd-propelled public disturbance before the October Days 
occurred on August 30. A group of armed citizens at the Palais-Royal planned to march 
on Versailles “in order to prevent the royal veto from passing in the National 
Assembly.”35 According to the marchers, “The veto does not belong to a single man, but 
to twenty million. The citizens gathered at the Palais-Royal think that the ignorant, 
corrupt, and suspect deputies must be revoked.” Moreover, the same crowd sent a letter 
directly to the National Assembly, which stated: 
The Patriotic Society of the Palais-Royal has the honor of informing you that, if 
the aristocratic party, formed by a part of the clergy and a part of the nobility, and 
one-hundred-twenty members of ignorant or corrupt members of the Commune, 
continue to cause trouble, and still want the absolute veto, fifteen thousand men 
are ready to burn their castles and their houses and yours particularly.36  
 
                                                        
33 Lefebvre, The Coming,  194. 
34 Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 69: 61. 
35 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 400 (“pour empêcher que le veto royal ne passe dans l’Assemblée 
nationale”). 
36 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 413 (“Le veto n’appartient pas à un seul homme, mais à vingt cinq 
millions. Les citoyens réunis au Palais-Royal pensent que l’on doit révoquer les députes ignorants, 
corrumpus et suspects.”; “La Société patriotique du Palais-Royal a l’honneur de vous faire part que, si le 
parti de l’aristocratie, formé par une partie du clergé, par une partie de la noblesse, et cent vingt membres 
des communes ignorants ou corrumpus, continue de troubler l’harmonie, et veut encore la sanction absolue, 
quinze mille hommes sont prêts à éclairer leurs châteaux et leurs maisons et les vôtres particulièrement.”).  
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Other reports testified that individuals shouted threats against the queen as well and 
accused her of participating counter-revolutionary activities.37 The leader of the Palais-
Royal movement was the Marquis de Saint-Huruge and although his forces were stopped 
by Lafayette and the National Guard en route to Versailles, the event threw the Commune 
into such an uproar that the Assemblée des représentants could not adjourn until after 
3:00 a.m., once order had finally been restored in the city.38 The Commune received a 
letter later on August 31 which hauntingly informed it that the Palais-Royal movement 
served “to forestall the fury of the people, it is they who open legal avenues” and that 
“[the people] want to explain their cahier and declare that it did not want to grant the 
king a veto.”39 The Commune had already ordered Lafayette and the National Guard to 
act “in order to break up all seditious crowds” on August 7, 40 and the Commune became 
even more visibly shaken by this new development; the deputies officially denounced the 
Palais-Royal movement as “seditious,” that it had elements of “subversion,” and “secret 
and perverse conspiracies” which hurt good citizens. Consequently, the Assemblée 
authorized Lafayette to take all measures necessary against agitators to restore peace and 
order.41 Despite these new initiatives, members of the Capuchins Saint-Honoré district 
sent a message to the Commune on September 1 stating that they wished to go to 
Versailles and stop the National Assembly debates until each deputy consulted the people 
who elected him on the issue of the veto. The frustrated Commune shortly replied that 
                                                        
37 Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 252. 
38 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune,  I:401. 
39 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 429-430 (“prévenir la fureur du peuple, c’est de lui ouvrir des voies 
légales”; “il [le peuple] veut expliquer son cahier, et déclarer qu’il n’a point voulu accorder au roi le veto”). 
40 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 124 (“pour faire cesser tous les attroupements séditieux”). 
41 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 435-437 (“séditieux”; “subversion”; “complots secrets et pervers”). 
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one city did not have the right to force the National Assembly on an issue in which the 
whole nation had an opinion.42 
-The Need for Order and the National Guard- 
 Not only were there significant demonstrations in late summer, but organized 
political action in the name of le peuple also increased. People moved beyond their 
districts in an attempt to spread their political opinions across the city.43 The number of 
groups who requested to address the Assemblée des représentants grew exponentially, 
and by mid-August the Commune began to make a legal distinction between députés 
from the districts and individual citoyens who had diminished legal authority.44 However, 
this distinction did not deter many groups from arriving at the Hôtel de Ville and the 
crisis of August 30 compounded the problem. Therefore, the Commune declared on 
August 31 that it would only receive a “deputation” only if it was “from a legally 
constituted body.”45 Nevertheless, the Assemblée des représentants continued to be 
inundated with parties that met this minimum requirement, and this constant interruption 
paralyzed their efforts to address many of the city’s urgent problems.  The Commune 
consequently decided on September 23 to limit unsolicited communication from the 
districts to written means alone.46 It is evident that by October 1789, the Commune’s 
futile efforts could not match pace with the turbulent activities and politically charged 
atmosphere of the city. Try though they might, the Assemblée could not control Paris 
alone. 
                                                        
42 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 438. 
43 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 290. 
44 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune,  I: 229. 
45 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune,  I: 425 (“d’un corps légalement constitué.”). 
46 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune,   II : 43. 
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 With tension from various sources threatening to boil over, the Commune 
entrusted Lafayette and the Parisian National Guard with its own primary goal – to 
maintain peace and order within the city. The Parisian National Guard, initially called les 
milices bourgeoises, had been originally organized by district but they all became 
ultimately responsible to General Lafayette in late-July. The National Guard consisted of 
3,600 regulars and 30,600 troops, and had 140 canons at its disposal.47 The first true test 
of the National Guard occurred early in August when grain convoys were frequently 
raided en route to Paris, causing much unrest. As a result, the National Assembly passed 
a decree on August 6 granting the National Guard military power “to reestablish the 
security of citizens, liberty of commerce, and good universal order,” which virtually 
encompassed all unrest.48 The Parisian National Guard was somewhat successful with 
this mission and the district of Saint-Philippe du Roule specifically praised the actions of 
the French Guards division.49 These troops had originally served as protectors of the king 
until they were replaced at the beginning of the Revolution by the Body Guards. 
However, the recently alienated French Guards still thought of themselves as special 
troops and were not always inclined to obey National Guard orders as suggested by the 
August 19 order that all French Guards must return to their regiments so that Lafayette 
could better control the militia.50 In fact, the situation was so bad that by July 14 five of 
the six French Guard battalions had completely defected from royal command and joined 
                                                        
47 Pierre Dominique, Paris enlève le roi: octobre 1789 (Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1973), 70. The 
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49 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 161. 
50 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, I: 275-276. 
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the Parisians which they were supposed to be policing.51 Yet, the Commune continued to 
place its trust in the abilities of the National Guard. In fact, a neighboring town even 
requested that Paris send some National Guard troops to stop its own “insurrection.”52 
Moreover, when rumors spread that foreign troops might attack the capital, the city 
entrusted original National Guard troops with protecting the barriers and roads.53 
  Lafayette labored arduously over three short months to discipline and build up 
the loyalty and reliability of his troops. He standardized the National Guard oath and 
concentrated on instilling its vows in his officers: “We swear and promise to remain 
faithful to the Nation, to the King, to the Law, and to the Commune of Paris.”54 After 
taking this oath, Lafayette and many of his officers went to Versailles to pay their 
respects to the king on August 25. Upon arriving at Versailles, the Parisian National 
Guard troops met Versailles National Guard troops who were: 
Burning with desire to share, with the citizens of Paris, in honoring M. the Mayor 
and M. the General, who no longer belonged exclusively to the capital since they 
became their defenders and, by necessary extension, that of the citizens of the 
entire kingdom...55 
 
The Versailles troops invited their military brothers to dine with them instead, but not 
before Bailly had sworn to Louis “to enforce [the king’s] legitimate authority, to conserve 
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the sacred rights of the Commune of Paris and to render justice to all.”56 The remainder 
of the Parisian National Guard took the official oath on August 30 in front of the Hôtel de 
Ville.57 Lafayette used the occasion of receiving banners from the king merely a month 
later on September 27 as an opportunity to reinforce their responsibilities, and the 
National Guard renewed their oath in the solemn aisles of Notre Dame.58 Lafayette was 
an adroit leader and politician who realized that he needed the support of all troops within 
the Parisian area to control any situations which might arise. As a result, he started to take 
other troops under his guidance, and even ironically arranged for four battalions of Swiss 
Guards to take the National Guard oath in front of the Hôtel de Ville on October 5.  
-Issues in the National Assembly- 
 As Lafayette strove to unify his troops, the National Assembly was dividing on 
the issue of the constitution. More specifically, the representatives seemed to be in a 
stalemate over the issue of the king’s veto. The group which Lefebvre refers to as 
“anglomaniacs” or “monarchials” wanted to keep an absolute veto for the king and 
establish a bicameral system based upon the English model,59 whereas, the “patriots” (led 
by Barnave) wanted to grant the king a “suspensive veto over legislations” only if the 
king would accept the laws already passed by the National Assembly including the 
August decrees, which abolished the feudal system in France and spelled out the 
fundamental rights of every citizen.60 Mirabeau, on the other hand, continued to advocate 
for one legislative body and an absolute veto for the king only if the constitution 
guaranteed “an annual assembly, annual army expenses, [and] annual tax laws” to 
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disperse the power.61 Lafayette, always the centrist of the National Assembly, attempted 
to balance the two sides in order to facilitate a peaceful transition of power to the new 
governing bodies.62 After much debate, the National Assembly approved of the 
“suspensive veto” on September 11, but the king would not accept the August decrees.63 
The king had earlier revealed his precarious position concerning his veto in an August 5 
letter: “If force obliges me to sanction, then I would give in, but then, there would no 
longer be a monarch or a monarchy in France…”64 Of course, the king’s decision on the 
veto and constitution was tantamount to his acceptance or rejection of the course of the 
Revolution so far; consequently, this political issue unfolded at the forefront of the public 
eye. On September 21 the king finally made a concession, albeit an ambiguous one. 
Although he had informed the National Assembly on September 18 that he would not 
accept the August decrees, he sent them a message agreeing to the publication of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the first articles of the constitution, but withheld his 
promulgation.65 This decision worried the patriots since they felt that it was imperative 
that the king accept the constitution. Moreover, the patriots and le peuple took his 
hesitance as further “proof” that he was under the influence of bad ministers. Confused 
and politically stymied, the National Assembly was unsure of how to proceed. Some 
representatives concluded that the publication meant that the king’s approval of the 
constitution was not needed while others such as Mirabeau insisted that the National 
Assembly ask for his “acceptance” of the decrees as late as October 1. The king’s delay 
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in ratifying the constitution had the potential to be disastrous in an already anxious 
setting. 
-Food Problems- 
 Although the majority of le peuple were politically conscious about formal 
legislation such as the constitution, they were more poignantly aware of legislation 
concerning their basic means of existence – bread. The 1788 grain harvest had been weak 
all across Western Europe.66  These crop failures, compounded with the trend of bread 
price inflation outpacing wage inflation over the past fifty years, had catastrophic 
consequences. From the period of 1726-1741 to 1785-1789 bread prices increased 65% 
whereas wages only rose 22%.67 But the price hike of bread in Paris immediately 
preceding the Revolution was even more distressing. On August 17, 1788, bread cost 
2.375 sous per pound, and the price soared to 3.625 sous per pound by February 1789.68 
At the time of the French Revolution, the average person consumed 1.5 pounds of bread 
per day, which constituted the majority of their diet.69 Yet the average wages for a day 
laborer were 25 sous per day and a skilled worker received 50 sous per day.70 In order to 
buy daily bread for a Parisian family of four in February 1789, a worker would have to 
spend 21.75 sous, which was 87% of a day laborer’s wages. Unfortunately, bread prices 
skyrocketed to 4 sous per pound in Paris, and up to 8 sous per pound in the provinces by 
July 1789.71 This means that the same family of four would need to expend 24 sous per 
day, or 96% of a day laborer’s wages on bread alone! Something had to give. 
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 As a result of the deplorable bread prices, much of the summer’s unrest can be 
attributed to this food crisis. The food riots which broke out in les Halles on August 28 
and 29 were so severe that the National Guard was called in to control the uproar.72 
Convoys of bread sent in from the provinces were often subject to attack and pillage. On 
August 31, the unrest in the city began at 2:00 a.m. as convoys approaching Paris were 
pillaged by looters and even country peasants who were weary of seeing grain leave their 
land.73 The participation of some citizens in food crisis events in the name of the city or 
le peuple strengthened their feeling of patriotic duty and confirmed the effectiveness of 
their own actions. For example, the Commune received a report on August 4 that eleven 
citizens had defended a convoy against 4,000 “brigands” (undoubtedly exaggerated) out 
of their feeling of civic duty. The Assemblée des représentants praised their actions and 
consequently reinforced a positive image of active citizen participation.74 As the crisis 
worsened, the blame for the shortage spread from counter-revolutionary conspirators, to 
the government, to the bakers. Not only were bakers accused of hoarding, but the districts 
even critiqued the ingredients they used, one asserting that the flour a particular baker 
used was so bad that “it would be dangerous to use it to make bread.”75 Therefore, the 
stores of usable flour were actually lower than whatever small amount of flour was in the 
city at any given time. 
 The situation in the countryside did not help the bread problems of Paris. 
Parisians were already at a disadvantage because unlike the residents of the countryside 
who purchased grain once a week to make their own bread, most Parisians bought bread 
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directly from bakers in the city.76 Although most had direct access to the grain 
themselves, peasants would cringe at the sight of convoys taking grain from their region 
to Paris. As early as April 1789, these convoys were frequently stopped by people 
suspicious of its source and destination.77 All peasants were aware that decreasing their 
own grain supply would increase prices and might jeopardize their very existence in the 
case of a future famine. Local authorities were so concerned with the grain supply that 
they implemented systems in which peasants had no choice but to sell their grain at local 
markets to residents and bakers before they could sell any surplus to merchants.78 
However, since royal taxes were not collected in 1789 and peasants no longer had to pay 
seigneurial dues, immediate income was not necessary, and peasants could hoard grain 
longer until the market was most favorable to them.79 The Great Fear spread in the 
provinces from July 20 to August 6 and peasants lived in constant state of apprehension 
and paranoia, fearing that brigands would come to steal their grain and property.80 These 
circumstances and suspicions greatly hindered the import of grain into Paris. 
-The Municipal Reaction to the Bread Crisis- 
As a branch of the Parisian municipal government, the Comité des subsistances 
was entrusted with regulating food within the city. Even though it was established as an 
independent branch in order to quickly remedy the food crisis, the Comité was 
completely bogged down during the summer of 1789.  The Comité des subsistances 
moved slowly due to the great number of issues that needed to be addressed. The Comité 
made sure to post what decisions it did make on placards to inform inhabitants and 
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remind them of its efforts.81 The crop of 1789 was not nearly as dismal as that of 1788 
and the Comité hoped that this new grain would help to bring down prices.82 However, 
this grain had yet to be threshed and distributed, so the Comité precariously pursued a 
balancing act to please suppliers and consumers while keeping order in the city. Because 
of the growing number of disturbances at the food markets and threats directed toward 
individual bakers, the Comité deployed National Guards at the bakers’ shops from 
September 1 to 16 in an attempt to quell the unrest.83 The Comité also took steps to 
secure more grain for the capital by sending deputations to neighboring municipal 
governments encouraging a permanent daily correspondence on the transfer of grain.84 
These steps proved not to be enough. 
 In an attempt to free up time to discuss other issues beyond bread, the Commune 
had deferred most food problems to the authority of the Comité hoping that it would 
more swiftly solve these problems.85 However, the Commune was never able to 
completely detach itself from food issues and found itself instead working with the 
Comité on a plethora of issues. Bailly subsidized “a bonus” of 9 livres per sack of flour to 
help bakers get the raw materials they needed.86 Clearly pressured by popular unrest, the 
Commune declared on September 2: 
The Assembly, perpetually occupied with means of assuring the subsistence of 
this city, had invited the representatives of the bakers to confer with them, in the 
presence of  the Comité des subsistances and M. the Mayor, on the most proper 
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means to make reign as quickly as possible, an abundance [of food] in the 
capital.87 
 
The Assemblée des représentants also continued to receive deputations pertaining to food 
issues. For example, it responded to the demands of the Récollets district in ordering a 
house to be searched in which it was believed 8,000 sacks of flour were hidden (this 
turned out to be a false accusation).88 Some bakers also approached the Assemblée to 
complain about the quality of flour they received, so the Commune sent out a team to 
inspect the quality of flour in the city.89 The Commune even addressed food issues 
beyond the common bread problems and settled a dispute as to when butchers could bring 
meat to sell at Les Halles.90 To make matters worse, since the constitution had not yet 
been passed, the Commune lacked an updated criminal procedure to follow and thus 
entered a judicial stalemate concerning the rights of citizens and when arrests or legal 
action were legitimate. On September 8, Lafayette instructed the Assemblée des 
représentants to alert the national Assembly that a new criminal procedure was crucial to 
restore order in the capital.91 On September 9, the National Assembly actually formed a 
committee to review and reform the criminal procedures, but no changes came until 
October 9, not in time to help the city calm the food crisis before the eruption of the 
October Days.92 
  The ever-turbulent Halles (the central markets) were a major source of 
aggravation for the Commune, since they were the major center of the Parisian food 
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trade. The Commune specifically formed a committee to assess the situation at Les Halles 
and take any necessary measures to solve the unrest there.93 It resorted to establishing a 
permanent guard for Les Halles that was comprised of 300 troops from different 
districts.94 Yet on September 10, the Assemblée remained troubled by the persistent 
disorder and warned bakers that if they did not follow regulations they would be 
prosecuted. In addition they proclaimed: 
On what had been presented to the Assembly, that the disorder at Les Halles was 
again beginning, and that the Guard which was established there did not suffice to 
repress [the disorder], it had been decreed that the Guard of Les Halles would be 
increased to 600 men of the national troops, paid and unpaid.95 
 
The Commune was also concerned that the bakers were not bringing enough flour to Les 
Halles and resolved that this supply should be reported exactly and valued each day.96 
The Commune and Comité des subsistances were fighting a losing battle against food-
based insecurity and disturbances. 
With minimal results to show for their great efforts, the Comité de subsistances 
came under increasing criticism in the summer and early fall. The district of Saint-
Antoine complained that representatives in the Comité de subsistances were not placed 
there directly by the districts who were “the only true Representatives of the 
Commune.”97 Similarly, the district of Pères de Nazareth called for a surveillance of Les 
Halles by regulatory commissionaires assigned to the task by district vote.98 The Comité 
was subject to denunciations by the popular press. Marat’s criticism of the Parisian 
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committees was so biting that the Assemblée des représentants directly questioned him 
about his seditious works.99 The frequency of these attacks increased with time and on 
September 30, the Spectateur Patriote (a popular newspaper) not only blamed the 
municipal government for failing to safely deliver grain and flour convoys to Paris, but 
also denounced the actions and failures of the Commune as part of a malicious 
governmental conspiracy.  
100 
“Distribution of Ports and Markets, 1789-1812:”This map shows the dominating central location of Les 
Halles and the routes which lead from the smaller markets to Les Halles. Since the area of the circle 
corresponds to the size of the markets, it is easy to see that Les Halles is nearly double the size of the 
largest of the other markets. 
 
  The strain of the food crisis came to a head with the printing of a pamphlet 
entitled “When will we have bread? You sleep Parisians, and you lack bread!” which was 
anonymously distributed at the end of September.101 It accused Lafayette, Bailly, and the 
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Commune of profiting from and perpetuating the bread crisis.102 It also suggested that the 
“bad flour” which the government did not distribute was really just a cover-up for its own 
hoarding.103 Referring to measures taken by the Commune in hopes of relieving the 
situation, the pamphlet declared, “We are beginning to see that these unfulfilled promises 
are made only with the intention of deceiving us.”104 The author argued that the people 
should pick their own National Guard General while denouncing Lafayette as a 
“betrayer” and a “vampire.”105 The pamphlet did not denounce everyone however. It 
asserted that the “good king” was being manipulated by others with devious intentions 
and that the people should not blame the bakers since they could not control the 
situation.106 Finally, the pamphlet issued its final blow. It asserted that the bread crisis 
was part of a plot to weaken the city so that the newly arrived Flanders troops could 
attack the city, and that the pretence of their arrival as extra protection for the king was 
false. Any previously held suspicions and uncertainties were multiplied by this pamphlet 
which seemed to put two and two together by linking the most prevalent crises of the 
city, that is, the bread crisis and the recent arrival of the Flanders Regiment. 
-The Crisis of the Flanders Regiment- 
Serious discussion of calling the Flanders regiment to Versailles started in mid-
September. Mathiez offers two explanations for this move. After the Vicomte de Saint-
Priest (the Minister of the Interior) had revealed to the Comte d’Estaing (Commander of 
the Versailles National Guard) that the French Guards had requested to be restored to 
their old positions as the personal guards to the king, Estaing requested 1000 extra 
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infantry in case of attack.107 The French Guard resented the new Body Guards who were 
given their most cherished duty. (The French Guards and the Swiss Guards had been the 
two elite units among the royal household troops.)108 Mathiez suggests that the Flanders 
regiment was also called to protect the king from political pressure to pass the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man along with the decrees of August 4 to 11.109 In any case, 
the Flanders Regiment arrived peacefully, even in the presence of the Versailles National 
Guard, on September 23.110  Lecointre, head of the Versailles Notre-Dame National 
Guard battalion, polled the companies to approve of the Flanders regiment on the same 
day. The results were 23 favorable to their arrival, 7 against.111 When the Flanders 
regiment arrived in Versailles, they respectfully gave the National Guard control of their 
artillery as a sign of goodwill, further winning over their trust.112 However, the reaction 
to their arrival was much different in Paris; it triggered Parisian protests and added to the 
general Parisian state of anxiety.113 The placards which informed Parisians that the 
Flanders regiment and other royal troops were 2,610 strong and were spread out within a 
60 mile radius around the city did little to reassure the city.114  
 The news traveled fast and as some Parisians began to panic, the leaders of the 
Commune tried to keep a level head. As far as Lafayette’s interpretation of the arrival, he 
could have been insulted that the king did not ask for his advice before acting,115 but he 
suggested that a report of troop movement at Versailles might calm le peuple. Ever 
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rational but prepared, Lafayette ordered that powder be moved from storage to Parisian 
military groups as a “way of displaying the power and defense of the City of Paris” in 
order to reassure Parisians until the troop movement at Versailles was confirmed.116 
Bailly didn’t believe there was cause for alarm and read correspondence from Versailles 
“in order to calm the worries of the Assembly.”117 A letter from Estaing assured the 
Commune that it was “indispensable” to call the troops to protect not only the king, but 
the National Assembly, and Versailles as well and that the troops were loyal to the 
commandant-général of the Versailles National Guard.118  Saint-Priest echoed their 
allegiance and aid to the Versailles National Guard as well119 and a memo from La Tour 
du Pin, a minister of the king, promised the Commune and the National Assembly that no 
more troops would be called to Versailles.120 Finally the Versailles municipal government 
informed the Commune that the Flanders troops took the actual National Guard oath.121 
With such reassurances, the Commune moved quickly to settle public anxiety and posted 
the following facts: the number of royal troops 15 to 20 leagues around Paris was 
composed of 1,050 Flanders troops at Versailles, 160 Chasseurs des Trois-Evêchés, 100 
troops at Chartres, and 350 troops at Rambouillet and Dreux. The grand total of troops 
including all other groups except for the Swiss was 2,610 men. On the same placard, the 
Commune pointed out that earlier in the summer, the government had employed 1,450 
troops to protect the food supply alone.122  
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 By this time, several rumors and speculation concerning the purpose of the troops 
had spread through Paris. One was that the Flanders regiment was called up to protect the 
king in an attempted flight to Metz.123 On September 22, one district had asked the 
Commune point blank if the Flanders troops, who were en route, “have taken the national 
oath ; ... if the troops were coming towards the capital in virtue of the orders of the 
National Assembly or at least with its agreement.”124 Gottschalk and Maddox refer to a 
letter dated September 16 that said “civil war is much talked of and expected.”125 It is 
hard to overestimate the importance of this single event; Mathiez argues that this troop 
movement was a “vital event” before the October Days.126 Moreover, if the arrival of the 
Flanders regiment wasn’t enough to exacerbate the agitation of le peuple, their welcome 
banquet certainly was. 
-The Infamous October 1 Banquet and the Parisian Reaction- 
 Military tradition had established that any troops arriving at Versailles were to be 
given a welcome banquet.127 Therefore, an October 1 banquet was held to officially greet 
the Flanders officers. Besides the Flanders regiment, the royal family, and members of 
the court, some Versailles National Guards, Chasseurs de Trois-Evêchés, dragons de 
Lorraine, and Body Guards attended the banquet.128 Records reveal that there were 210 
place settings at the banquet tables, which gives a rough estimate of the number of 
attendees.129 Due to the limited seating, most of the attendees were officers since all the 
regiments could not possibly attend the banquet. Members of the Flanders and Trois-
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Evêchés regiments composed an orchestra who set the tone for the evening by playing “O 
Richard, o mon roi” whose lyrics are of great significance130: 
O Richard! O my king!  
The Universe has forsaken you! 
On earth, it is only I 
Who is interested in you! 
Alone in the universe  
I would break the chains  
when all others have forsaken you!131 
  
This strongly royalist song seemed to imply that the troops supported the king alone and 
looked upon the rest of the nation as deserting the king – not exactly a song in favor of 
the progress of the Revolution. Additionally, some ladies of the court gave out black 
cockades in a gesture to Marie Antoinette’s Austrian heritage, and white cockades which 
was the color of the bourbon dynasty, while neglecting the new tricolor.132 Some 
accounts testify that the guests, especially the Body Guards, actually trampled the tricolor 
cockade instead. Moreover, when toasts were offered, several glasses were raised in 
praise of the royal family, while no one proposed to drink to the health of the nation. 
Whether one believes that the toast to the nation was intentionally left out or accidentally 
forgotten seems to correlate with whether one thinks that the trampling of the cockade 
was probable or not. The party seems to have continued after the banquet officially 
ended. Lecointre, who was not at the banquet itself, testified that the revelry spilled out 
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from the Cour de Marbre of the chateau, alarming citizens of the town.133  Even Leclercq, 
who is generally conservative in his evaluation of the October Days, argues that some 
people chanted “Long live the king” and “Down with the [National] Assembly” and that 
the attendees lingered in plain view to continue drunken singing and debauchery.134 
135 
If the rumors of the Body Guard banquets were not enough for citizens to conjure up frightening 
images, the popular illustrations of the event conveniently and dramatically fleshed them out. The sketch 
above, “Orgy of the Body Guards,” shows a popular representation of the October 1 banquet. The caption 
reads: The Body Guard’s Orgy in the Salle de l’Opera of the château at which had been given by the 
Versailles National Guard for the Officers of other different regiments even the Dragons and Soldiers 
[hired, Flanders] were welcomed there. It was at this Banquet that the excess of joy raised a voice which 
cried down with the Cockades of the vivid color, the Cockades of the color white, of the color black are the 
good ones; at the same time the sacred sign of French liberty [the tricolor cockade] was trampled.” The 
engraving page 35, on the other hand, is a scene from the October 3 banquet and is simply called “Banquet 
des gardes du corps à Versailles.” Its caption tells another story of distasteful behavior: “Saturday October 
3, 1789, at Versailles the Body Guards regaled the Flanders Regiment, Swiss Dragons, and Guards of the 
Nation etc. etc. This meal was very gay, the Officers changed coats with the Grenadiers and the Soldiers: 
when at 4:00 a P[ère] Capucin passed near the Salle de l’Opéra, where this meal was being given, two 
Body Guards took him by his shoulders and brought him in triumph into the Assembly which welcomed 
him joyously, someone made him sing while making him drink champagne after which the officers took up 
a good collection for this Father [priest], he was given 200 livres and returned to the monastery with a full 
purse and stomach.  
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136 
News of the banquet reached Paris on October 3 and immediately threw the city 
into an uproar. The majority of the population believed that tricolor was actually trampled 
at the banquet (as does Mathiez), and that the nation was intentionally insulted in 
omitting a toast to its health. On this day when news arrived at Paris, the Body Guards 
made another public relations blunder with a second meal to use up alcohol from the first. 
Moreover, reports of the Body Guards wearing white cockades agitated the populace, but 
what le peuple did not realize was that the white cockade was actually a mandatory part 
of the Body Guard uniform.137 As a result of this popular uproar, the municipality 
attempted to legally regulate the wearing of cockades. Danton led the Cordeliers district 
in ordering “prosecution for the crime of lèse-nation of anyone wearing any but the 
tricolor cockade.”138 The normally meticulously cautious Commune immediately 
believed the denunciations of what had passed at the banquet and on October 4  
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proclaimed that: 
[the Assemblée] is occupied with the outrage made against the nation and the 
Commune of Paris by several people who permitted themselves to abjure and turn 
from the cockade that [the nation] adopted as a symbol of union and of liberty... 
Declares that cockade of the colors the red, blue, and white is the only one which 
citizens must wear; forbids everyone to wear any others; entrusts M. the 
Commandant-General to give the necessary orders for the execution of this 
decree...139   
 
Ironically, Mirabeau had suggested warning the king as far back as July that great 
“feasting in a royal palace had been the prelude to the massacre of St. Bartholomew.”140 
His predictions had the potential to come true. 
 Meanwhile, black and white cockades sprang up around the city and the 
Commune, realizing that “this insurrection was exciting, at this moment, the largest 
disturbances in the capital,”141 called Lafayette and the National Guard to restore peace 
and order within the city.142 On October 4, Lafayette reviewed 5,000 of his troops and 
asked for the guards to renew their oath of loyalty which they had taken during the 
summer. The city’s inhabitants were aware of this great movement and a crowd formed 
to watch the ceremonies and orders.143 It was impossible for any Parisian to not be 
touched by these developments and mounting tensions. 
-Other Sources of Agitation in Early-Fall- 
 The reaction to the banquet was magnified in part because of the formerly 
discussed agitations of the summer and also because of other individual developments 
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which had taken place since the arrival of the Flanders regiment. The continued rumors 
of a possible king’s flight to Metz worried Lafayette that he would not be able to 
maintain order if such an event did occur.144 On September 21, he received a report from 
one of his subordinates, Jean-Philippe Morel, who said that royalist troops would kill 
Lafayette and Bailly, dissolve the National Assembly, attack both Paris and Versailles, 
and then bring the king to Metz.145 However, Morel was probably merely trying to 
advance his position in the National Guard by trying to represent popular rumors as 
inside information. Violence against bakers became more frequent in the capital as 
individuals tried to impose their own “just” regulations on the bread supply with little 
regard for the regulations of the Commune. This led the exasperated Assemblée des 
représentants to conclude on September 29 that:  
Extreme need seems to be the pretext of this violence, the public order, the surety 
of properties without which there is absolutely no confidence ... must ban forever 
these acts of authority which relocate all in the hands of the strongest.146 
 
In the same vein, the National Assembly committee had finally reported its 
decisions about revising the criminal code on September 29, but these revisions were not 
immediately put into action, leaving the city without a definitive system for controlling 
the unrest.147 By October 3, the Commune was so convinced an uprising would take place 
in the near future that it thought le peuple would soon attack the Ecole Militaire in search 
of arms.148 Likewise, the bourgeoisie was frightened by the sudden popular revolutionary 
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movement, while the “patriot deputies” encouraged the involvement of le peuple in the 
making of “the new order.”149 
 The press played a substantial role in influencing public opinion with its strong 
tirades and vocal demands. Marat wrote one of the most popular papers, l’Ami du peuple, 
in which he pungently criticized anyone he felt was inhibiting revolutionary progress, and 
his volatile columns did much to excite le peuple. For example, he criticized the outcome 
of the Bensenval case saying that “The People has stupidly missed its chance to get rid of 
enemies of the State…. who have now resumed their machinations.”150 Marat, along with 
Rutledge, was a leading accuser of Necker as an aid to hoarders who caused the bread 
crisis.151 The Commune had had enough of Marat’s tirades by late September and looked 
to shut down his paper for slandering government officials.152 Yet other editors were also 
critical of officials; Desmoulins denounced Lafayette and the regulation of the Palais-
Royal in his pamphlets such as “The Discourse of la lanterne to Parisians.”153 The simple 
publishing of rumors seemed to validate their truth. The September 12-20 issue of 
Révolutions de Paris articulated the suspicion that émigrés were about to attack France 
with foreign troops to restore the Old Regime.154  
 The heightened anxiety of le peuple, along with denunciations and rumors spread 
by the press, the Versailles banquet, and the cockade issue led to a great state of disorder 
and alarm on October 4. Even in the morning session of the Assemblée des représentants, 
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some deputies reported that they heard rumors which “were proving an increasing 
agitation, one ready to produce an explosion.” Although the Commune ordered all troops 
to assemble, it acted out of character by extending this command “to reassemble in their 
troops the largest number of citizens that zeal and patriotism would unite beside 
them.” 155 It is generally accepted that in addition to the usual agitation at the Palais-
Royale about the economic crisis and the awful intentions of counter-revolutionaries, a 
woman gave a speech that foreshadowed the events of the next day. In her speech, she 
voiced her desire to go to Versailles to get bread herself and said that she would depart 
the next day.156 Although the truth of this incident is sometimes debated, Gottschalk and 
Maddox, and Michelet, both include this event in their accounts of the October Days.157 
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Chapter 2: The Journée Part I, October 5 
-From les Halles to the Hôtel de Ville- 
 One of the major historical disputes about the October Days concerns the initial 
significant motivations of the marchers who gathered on October 5 at the Hôtel de Ville. 
The most widely accepted argument is that the women initially gathered in response to 
the dire conditions related to the bread shortage. Batiffol names this as the leading cause 
of the October Days158 while others such as Michelet believe the fear that the newly 
arrived foreign troops might start a war greatly motivated the marchers along with their 
hunger.159 Mathiez also stresses the patriotic sense of duty in protecting the nation from 
disgrace as he explains, “the women of Paris [went] to Versailles to ask for some bread, 
the discharge of the [foreign] troops, the punishment of all those who outraged the 
tricolor cockade.”160 Garrioch attributes the sudden reaction of the women to what had 
been a lingering problem as being triggered by the October banquet as well.161  There are 
also historians who view the journée as a popular event that was partially manipulated by 
agents (generally of the Orléanist inclination). For example, de Villiers believes that 
although the vast majority of participants were women seeking bread, they were 
manipulated by disguised agents who, using Orléanist money for bribes, agitated the 
crowd in order to pressure the king into approving the constitution.162 Other historians 
point to testimonies of men disguised as women to argue that an Orléanist conspiracy 
directed the entire movement. 
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 In order to comprehend the great participation of women in the October Days, it is 
necessary to fully understand the gendered mentality that guided their actions. Unlike 
men whose occupation formed the basis of their identity, society defined women by their 
familial responsibilities rather than by job.163 Therefore, men mainly controlled the 
politics of la nation, while women directed the private sphere.164 Seen as leaders in the 
domestic realm, women had two main issues on which society respected their authority – 
bread and religion.165  Therefore, men did not begin an uprising in response to the 
deplorable food conditions because this was part of “women’s domain,” making it the 
“primary responsibility” of women to air their grievances.166  Therefore “all the weight 
[of the food shortage] falls on her” since a woman was responsible for the survival of her 
family.167 Moreover, since women were closely tied to their local community for identity, 
it was not unusual for them to stand up to outside forces, including government 
authorities, to protect the interests of their neighborhood in which they had a stake.168 For 
those women who did work outside the home and in the markets, “the whole question of 
prices, supply, and quality of food” was even more relevant.169 Louis-Sébastien Mercier 
observed that “the fishwives make the law” in Les Halles where females managed many 
of the stalls.170 These women, les dames des Halles, even had an official “corporate 
status” which had been bestowed upon them by Louis XV who allowed them to visit 
Versailles on special occasions and associate themselves with the royal family during 
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public events.171 The part the women of Paris played in the October Days was 
psychologically consistent with their traditional gendered sphere, and les dames des 
Halles were well prepared to play a leading role in propelling the movement. 
 The initial movement of October 5 started in Les Halles around 7:00 a.m.172 Many 
historians pinpoint Saint-Eustache as the first center of commotion. Batiffol suggests that 
women started yelling about bread problems while everyone was in line for food and that 
someone suggested going to the Hôtel de Ville to collectively voice their complaints. De 
Villiers however attributes the initial commotion to the pillaging of a bakery whose 
owner was accused of cheating customers, which resulted in a march of women to the 
Hôtel de Ville to have him judged.173 De Villiers attributes this movement to the work of 
agents of the duc d’Orléans who took advantage of the commotion to suggest this pretext 
for directing the crowd to the Hôtel de Ville. 174  Moreover, since people from different 
districts soon joined the crowd from Les Halles, de Villiers concludes that this was the 
work of Palais-Royal agents who distributed bribes in nearby neighborhoods.175 
However, Garrioch offers a more plausible explanation for the great number of women in 
the crowd from different districts. The central markets of Les Halles involved a great 
daily exchange of people, as it was the main source of supplies in the city. Thus, there 
were heavily traveled roads near Les Halles that led to the North and East.  With this 
continual “coming and going,” Garrioch concludes: 
It is hardly surprising that the news of the events in the heart of the city should 
have spread quickly to the northern and eastern faubourgs. Against this 
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background, the geography of recruitment for the march to Versailles becomes 
easily explicable.176 
 
Thus, the number of women in the crowd swelled on the way to the Hôtel de Ville as the 
marchers encouraged, in some cases even threatened, other women to join them amidst 
the gathering cry of a drum.177 The ad hoc formation of the crowd lent itself to a diverse 
socio-economic composition as well and by the time it reached the Hôtel de Ville, the 
crowd included women of all market occupations and even some bourgeois wives.178  
179 
Les Halles can be seen above the center of the map, southeast of the Palais-Royal. In the top left hand 
corner of the map the Champs Elysées, Place Louis XV, and the Tuileries gardens progress from west to 
east. The Hôtel de Ville and the Place de Grève lie just north of Cité (the islands in the middle of the 
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Seine). The faubourgs of Paris are also shown, most notably the Faubourg St. Antoine lies to the extreme 
east near the Bastille.  
 
 The women arrived at the Place de Grève (the square in front of the Hôtel de 
Ville) at 8:00 a.m.180 Estimates of the number of people in the crowd at this point range 
from 800 to 2,000 people.181 The women demanded to address Bailly and Lafayette to 
order that some immediate action be taken to alleviate the bread crisis, but the Assemblée 
had yet to convene.182 Bailly and Lafayette had not even arrived at the Hôtel de Ville to 
conduct the day’s business and thus the women waited for three hours in hopes that they 
would arrive. Irritated that no one was addressing their concerns, some of the women 
threw rocks at the National Guard posted outside of the doors,183 while others became 
increasingly impatient and cried that Bailly and Lafayette should get la lanterne.184 
Michelet reports that some of the women cried "some bread and some arms!"185 Some of 
the women had brought “arms” including “broom handles, spears, pitchforks, swords, 
pistols and rifles, although none of them was able to procure ammunition.”186 The ability 
of the women to use these arms aside, this choice illustrates that they were ready to act if 
the municipal government did not. 
 The women hoped that by entering the Hôtel de Ville before 10:00 a.m.,187 they 
would be able to take control and force the hand of the municipal government, provided 
any of the representatives showed up. The women wanted a nonviolent demonstration 
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and, clearly aware of gender roles concerning both the issue at hand and violence, 
actively prevented men gathering outside from entering the Hôtel de Ville which would 
disrupt this peace and division.188 The peace was disturbed however, when someone rang 
the tocsin of the Hôtel de Ville, the traditional signal of emergency and distress, at 11:00 
a.m. About the same time, some men attacked the door on the Saint-Jean side of the 
Hôtel de Ville and successfully entered the building. As to whether or not the men were 
acting as a result of some sort of conspiracy, Mathiez adds “One looks in vain to discover 
the hand of the Duke of Orléans and his friends in the beginning of this uprising.”189 
Hufton blames the "uglier" and chaotic scene which followed on the entrance of the 
men.190 In what the Commune recorded as an “extraordinary agitation,” the people spread 
out inside the building. 191 Some women tried to free prisoners during the disorder, some 
people broke into the arms room to take arms, and “some bad-intentioned people” tried to 
steal money from “the savings and the treasury of the city.”192 Multiple accounts speak of 
men wielding torches who tried to set rooms and documents ablaze.193 It is important to 
note that the Commune, in its records that they wrote later in the afternoon, makes the 
distinction between good citizens and trouble-making figures: “The honest citizens heard 
with lively indignation the names which were the most respectable and dear to all the 
citizens uttered with the most atrocious insults and menaces.”194 This distinction between 
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the noble actions of good citizens during the October Days and the unfavorable actions of 
bandits or other people continued to be an important characteristic in most ensuing 
accounts of the October Days. 
-The Departure of the Women and Maillard for Versailles- 
 When Maillard arrived at the Hôtel de Ville he quickly worked with other 
National Guards called by the tocsin to settle the disorder. The women told Maillard that 
they wanted to force the Assemblée des représentants to address their demands before 
any other matters.195 Frustrated that the Assemblée had yet to convene, they informed 
Maillard that they wanted to see the king himself and asked Maillard if he would lead 
them. This seems to be a practical request since Maillard was popular due to his role in 
the attack on the Bastille and was considered to be the leader of the volontaires de la 
Bastille.196 Overall, he was a man of the people – a patriotic and logical choice to lead the 
women to Versailles to see the king. Historians still dispute why Maillard actually agreed 
to do so. Batiffol argues that the chevalier d’Hermigny, the head of the National Guard at 
the Hôtel de Ville in the absence of Lafayette, suggested that he take the people to 
Versailles as a way of relieving the demonstration of the Hôtel de Ville and restoring 
order.197 Maillard testified in the ensuing Châtelet investigation that “it was the only way 
to free the Hôtel de Ville and the capital” and that the National Guard would then have 
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time to gather and react to the march.198 In any case, the crowd of women departed for 
Versailles before Lafayette arrived, with Maillard as their leader. 
 By now, the women had somehow procured two canons and the size of the crowd 
along with the arms they already carried made for an intimidating sight.199 It did not take 
long for the women to encounter a second challenge, a Swiss guard and hussard who 
were patrolling the Tuileries gardens. The guards would not let Maillard pass through the 
gardens with the crowd of women. A brief scuttle ensued, and the issue was quickly 
resolved when the women intimidated and disarmed them by smacking them with their 
brooms.200  The rest of the journey to Versailles was quiet, although challenging. As the 
women marched, it began to rain, slowing their progress and adding to their misery. At 
Sèvres, the halfway point between Paris and Versailles, the women tried to procure some 
food, but there was only 32 pounds of bread available for several hundred women.201 
Maillard managed to buy an additional 12 pitchers of wine for the women to drink as 
well.202 Once the crowd left Sevres, they followed the Saint-Cloud road the rest of the 
way to Versailles.203 When the town was in sight, Maillard instructed the crowd to sing 
“Henry IV” to show that their aims were not malicious.204 Upon its arrival at Versailles, 
the crowd had swelled to 6,000 people, the majority of which were women.205 
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206 
This is an anonymous drawing of the march on Versailles. Notice that the artist has excluded all men from 
the picture, and that the woman to the far left appears to be a bourgeois. The women carry a variety of arms 
and drag a canon from Paris. Two of the women dragging the canon and the woman at the head of the 
crowd all wear the national cockade on their vestments.   
 
-The Response of the Lafayette, the National Guard, and the Commune- 
Meanwhile, several thousand National Guards had gathered at the Hôtel de Ville 
upon the sounding of the tocsin. Rudé estimates that there were 20,000 troops assembled 
at the Place de Grève by the time the building was secured.207 Lafayette had finally 
managed to make his way through the confusion of the streets to reach the Hôtel de Ville, 
but not in time to see Maillard leave with the crowd of women. As the Commune debated 
what should been done, six grenadier companies led by Mercier approached Lafayette to 
inform him that the Comité des subsistances was not helping the situation, and that they 
intended to go to Versailles to support the women and take the king away from the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Comme nos pères  Like our fathers 
Chantons en vrais amis  Let us sing in true friendship 
Au choc des verres  To the collision of glasses 
Les roses et les lys.  The roses and the lilies. 
The French verse from “Vive Henri IV,” Chants militaires des soldats de France, 
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counter-revolutionary forces which were present at the October 1 banquet.208 Some of the 
troops added that if the king fled, the dauphin could take the throne.209 Lafayette went 
outside and attempted to address his troops and reason with them, but insistent cries of 
“À Versailles! À Versailles!” drowned out his words.210 Lafayette returned to the 
Assemblée des représentants informing them that “it was not possible to resist” the 
demands of his troops. Consequently the Commune: 
Authorized M. the Commandant-General, and even ordered him to go to 
Versailles; recommends to him at the same time to take the necessary precautions 
for the security of the city; and, to take any other subsequent measures according 
to his discretion.211 
 
In addition, the Commune sent deputies Delagrey, Lefèvre, Desmousseau, and Maillot 
with Lafayette to bring news back from Versailles to Paris. Lafayette and the Parisian 
National Guard did not actually depart for Versailles until around 5:00 in the evening.212 
Luttrell maintains that Lafayette delayed the departure because he thought that the initial 
march might have been part of an Orléanist conspiracy to draw the National Guard out of 
Paris so that it would leave the city vulnerable to attack.213 As Loustalot watched the 
20,000 troops file through the city gates he was inspired to write “March on good 
citizens, you carry with you the destiny of France.… Save our deputies, uphold the 
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national majesty.”214 Everyone was aware of the potentially grave implications of the 
demonstration in Versailles. 
Upon finally convening around mid-day, the Commune had several other issues to 
deal with besides the demands of the National Guard. It sent M. Fissour to warn the king 
and the National Assembly of the movement. The message, in part, informed them: 
[the Assembly] declared in nearly all the neighborhoods of Paris, gathered, since 
nine o’clock in the morning on the place of the Hôtel de Ville, and, that in the 
middle of disorder some particular individuals indulged themselves in pillage, 
which was happily stopped. MM. the Representatives do not know of any other 
pretext for this movement than the sustained fermentation excited by the cockades 
of different colors than those of the Hôtel de Ville; fermentation that the fear of 
lacking bread made more dangerous. The people exiting the Hôtel de Ville began 
to arm themselves in part, [and] appeared to direct their steps towards 
Versailles.215 
 
The immediate bread crisis in Paris had not ended, and the Commune received reports 
that bread convoys from Nantes and other areas of the provinces had slowed down, so 
they ordered Lafayette to appropriate National Guards to escort the convoys the 
remainder of the way to Paris.216 In addition, deputies from the Oratoire district urged the 
Commune to order bakers to quickly make as much bread as they possibly could to 
maintain order in the city.217 
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-The Reaction at Versailles and the Actions of the Women before the Arrival of the 
Parisian National Guard- 
 When news of the march reached Versailles, Marie Antoinette ordered Saint-
Priest (the Secretary of State and one of the king’s closest advisors) to send cavaliers to 
find the king, who was out hunting.218 Messengers did not find the king until 3:00 at 
which point the hunting party quickly returned to Versailles.219 Batiffol contends that 
some of the nobles who were returning to the château passed the crowd en route, which 
threw rocks at them.220 Upon sight of the marchers, the Marquis de Favras tried to 
organize several military officers to turn away the crowd from the château and convinced 
Saint-Priest to send his carriage to escort the royal family out of Versailles. (Neither of 
these measures was carried out successfully).221 Saint-Priest ordered Estaing to lead the 
defense of the château and he took precautions to ensure the availability of troops if the 
crowd was hostile.222 
 Also at 3:00, Target announced to the National Assembly the impending arrival of 
the crowd via the Avenue de Paris.223 When Mirabeau passed this information on to 
Mounier, the president of the National Assembly, Mounier assumed that Mirabeau was 
part of the conspiracy that arranged it since he knew they were coming. Moreover, 
Mounier also thought that the women and National Guard were coming to Versailles to 
pressure the king into passing the August Decrees and the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man.224 
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 Maillard and the women arrived at Versailles at 3:30.225 Upon their arrival, the 
crowd broke into two groups. Some women stopped at the Hôtel des Menus Plaisirs 
where the National Assembly held its meetings, while others went to the Place d’Armes, 
the central square in front of the gates to the château itself.226 Outside of the Hôtel des 
Menus Plaisirs, the women turned over their three canons to dragoons outside of the 
National Assembly after the dragoons took an oath of loyalty to the nation, which the 
women demanded.227 Some of the women entered the National Assembly and Maillard 
gave a brief speech to the representatives present.228 Michelet maintains that a man in the 
crowd informed some deputies that the crowd came for bread and to punish the Body 
Guard for their degradation of the tricolor cockade. Some women hurled insults against 
the clergy, who had opposed some of the August decrees.229 A noble of the court in a 
letter written on October 6 told his wife that some women had used threats in the 
National Assembly and talked of killing the queen.230 Mirabeau was a popular deputy, 
and the women insisted on seeing him.231 But for those who believed that Mirabeau was 
part of a conspiracy who organized the crowd from the beginning, the women’s devotion 
to Mirabeau only served to further incriminate him. Leclercq, a believer in an 
Orléans/Mirabeau conspiracy, actually believes one accusation that “the vicomte de 
Mirabeau caress[ed] the bosoms of the prettiest women.”232 
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 As for the contingent of the crowd that continued to the Place d’Armes, Swiss 
troops and the Chasseurs des Trois-Evêchés met them at the gate. The women asked the 
men to take an oath of loyalty to the nation like the dragoons at the National Assembly 
and asked to see the king. The troops promised them eventual entry of a small group of 
women so the crowd sent news back to the National Assembly to form a deputation of 
women to go and address the king.234 Louis sent orders that no one was to be hurt in the 
crowd.235 As the women waited, some verbally abused the guards and there is even one 
report that a woman threatened a guard with a knife. Around 4:00, one man in the crowd 
scared a horse as he attempted to run behind the troops and through the gate, so the Body 
Guards chased the man. The crowd assumed the troops would kill him, so someone shot 
and injured a Body Guard named M. de Savonieres. Luckily, Mounier and the deputation 
of women arrived shortly after to see the king, which restored order as the crowd 
nervously waited for word back from the king.236 
 Although Saint-Priest had tried to reassure the deputation that the king was doing 
everything possible to supply Paris with bread and that they must be patient, the women 
still demanded to see the king.237 The guards finally admitted the deputation of women to 
see the king at 7:00.238 Louison Chabry, one of the speakers, fell on her knees to ask the 
king for some bread, at which point he raised her to her feet to embrace her. Louis 
continued to articulate his love for his Parisian subjects and reassured them that he was 
                                                                                                                                                                     
outer-most front gates of the château. (The château is the building which contains the Cour Royale). The 
Hôtel de Noailles, where Lafayette set up headquarters, is on the Rue de la Pompe which is the next main 
street to the right of the Place d’Armes. The Hôtel des Gardes du Corps (Body Guards) is #23 and is 
located near the bottom of the Avenue de Sceaux. The Caserne des Gardes Françoises lies at the top left of 
the Place d’Armes and played an important role in the action in the Place d’Armes. 
234 Villiers, Reine Audu, 109-110. 
235 Batiffol, Les journées.   
236 Batiffol, Les journées,  25-26. 
237 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 84. 
238 Hufton, Women and Citizenship, 10. 
 55
trying to resolve the bread crisis for them.239  The king gave each of the women 7 louis to 
show his generosity and he explained it was the only immediate gift which he could offer 
them.240 The small deputation of women ran back to the crowd outside the gate in the 
Place d’Armes shouting “Long live the king! Long live the good king and his house! 
Tomorrow we will have bread.”241 It took the group a few minutes to reassure the crowd 
that they had not been bribed and that their report was true. Although the king gave the 
women some money, this was not a bribe, but was more a sign of his goodwill and of his 
promise to provision Paris. However, after hearing the order for the king’s servants to 
gather grain for Paris, Maillard departed for Paris with about 60 percent of the women to 
bring the capital their triumphant news.242 
 Thus, before the Parisian National Guard even arrived, Louis and his staff knew 
the severity of the bread problem in Paris and started the process to find solutions.243 
Lecointre (an officer of the Versailles National Guard) worried, however, that the women 
would become agitated again if they did not eat and worked with the Versailles municipal 
government to procure 2 tons of rice. Although the marchers had no way of cooking it, 
the officials hoped that this would satisfy their demands for food until the bakers had 
made enough to give them the next morning.244 
 During the evening, Saint-Priest and some of the king’s other advisors encouraged 
him to flee to Rambouillet for his safety. Mounier agreed that the royal family should 
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leave Versailles245 but also told the king that if he approved the constitutional decrees and 
Declaration, the people would be less inclined to see his actions as part of a counter-
revolutionary movement.246 At 10:00 p.m., the king sent Mounier to the National 
Assembly to finally announce his full acceptance of the National Assembly’s 
constitutional decrees.247 Louis could not reconcile himself to the idea of such a cowardly 
act as running away, and he merely repeated in a stupor “A fugitive king! A fugitive 
king!”248 
In the meantime, the National Assembly was trying to continue with their 
scheduled agenda while dealing with interruptions caused by the new movement. When 
Mounier announced the king’s acceptance of the constitution, many of the women replied 
that they did not come for politics but for bread.249 The presence of the women greatly 
slowed the work of the Assembly.250 The deputies did not even begin to discuss the 
criminal procedure revisions, which Paris was in dire need of, until 1:30 a.m. on October 
6.251 
Many of the women tried to spend the night in the chambers of the National 
Assembly, much to the dismay of many deputies who clearly feared their presence.252 
One of Lafayette’s aides witnessed the women curling up on the benches for beds253 and 
described their plight: “The miserable creatures were... sleeping pell-mell in horrible 
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disorder.”254 Others tried to find shelter throughout the town, while some resigned 
themselves to the wet fields. 
 255 
“The Parisian Women seating in the National Assembly among the Deputies:” Note the four women 
between the two desks. All four are standing while most of the deputies are seated. This stance reinforces 
the action in which the women are clearly and unabashedly articulating their opinions to the deputies. 
 
Saint-Priest had not given up with his escape plan and he summoned the royal 
carriages. They tried to enter through a gate but some Versailles National Guard and 
Swiss Guards stopped them.256 They had received orders to let no one pass through the 
gate except for the carriage of one minor National Assembly deputy who regularly 
traveled to and from the National Assembly. Parts of the crowd who were near the gate 
realized that the king might try to leave and they protested the passage of the royal 
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carriages. Fortunately, some of the Versailles National Guardsmen turned around the 
carriages and escorted them back to the stables, which calmed the crowd. 257 
-The Arrival of Lafayette and the Parisian National Guard at Versailles- 
Meanwhile, Lafayette and the Parisian National Guard made their way slowly 
from the capital to Versailles, partly because of Lafayette’s caution and partially because 
of the weather. Lafayette, still not convinced that a conspiracy was not the cause of the 
uprising, feared an attack from the Flanders Regiment and even the Versailles National 
Guard.258 At the Avenue de Saint-Cloud outside of Versailles, Lafayette made his 
National Guard troops once again renew their oath to protect the king and his property.259  
The National Guard arrived at the Avenue de Paris in Versailles a little before 
midnight.260 Lafayette and his troops had taken between 6 and 7 hours to complete a trip 
that usually took 3 to 4 hours by foot.261 
 Once the head of the troops reached the Place d’Armes, the Parisian National 
Guard column still stretched all the way back to the Hôtel des Menus-Plaisirs.262 The 
guards at the grille informed Lafayette that he could only enter the château alone to see 
the king. Fearing a trap, his grenadiers were very concerned and it took several minutes 
for Lafayette to convince his men that he would not be in danger without them.263 As 
Lafayette stepped into the Oeil de Boeuf where the king held court, “everyone was 
watching the general with a sentiment of curiosity, mixed with fear and with anger.” 264 
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One of the aristocrats muttered “Voila Cromwell,” to which Lafayette answered, 
“Monsieur, Cromwell would not have entered alone.”265 Guy le Gentil, the marquis de 
Paroy, also revealed the court’s general mistrust of Lafayette in his October 6 letter: “At 
eleven-thirty, the great General La Fayette appeared, covered with mud from head to 
foot; his soul was covered still more so in the eyes of the spectators.”266 Lafayette 
informed the king that about 20,000 armed troops had wanted to come to Versailles, and 
despite Lafayette’s own loyalty to the king, he could not dissuade them from marching. 
Thus, the march was in no way his choice.267 Then Lafayette provided the king with a list 
of requests. He asked the king to publicly announce his support of the national cockade 
and to distance the Flanders regiment from Versailles, and suggested that the king move 
to Paris.268 The last request was not only that of Lafayette. One of the messengers from 
the Commune carried a note to the king, which read: 
The king would give a great proof of his love for the French nation if he wanted 
to live in the most beautiful palace in Europe in the middle of the largest city of 
his empire and among the most numerous part of his subjects.269 
 
By this time, the king had received requests from three distinct groups of Parisians, the 
women of the crowd deputation, Lafayette, and official messengers from the municipal 
government itself. The king did not give a clear answer to the last point. There was no 
immediate threat to the château since most of the crowd had settled down for the night, so 
the king retired for the evening, leaving Estaing and Lafayette to discuss plans for the 
security of Versailles for the night. 
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 Estaing allowed Lafayette’s Parisian National Guards to take responsibility for the 
outer-posts of the château’s courts while the Body Guard and other Versailles troops 
retained the inner-posts.270 After the officers gave these orders, Estaing retired to his 
home while Lafayette left for his command site at the Hôtel de Noailles on the rue de la 
Pompe.271 This seems to be Lafayette’s biggest blunder during the October Days. The 
Hôtel de Noailles was some distance from the château itself, and thus some historians 
believe that he should have stayed closer to the king that night since his position did not 
enable him to respond quickly to any change in situation.272 However, it was natural for 
Lafayette to stay at the Hôtel de Noailles which was owned by his father-in-law.273 
Despite historical and contemporary criticism of Lafayette’s distance from the château on 
the night of October 5/6, it is crucial to note that the Hôtel de Noailles was not far from 
the château at all compared to the location of the Body Guard barracks. 
-The October 5/6 Session of the Commune of Paris- 
  Back in Paris, the Commune still had no news at 1:00 a.m. on October 6 of what 
had taken place at Versailles. Thus, the Assemblée des représentants sent another 
deputation to find Lafayette or a messenger and to ask for the latest developments.274 The 
districts were also concerned about what had happened and the Cordeliers district argued 
that Paris should send bread to feed the National Guard in Versailles, but the Commune 
did not dare to spark an uprising by removing food from the city.275 At 3:00 a.m., 
Deschamps finally returned with the news that the king had received Lafayette and the 
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National Guard well. An hour later, some dames des Halles returned from Versailles to 
report that the king had embraced Louison Chabry and had promised the women bread. 
Maillard provided the Commune with a more official “Extrait du procès-verbal de 
l’Assemblée national le 19 août et le 18 septembre.”276 He also brought back the National 
Assembly’s October 5 orders that it: 
Authorize all individuals and notably those who are charged by commissions 
from their municipalities to buy grain and flour to claim the executive power and 
the military power, to provide liberty and safety in the markets, and to facilitate 
the transport of bought wheat and flour…277 
 
In addition, Maillard gave the Commune the king’s orders for the immediate provisioning 
of Paris and Louis’ letter to the NA which states: 
I am deeply touched by the insufficient provisioning of Paris; I will continue to 
second the zeal and the effort of the Municipality by all means and all resources 
within my power; and I have given the most positive orders for the free 
circulation of grain, on all the routes, and the transport of those [convoys] which 
are destined for my good City of Paris.278 
 
After 4:00 a.m., Desmousseaux returned to the Commune to report somewhat incorrectly 
that the king would send the Flanders Regiment away and that the National Guard had 
both interior and exterior posts at Versailles; but he correctly reported that the king had 
accepted the constitutional decrees.279 He was followed by Lefevre and La Grey who 
announced that the National Guard had arrived at the château at 11:30 p.m. and that 
                                                        
276 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 174.  
277 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 176 (“Autorise toutes personnes et notamment celles qui sont 
chargées de commissions de leurs municipalités pour acheter des graines et farines, à réclamer le pouvoir 
exécutive et la force militaire, pour procurer liberté et sûreté dans les marchés, et pour faciliter le transport 
des blés et farines achetés…”). 
278 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 177 (“Je suis sensiblement touché de l’insuffisance de 
l’approvisionnement de Paris ; je continuerai à seconder le zèle et les efforts de la Municipalité par tous les 
moyens et toutes les ressources qui sont en mon pouvoir ; et j’ai donné les ordres les plus positifs pour la 
circulation libre des grains, sur toutes les routes, et le transport de ceux qui sont destinés pour ma bonne 
Ville de Paris.”). 
279 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 178. 
 62
Lafayette had informed the king that his troops were under oath and he had no choice in 
coming. They also reported that Lafayette had requested four things from the king: 
1. That the National Guard be the only guard for the king. 
2. That the king help the Commune in procuring food for Paris. 
3. That the people wanted the constitution, and judges for the trials of prisoners 
waiting in prison. 
4. That the king demonstrate his love for Paris by moving to the capital. 
 
To these demands the king had replied: 
1. That Lafayette should confer with Estaing about the guarding of Versailles. 
2. That he had already given orders to relieve the Commune before the arrival of the 
Parisian National Guard. 
3. That he already sanctioned the August constitutional decrees and the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man that evening. 
4. That although he loved his Parisian subjects, he had not yet made a decision about  
leaving Versailles.280 
 
Finally satisfied with the information that it received, the Assemblée des représentants 
adjourned and the exhausted deputies agreed to meet again later in the morning.281 
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Chapter 3: The Journée Part II, October 6 
-The Morning Chaos- 
 The events which took place in Versailles on the morning of October 6 are still a 
source of historical controversy. However, one thing is certain – a great portion of the 
crowd managed to enter into the interior and exterior courts of the château and even parts 
of the building itself during an interval of less than two hours filled with much confusion 
and some violence. The infiltration of the courts began sometime before 8:00 a.m. on 
October 6. Gottschalk and Maddox conclude that the crowd initially wandered into the 
Cour des Ministres because the Body Guard habitually opened the gate at 5:30 a.m. and 
they did so on October 6.282 De Villiers also says that the old French Guards also opened 
the gate in the Cour des Princes, as was tradition when they used to guard the king 
directly.283 According to Leclercq, the women were rallied by a drum and split up upon 
entering the Cour des Ministres under the influence of conspirators, and some were 
diverted away from the Cour des Princes to the open Grille de Chapelle.284 In their 
narrative, Gottschalk and Maddox contend that the crowd and “at least one National 
Guard” moved into the inner courts through the open and unguarded gate of the Cour des 
Princes.285 At the first sign of infiltration of the courts, the king sent orders to his troops 
that no one fire upon the people, and the subsequent actions of the Body Guard showed 
that they were willing to obey.286 
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 This is a floor plan for the second floor of the château with the names of the rooms and courtyards. Of 
special concern are the queen’s apartments which lie to the right of the Terasse et Parterre du Midi. The 
stairs which lead to these apartments are visible to the right of the Salle des Gardes. At the top of the Cour 
de Marbre is the Chambre de Louis XIV where the king stood on the balcony to address the people. 
Directly to the left of the room is the Oeil de Boeuf.287 
 
According to the “brigand” or “bandit” theory of entry, a group of ambiguous 
wrongdoers eventually made their way into the Cour des Ministres and were prepared to 
fight royal troops with the intention of general pillaging.288 Leclercq argues that the 
bandits encountered and mixed in with some women and Fournier l’Américain in the 
Cour des Ministres. Then, by way of the Cour Royal this group moved into the Cour de 
Marbre where the real fighting began.289 Michelet, like Hufton, blames the men for 
starting the violence.290  
 The defining moment which seemed to lead to the outbreak of general violence 
was the death of a 17-year-old boy. Jérôme L’héritier was in the Cour de Marbre when he 
died. Historians usually offer one of two causes to explain his death: the first is that he 
slipped and cracked open his skull on the marble floor and the other is that he was shot by 
a royal guard through a window of the château. The crowd at least assumed that the latter 
was true, which aroused their anger.291 Mathiez supports this interpretation of L’héritier’s 
death as well.292 Batiffol also agrees that the boy was shot and even argues that this led 
directly to the storming of the queen’s apartments.293 After searching through official 
records, Rudé discovered that the burial of two Body Guards and L’héritier are described 
very differently in the “Registre des actes de sepulture de la Paroisse Royal de Notre 
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Dame de Versailles” (fol. 82). L’héritier received an honorable, almost military-like 
burial, while no honors were extended upon the deceased Body Guards who were buried 
at the same time.294 Therefore, Rudé concludes that some Body Guard must have shot the 
boy and that the crowd was aware of this event. It is important to note that Charles 
Doussan, a Parisian who died during the attack on the Bastille, was also buried in a 
ceremonious manner and “one took great care to insert an honorable mention on his death 
certificate” as well.295 The populace clearly accepted both men as innocent individuals 
who died a patriotic death. Regardless, the record of L’héritier’s burial disproves de 
Villier’s argument that witnesses invented the story about the death of a 17-year-old boy 
as an excuse to justify the violent actions of the crowd.296 L’héritier did exist, did die on 
the morning of October 6, and the crowd did think that he deserved special recognition, 
suggesting that the shooting of L’héritier is a plausible argument. In any case, the 
gunshots that rang out did anything but calm the crowd as tensions flared and chaos 
broke out.297 Rudé asserts that the crowd cried “Look for the baker, the baker’s wife and 
the baker’s little boy” (referring to the royal family) as it spread through the 
courtyards.298 
 De Villiers gives a very detailed account of the invasion of the château itself and 
the resulting attack on the queen’s apartments, although he attributes the direction of the 
movement to “rioters” who were “incontestably [occupied with]… searching to 
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assassinate the Queen.”299 The crowd first encountered the Body Guards at the foot of the 
Marble Staircase, and forced the Body Guards to retreat to the vestibule, while some of 
the Swiss guards fled since they had orders not to harm the people but wanted to save 
themselves.300 At the top of the staircase, 20 guards remained to block the path and the 
people demanded that the guards give them bread and drop their weapons.301 The Body 
Guards refused and ordered Auguié, Marie Antoinette’s chambermaid, to save the queen 
from the approaching crowd.302 After some members of the crowd killed two Body 
Guards on the way to the queen’s chamber, they severed the heads from the corpses and 
immediately marched them back on pikes to Paris.303 This suggests that at least some of 
the marchers only really wanted revenge on the Body Guards for their disreputable 
behavior at the October 1 banquet. Eventually, the Body Guards locked themselves in the 
nearby salles for the king and queen’s guards.304 Next, the quick-thinking guards 
retreated from the Salle des Gardes de la Reine into an antechamber whose door they 
cleverly disguised with a folding screen. The crowd, seeing only the door at the opposite 
end of the room broke down that door which led to the Salle du Sacre, in the complete 
opposite direction of the queen’s bedroom.305 
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306 
The heads of the two decapitated Body Guards are triumphantly carried on pikes. 
 
 
 After the king heard that violence had broken out, he hurried down the passage du 
roi on the first floor, which led to an interior staircase behind Marie Antoinette’s 
bedroom. However, while Louis was running to save his queen, Marie Antoinette had 
passed him overhead by a secret second level passage, which led to the king’s 
apartments.307 He realized what had happened and followed her path back to the Oeil de 
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Boeuf.308 By 8:00 a.m. on October 6, all of the royal family had reunited in the king’s 
apartments.309 The Body Guards immediately barricaded the doors of the Oeil de Boeuf, 
but none of the crowd ever succeeded in reaching it.310 
 Once Lafayette arrived at the château, he ordered his troops to prevent people 
from pillaging.311 He was disappointed to see that his troops did not eagerly help some 
Body Guards who were being cornered by some members of the crowd, so he urged them 
to save them from their deaths.312 The Parisian National Guard did succeed in saving the 
Body Guards de la Mother and d’Aubiac in the Place d’Armes313 and the crowd did not 
succeed in killing any more Body Guards after Lafayette’s command.314 This command, 
along with the actions of Jean-Etienne Gondron who pushed his troops into the Cour de 
Marbe to defend the Body Guards and the château from the crowd, gradually restored 
order.315 The number of people who died in fighting varies by account. In 1827, 
Montegaillard estimated that ten to twelve Body Guards died, whereas Michelet 
concluded that seven Body Guards died along with five National Guards/crowd 
members.316 The fact that less than twenty people died in an incident in which thousands 
of people were involved is revealing. This suggests that the primary intention of the 
crowd was not violence and destruction since it could have killed many more people. The 
final death toll is also a testimony to the noble restraint and discipline of the king’s 
troops. 
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-The Consequences of Restoring Order- 
 After calming the crowd at 8:00 a.m., some of the National Guards proceeded to 
the Oeil de Boeuf where they asked the Body Guards to open the doors so that they too 
could defend the king and give the Body Guards their tricolor cockades.317 Lafayette 
entered at this time to address the king for the first time on that morning.318 It is certain 
that complete order had been restored by 9:00 a.m. since Lecointre asked Lafayette what 
his troops should do at the Place d’Armes, to which Lafayette replied that everything 
seemed secure so no immediate action was necessary.319 
 Lafayette first appeared to the crowd on the king’s balcony and eloquently 
informed them, “Messieurs, I gave my word of honor to the king that there would not be 
any harm done to all that belongs to His Majesty. These Messieurs are his Body Guards, 
if anything would happen to them you would make me break my word of honor that I 
gave, I would no longer be worthy to be your leader.”320 Thus, he made the people and 
his troops alike renew their oath of loyalty to the king when he presented him on the 
balcony.321 The crowd cheered as Necker and the Keeper of the Seals stood alongside 
Lafayette and the king on the balcony. After this first appearance on the balcony, the king 
asked Lafayette to show the crowd his approval of the Body Guards. Consequently, 
Lafayette brought a Body Guard out on the balcony with him, took off his own tricolor, 
and presented it to the Body Guard. Lafayette then cemented this final union with an 
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embrace.322 The crowd showed their approval as other Body Guards threw off their 
sashes and National Guards offered them their tricolors, and shouts of “Long live the 
Body Guards!” filled the court.323   
The entire royal family was soon on the balcony, but the crowd reacted by 
demanding that the queen appear alone. She withdrew into the apartment and, in one of 
the most dramatic moments of the day, Lafayette asked the queen, “Madame what is the 
personal intention of the queen?” To which she replied, “I know the fate which awaits 
me, she respond[ed], but my duty is to die at the feet of the king and in the arms of my 
children.” “Well then, Madame, come with me,” urged Lafayette. “What! alone on the 
balcony? Haven’t you heard and seen the threats that have been made against me?” 
exclaimed the queen. Yet, the ever-collected Lafayette calmly repeated, “Yes, Madame, 
go ahead.”324 Once on the balcony, Lafayette took the queen’s hand and kissed it with the 
reverence of a gentleman.325 Whether it was due to this action, or to the queen’s stately 
calmness and acceptance of the crowd’s demand,326 le peuple began to chant “Long live 
the queen!”327 At some point during the king’s numerous appearances on the balcony, the 
crowd started to shout “The king to Paris!”328 Once this idea, which had been on the 
minds of all Parisians for months, was verbalized, the king could no longer ignore this 
demand.329 It appears that the women sincerely believed that the bread shortage would 
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end if the king lived in Paris.330  The king and Lafayette reappeared on the balcony for 
the last time to announce to the crowd that the royal family would move to Paris that very 
day.331 
 The parade back to Paris with the royal family finally left the gates of Versailles 
at 1:00 p.m. Gottschalk estimates that 60,000 people participated in the procession while 
Estaing and Lafayette personally rode alongside of the royal carriages.332 In the general 
state of emergency on the night before, the National Assembly had declared that it was 
“inseparable” from the king. Thus, it decided to move to Paris, but sent 36 deputies to 
accompany the king directly for the time being.333 Impressively, 60 carts of grain 
accompanied the group which the Versailles municipal government and the king’s 
ministers had been collecting throughout the night.334 Some of the women raised bread on 
pikes, like National Guards carrying their flags.335 The procession moved just as slowly 
as Lafayette had moved the night before, and it took seven hours for the entourage to 
reach Paris on the evening of October 6.336 
-The Commune Prepares to Receive the King- 
 Earlier that day, the Assemblée des représentants reconvened at the Hôtel de Ville 
and quickly received news from Rousseau about the morning’s events. He informed the 
Commune that the king had addressed the crowd from his balcony saying, “My friends, I 
will go to Paris with my wife, with my children, it’s to the love of my good and faithful 
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subjects that I consign that which I hold most precious.”337 In response to the news, the 
Commune immediately issued a proclamation and ordered printers to post it throughout 
Paris. It read: 
The citizens are informed that the King, the Queen, and the royal family are en 
route to move to Paris. The Body Guards of His Majesty, who, this morning, took 
the national commands, fraternally joined themselves under the flag of the 
Parisian National Guard.338  
 
The Assemblée continued its regular business and received reports on the continuing food 
shortage, which led to a discussion of how to preserve the present food supply and 
maintain its quality.339 The representatives then tried to reward Charles Monnoyer for 
preventing fires in the Hôtel de Ville on the previous day, but Monnoyer only asked that 
he be admitted to the National Guard as his reward.340  
At 1:00 p.m. a deputation led by Bailly and followed by some National Guard 
units left to meet the king outside of the barrière de la Conférence. The king and the 
parade met Bailly’s group at 5:00 p.m., whereupon Bailly, for the second time in three 
months, gave the keys of the city to Louis. After Bailly assured him that “under the reign 
of Louis XVI, the King was made powerful by his people and the people happy by their 
King,” the king proclaimed, “I will always find myself with pleasure and confidence 
among the citizens of my good City of Paris.”341 
 
                                                        
337 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 184 (“Mes amis, j’irai à Paris avec ma femme, avec mes enfants; 
c’est à l’amour de mes bons et fidelles sujets que je confie ce que j’ai de plus précieux.”). 
338 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 185 (“Les citoyens sont informés que le Roi, la Reine et la famille 
royale sont en marche pour se rendre à Paris. Les gardes-du-corps de Sa Majesté, qui, ce matin, ont prêté 
les troupes nationales, se sont fraternellement confondues sous les drapeaux de la Garde nationale 
parisienne.”). 
339 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 186. 
340 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 189. 
341 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 189-190 (“sous le règne de Louis XVI, le Roi sera puissant par son 
peuple, et le peuple heureux par son Roi”; “Je me trouverai toujours avec plaisir et confiance au milieu des 
citoyens de ma bonne Ville de Paris.”). 
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-The Reception of the King and the Great Procession in Paris- 
Le peuple of Paris greeted the procession with great enthusiasm, and thousands of 
individuals gathered in the Place de Grève to see Bailly present the king from a balcony 
in the Hôtel de Ville. Bailly announced the king’s confidence in his Parisian subjects, and 
the duc de Liancourt proclaimed that the National Assembly would soon relocate to Paris 
since it had made itself inseparable from the king.342 The crowd shouted “Long live the 
King, long live the Queen, long live his lordship the heir...” and “Long live the National 
Assembly!”343 For the time being, the king once again earned the trust and goodwill of le 
peuple by coming to Paris and assisting the city in its time of crisis. The National Guard 
troops, especially those who used to be French Guards, were pleased to hear that the 
king’s inner guards would be National Guards instead of the Body Guards.344 As the 
celebration continued for days, a Dame des Halles composed a song which summed up 
popular sentiment: 
We sing of Louis’ mercy 
We celebrate his presence as well, 
He comes to stay here, 
And in Paris he holds his court. 
Yes, everyone goes to see it sparkle 
He’s a good father of the family. 
All French, big and small. 
Poor, rich, are his children. 
 
 
The days of the king so debonair 
Interest all of Europe 
To see his days more happy from a far 
Here is the object of all the good wishes 
For his happiness, his dear company 
His dear child, it’s necessary, 
                                                        
342 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 191. 
343 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 191 (“Vive le Roi, vive la Reine, vive Monseigneur le Dauphin…” 
and “Vive l’Assemblée nationale!”). 
344 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, II: 191.  
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O Heaven, conserve therefore without end 
The King, the Queen, and the Dauphin. 345 
 
 
                                                        
345 Jehanne d’Orliac, Les Dames de la Halle, 1181-1939. (Paris: Fantino et Crie, 1946), 145.  
De Louis chantons la clémence  Les jours du roi si débonnaire 
Célébrons aussi sa présence,  Intéressent l’Europe entière 
Il vient faire ici son séjour,  Les voir longs et des plus heureux 
Et dans Paris il tient sa cour.  Voilà l’objet de tous les vœux 
Oui, chacun de la voir pétille  Pour son bonheur, campagne chère 
C’est un bon père de famille.  Enfant chéri, c’est nécessaire, 
Tous Français, petits comme grands. O ciel, conservez donc sans fin 
Pauvres, riches, sont ses enfants.  Le Roi, la Reine et le Dauphin. 
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Chapter 4: The Spontaneous and Premeditated Nature of the Journée 
-An October Days Conspiracy Plot?- 
 One of the many mysteries surrounding the October Days is whether it was the 
result of, or influenced by, a political conspiracy. Most historians and contemporaries 
who share this view blame Lafayette, Mirabeau, or Orléans for leading such a conspiracy. 
However, most historians find it unlikely that Lafayette had malicious intentions or 
purposely organized any part of the journée. Lafayette’s accusers point out that “général 
Morphée”346 had urged the king to relocate to Paris several times during the summer, and 
had renewed this advice at the end of September.347 However, not only was this a rather 
common demand, but Mounier even visited Lafayette at the end of September to procure 
his promise that he would never use force to bring the king to Paris.348 Mathiez thinks 
that while Lafayette certainly had the greatest influence of all the people involved in the 
October Days, he was a “man of honor” who did not betray his oaths of loyalty.349 It is 
important to recall that Lafayette tried to dissuade his troops from marching to Versailles 
in the first place. Gottschalk hypothesizes that he gave in to their demands as a way of 
staying in control, keeping order, and not destroying the discipline of his new militia 
which he had been building up for the past three months. Moreover, it is evident that 
Lafayette took great caution in approaching Versailles, and emphasized the duties of his 
troops by reinforcing their oaths. On the charge that Lafayette did not sleep closer to the 
king on the night of October 5/6, this is merely a mistake on his part and not a sign of 
                                                        
346 Villiers, Reine Audu, 149. Lafayette’s critics sometimes refer to Lafayette as “General Morpheus,” 
alluding to his irresponsibility in being asleep at the start of the crisis on October 6. 
347 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 317. 
348 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days, 318. 
349 Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 69: 49 and 53 (“homme d’honneur”). 
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deliberate scheming. Gottschalk and Maddox’s assessment of Lafayette appears to be the 
most accurate: 
[He was] a competent, well-meaning, patriotic soldier and statesman who, at this 
stage at least, generally managed to control events, even if they sometimes got out 
of hand, and in doing so was thrust into a position of leadership, a position he 
neither diligently conspired to achieve nor earnestly shunned.350 
 
Lafayette was not a conspirator looking to increase his power over the king, but merely a 
man of his word who was constantly concerned with maintaining peace. 
 The most popular target of the instigator theory is the duc d’Orléans. Leclercq 
brilliantly describes him as “First prince of the blood, privileged, the richest landowner in 
the kingdom, his financial means were nearly without limits, his intellectual means did 
not exist.”351 Dominique accuses Orléans of speculating on blés and of having had a hand 
in controlling the bread supply to suit his financial interests.352 Like many historians and 
Orléans’ contemporaries, Dominique also articulates the suspicion that Orléans was after 
his cousin’s throne, and believed that the Revolution offered him the opportunity to 
become king. Lafayette, himself suspicious of Orléans’ intentions, recorded a peculiar 
meeting with him in his memoirs, which Dominique interprets as Orléans insinuating that 
he wanted Lafayette’s cooperation in a plot.353 The fact that Orléans owned the Palais-
Royal, the political center of agitation that Lafayette’s National Guard was always 
addressing, did not help his case. Mathiez even cites the king for blaming Orléans “for 
having transformed the Palais-Royal in a bad way and for enriching himself with the 
                                                        
350 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days,  viii. 
351 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789,  37 (“Premier prince du sang, apanagé, le 
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vices that he lodged there.”354 This was because Orléans allowed many politically active 
groups to rent his arcades at the Palais-Royal including influential cafes and political 
clubs, in hopes of becoming a man of the people. Leclercq personally asserts that “money 
was, literally, thrown from the windows of the Palais-Royal.”355 Thomas Jefferson, 
although certainly a heavily biased source at this time, includes in his analysis of Orléans 
the assumption that he was receiving money from England which wanted to upset the 
French government.356 To this accusation, Mathiez argues that this is very uncertain since 
he believes that Pitt wanted to keep England neutral in French affairs for the time being, 
and thus would not interact with Orléans.357 Orléans’ post-October Days flight to 
England, upon Lafayette’s request that he leave, did much to contribute to the theory of 
English aid.  
Yet, in the context of the political environment of the October Days, it does not 
make sense that Orléans would have supported a plot to move the king to Paris. Rumors 
raged all summer long about the possibility that the king might flee; it would have been 
completely against Orléans’ interests to trap him in Paris where it would be harder for 
him to escape. If Orléans truly wanted to take the crown, it would have been to his best 
advantage to wait for the king to leave the country on his own, at which time he might 
receive enough popular support to take the throne.358 Orléans seemed to enjoy his 
political popularity but not be too eager for any tangible leadership positions. After the 
                                                        
354 Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 258: (“d’avoir transformé le Palais-Royal en un mauvais lieu et de 
s’enrichir avec les vices qu’il y logeait.”). 
355 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789,  39 (“l’argent fut, littéralement, jeté par 
les fenêtres au Palais-Royal”). 
356 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 39. 
357 Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 260-261. 
358 Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 263. 
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deputies elected him as president of the National Assembly on July 4, 1789, Orléans 
turned down this powerful position protesting: 
But Messieurs, I would betray your good will and if I were to accept this position 
[of president], knowing how little I am qualified for it. Find it good Messieurs, 
that I refuse it, and only see in this refusal the indubitable proof that I will always 
sacrifice my personal interest for the good of the State. 359 
 
As for his actions during the journée itself, some witnesses of the October Days testified 
that they saw Orléans himself at the château on the morning of October 6. However, very 
few sources note his presence and Mathiez went so far as to calculate that Orléans could 
not have possibly arrived at Versailles before 8:00 a.m. on October 6, based on the 
testimony of other witnesses who had seen him before the violence. The witnesses who 
place Orléans at the château before 8:00 are even contradictory among themselves. All 
things accounted for, Orléans would have missed the outburst of violence and could have 
arrived only as order was being restored.360  
 After Orléans, the second person most frequently blamed for organizing the 
October Days is Mirabeau. At the start of the revolution, Mirabeau was a member of the 
“moderate left.”361 Despite his noble heritage, he was popular with le peuple in Provence 
and Paris.362 As a member of the National Assembly, he backed the movement to abolish 
the tithe but was an advocate that parish priests should receive a salary from the state as 
the Church would give them nothing to live on.363 The nobility felt deserted by his 
moderate position, detested “his conscious intellectual superiority,” and abhorred his 
                                                        
359 Goutal-Arnal,“Mes loisirs, ou journal d’évènements tells qu’ils parviennent à ma connaissance: les 
débuts de la révolution Française relates par le libraire Parisien Siméon-Prosper Hardy,” 595-596 (Mais 
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position as a journalist.364 His criticism of Necker in the press, however, also made him 
some “patriot” enemies as well, such as Lafayette.365 Mirabeau’s biographer, Barbara 
Luttrell, argues that liberal deputies in the National Assembly misconstrued Mirabeau’s 
support of the veto as a return to despotism, whereas, in reality, he favored a system of 
checks and balances.366 Mirabeau was very ambitious, and most people thought of him as 
outright “venal.”367 Shapiro argues that Mirabeau actually had hoped to replace Bailly as 
the Mayor of Paris at the end of July.368 The public and politicians alike knew that 
Mirabeau wanted a position as a minister to the king;369 via the press, he urged the king to 
choose a minister from the National Assembly on September 14 and October 15.370 What 
no one knew until October 1790, however, was that the court started secretly 
corresponding with Mirabeau in October 1789 during which Mirabeau gave political 
advice to LaMarck who brought back this information to the court. 371  The court 
eventually paid him regularly for his advice.372 Essentially, the court employed him 
without making him a minister. 
Some people believed that Mirabeau was secretly working for Orléans or was at 
least manipulating him and his resources for his own plots.373 Lefebvre explains that 
Mirabeau might have believed that the constitutional “crisis would easily resolve itself if 
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the king abdicated his throne and the duc d’Orléans became regent.”374 In any case, if he 
supported an Orléans attempt to become king, Mirabeau would have the opportunity to be 
a minister. In reality, Mirabeau did not like Orléans.375 Luttrell cites Mirabeau’s 
conversations with LaMarck to show that Mirabeau was not interested in the political 
activities of Orléans or Lafayette for that matter.376 She argues that Mirabeau did not 
want Orléans to overthrow the throne because then the monarchy would become “the 
prize in a political game,” which would completely negate his system of checks and 
balances. Nor, would he favor the disorder such actions might cause, including the threat 
of civil war.377 Moreover, Luttrell argues, “Palais-Royal propagandists denounced 
Mirabeau as a counter-revolutionary.”378 If Mirabeau was in fact conspiring with Orléans, 
the Orléanist supporters of the Palais-Royal would not have reacted violently against him. 
Considering the relationship and aims of Orléans and Mirabeau, the most 
plausible assessment of their responsibility in the October Days comes from Mathiez. 
Mathiez points to the lack of proper accounts of any specific actions undertaken by 
Orléans’ agents and says that witnesses who speak of agitators are vague and 
inconsistent.379 Rather, Mathiez categorizes the participants as people whose political 
ideas happened to run close to those of Orléans: “The journées of October were not done 
by and for the Duke of Orléans, they were done by people who liked the Duke of 
Orléans.”380 Before Mathiez, Pierre-Victor Malouet, a National Assembly deputy, had 
concluded that if no one associated with the Orléans party had participated in the journée, 
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“the course of things would not have been changed.”381 The influence of any Orléanist 
members who happened to be in the crowd was not even enough to control the events of 
the October Days, let alone direct the journée as a premeditated plot. Mathiez concludes 
that one must not exaggerate their power over the October Days and realize that although 
Orléans “tried to profit from these events, he did not create them.”382 As for Mirabeau, 
Mathiez concedes that he did take part in the journée as a vocal member of the National 
Assembly, but his role was ultimately a minor one.383 
Since the October Days were not the result of an overarching plot, the group of le 
peuple who marched on Versailles are classifiable as a “crowd” rather than a “mob” 
based on Rudé’s standard, since “mobs” are “hired band[s] operating on behalf of 
external interests.”384 However, Rudé also explains that “the venality of the masses was 
taken for granted [by the government] and the remedy for popular insurrection was 
sought in the tracking down of presumed conspirators rather than in the amelioration of 
social grievances.”385 Thus, when the municipal government demanded that the Châtelet 
conduct an investigation to find the conspirators behind the “crimes of October 6,” they 
were acting on the long established assumption that such a large and influential crowd 
must be a mob. (In fact, the Commune initially believed that Saint-Huruge, in starting his 
August 30 movement, had received bribes as well.)386 The motivations of the marchers 
were clearly beyond bribes. If the women had merely wanted money, they could have 
                                                        
381 Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 68: 279 (“le cours de choses n’en aurait pas été changé”). This is especially 
notable because Malout was a relatively conservative member of the Third Estate. Timothy Tackett, 
Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a 
Revolutionary Culture (1789-1790), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 37. 
382 Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 263 (“tâche de profiter des événements, il ne les crée pas”). 
383 Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 283-284. 
384Rudé, The Crowd, 239. 
385 Rudé, The Crowd, 193. 
386 Mathiez, “Étude critique,” 67: 263. 
 83
taken the money from the Hôtel de Ville and avoided a four-hour march in the rain. 
Moreover, if for some reason these women wanted to pillage Versailles instead, the 
majority of them would not have left peacefully after hearing the results of the deputation 
to the king on the night of October 5. It is evident that the women had their own deeper 
motivations. 
Nevertheless, Lefebvre and de Villiers both argue that there was a significant plot 
behind the October Days. Lefebvre actually turns the Orléanist conspiracy theory on its 
head by claiming that although Orléans gave his own money to the movement, the main 
aim of the supposed plot was popular political benefit and not personal gain, that is, to 
force the king to accept the constitution:  
Could Louis XVI have been replaced with someone willing to accept an 
accomplished fact unreservedly, the basic constitutional issue could have been 
covered up; but since this was impossible there was no way open except to coerce 
him by a new mass uprising and such was the origin of the October Days.387 
 
By bringing the king to Paris, Lefebvre postulates, fear of le peuple could render him 
hostage to “perpetual intimidation” which would benefit the designs of patriot 
deputies.388 In arguing for the premeditated origins of the journée, de Villiers cites a 
document from the Cordeliers district that proclaimed: “Commissioners will be sent to 
the Hôtel de Ville who will press the Commune to enjoin M. le Commandant général to 
meet with the King at Versailles tomorrow, Monday, October 5.”389 However, any hint of 
a delegation from the Cordeliers district with such a document is completely absent from 
the Commune’s records on October 4. Moreover, the historian must note that the district 
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wanted only Lafayette to go see the king, rather than a crowd of several thousand people. 
Lefebvre and de Villiers’ reasoning concerning a master premeditated plot is weak. 
-The October Days as a Fusion of Premeditated of Ideas with a Spontaneous, Popular 
Impulse- 
Therefore, the journée was spontaneous in the sense that it was “natural and 
legitimate, if any ever was, entirely spontaneous, unanticipated, [and] truly popular.”390 It 
was not the result of a higher orchestrated plot, but of popular motivation. The October 
Days were truly spontaneous (even if a woman did make a speech about going to 
Versailles on the evening of October 4) in the sense that there was no great plan or strong 
driving forces outside of le peuple. However, the themes (the bread crisis, etc.) and 
actions of the October Days had precedents, some even before the early months of the 
Revolution. Thus, Mathiez’s conclusion remains the most accurate: “If it is true to say 
that the insurrection was premeditated in the sense that it had a precise objective, fixed in 
advance, one sees also that it was, for a large part, a popular and spontaneous 
movement.”391 
 There had been talk of bringing the king to Paris since the convening of the 
Estates General. The Third Estate spring cahier, or list of grievances, included the 
demand that the king move from Versailles to the capital.392 In fact, four of the Parisian 
cahiers specifically included this request.393 Lafayette had told the king during July that 
the National Guard would be able to protect him better in Paris. Dussaulx, a 
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representative in the Commune, had predicted on August 26 that something would 
eventually force the king to come to Paris.394 On September 25, the Chronique de Paris 
invited “the king and the queen to spend the winter in Paris.”395 By the time of the march, 
the popular idea that the king should move to Paris had become deeply engrained into the 
consciousness of le peuple. 
There were also many instances during the summer in which different groups 
considered marching to Versailles for variety of reasons. In his July 3 journal entry, 
Siméon-Prosper Hardy wrote that a “seditious orator” at the Palais-Royal called for an 
armed crowd to go to Versailles and protect the Third Estate deputies from being 
murdered by the nobles. The Commune quickly responded by placing canons on the route 
to Versailles to prevent any potential crowds from marching.396 Of course, another major 
example of the intent to go to Versailles is the August 30 march attempt from the Palais-
Royal, which triggered relentless demonstrations thereafter.397 The goal of this march 
would have been to convince the king to give up the veto, but nonetheless, the important 
precedent here is that a popular group considered a march that they almost executed.398 
On September 17, Lafayette warned Estaing that 1,800 old French Guards who had 
become National Guards wanted to go to Versailles to resume their posts near the king 
and keep any counter-revolutionary influence away from him.399 Less than a week later, 
rumor had it that workers in the École militaire were even considering going to 
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Versailles.400 The Révolutions de Paris reported in its September 22 issue that there were 
rumors that le peuple might go to Versailles.401 Even though people did not immediately 
act upon these rumors, they illustrate that le peuple had already begun to contemplate 
going directly to Versailles to see the king. Yet these rumors only prove that the idea of 
going to Versailles had been considered, not that it was part of a premeditated plot or 
conspiracy. 
During the eighteenth century, common belief held that the presence of the king 
had effective calming capabilities. The letter of thanks that the Commune wrote to the 
king for visiting Paris on July 17 illustrates this point. It included the line: “It’s his 
presence which reestablished peace in Paris….”402 The National Guard of Versailles also 
employed this idea. On September 13, a bread riot broke out in Versailles so severe that 
the crowd was attempting to hang a baker. The National Guard quickly brought the king 
to the scene “in order to calm the minds [and spirit].”403 This tactic was successful. 
The precedent of appealing directly to the king and looking to him to establish 
order also goes further back in French history. Thus, movements such as the October 
Days “mark not a radical break with previous patterns of behaviour, but [use] such 
behaviour to assert new versions of old claims.”404 For example, in 1740 people appealed 
to the king over price increases and a crowd of women even surrounded one prominent 
cardinal who was known to have governmental influence.405 In 1775, crowds around the 
country seized supplies or controlled merchants in the “Flour Wars” which resulted in 
“popular price control.” Although the king resorted to using troops to stop the rioting, le 
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peuple had “solicit[ed] the intercession of the king as the protector of his people.”406 
More recently, the Parisian quarry-workers appealed to the king in their 1786 strike.407 Le 
peuple expected the king to fulfill his paternal role and protect the interests of his 
subjects. 
The suspicion that the aristocracy was behind the bread crisis was not a new 
theme either. In eighteenth-century France, le peuple sometimes believed in times of 
crisis in a “pacte de famine” in which the aristocracy and the Old Regime conspired to 
create an “artificial bread scarcity.”408 This complaint reappeared whenever there were 
major food shortages that produced high bread prices. By the time of the October Days, 
some individuals who felt that the Comité des subsistances was not actually improving 
the food situation extended this accusation even to the Parisian municipal government 
and its leaders (see “Quand aurons-nous du pain?”).  
It is evident that les dames des Halles felt that their previous special position at 
court might have encouraged them to actually undertake the march to Versailles in the 
first place. They had played an important role in the procession that escorted the king into 
Paris on July 17.409 Maria Leczinska, the mistress of Louis XV had indulged the whims 
of the poissardes of Paris on special occasions before the Revolution. In fact, many of les 
dames des Halles made the trek to Versailles several times before the journée.410 This, no 
doubt, increased their confidence that they could make the journey to Versailles and that 
the court would receive them well. 
                                                        
406 Rudé, The Crowd, 24 (“la guerre des farines”). 
407 Rudé, The Crowd, 227. 
408 Rudé, The Crowd, 22. 
409 Gottschalk and Maddox, Lafayette Through the October Days,  127. 
410 Hufton, Women and Citizenship, 15. 
 88
It is important to remember that, despite Lafayette’s efforts to discipline them, the 
National Guard still shared the general consciousness of le peuple. Of the 800 to 900 
volontaires de la Bastille, 6/7 became National Guards.411 Le peuple greatly respected 
these members as protectors of the Revolution, and these troops formed a very popular-
minded core of the National Guard, which found that it could not completely separate 
itself from the grievances of the people on October 5. 
Besides the precedent of ideas, there were also precedents of specific actions that 
took place during the October Days. The bread problem severely worsened over the 
course of the year before the Revolution and during the early months of the Revolution 
itself, as has already been discussed. Yet, it is important to stress this trend since Rudé 
cites food problems as the cause of most “outbreaks of independent activity by the menu 
peuple.”412 Bread prices almost always went down after popular demonstrations, thus le 
peuple increasingly turned to crowd expression as a means of controlling the food 
problem. The efficacy of these popular demonstrations is illustrated by the July 22 
movement that resulted in a price drop from 3.625 sous per pound of bread to 3.375 sous 
per pound, and again after August 8 demonstrations at the Hôtel de Ville reduced the 
price to 3 sous per pound.413 The rallying cry for crowd formations during many 
revolutionary events was the ringing of a tocsin (the tocsin of the Hôtel de Ville did ring 
on October 5), but the women of the October Days also took their cue from military 
traditions to rally the crowd with a drum. The National Guards used this instrument 
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occasionally,414 and Versailles troops also used it to announce the arrival of the Flanders 
Regiment.415 
The measures which the October Days crowd took to legalize their actions reflect 
the increasing feeling among le peuple that they should seek governmental permission for 
what they assumed was extraordinary patriotic behavior. During the August 30 
movement, the Palais-Royal sent a deputation to the Hôtel de Ville as a way of trying to 
achieve “un caractère de légalité.”416 Via their actions, women showed that they 
understood the power and importance of the Commune in their lives, and they expected 
the Commune to address their issues. On September 7, one woman was confident enough 
to enter the Assemblée des représentants alone in an attempt to procure a letter de cachet 
that her husband had written against her.417 Just a week before the march, a delegation of 
les domestiques approached the Commune to declare that they would each give 6 livres to 
Paris and asked the Assemblée that it start a Caisse nationale so that others could follow 
their example.418 The women had experience in not only forming processions, but also in 
asking the Commune for permission. Commune records indicate that a deputation of 
women from the district Saint-Leu appeared in September to request clearance for a 
religious procession which they were planning to Saint-Geneviève. Women clearly had 
practice in seeking legal permission from the Commune and realized the political 
importance of the Hôtel de Ville.419 
Many actions involving the king already had models from earlier in the 
Revolution. By directly addressing crowds from balconies, Louis was able to discern the 
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approval or disapproval of the public regarding his actions. On July 15, Louis spoke to 
National Assembly deputies from his balcony at Versailles where they cheered his 
request for “help in restoring order in Paris.”420 After dinner with the Commune 
deputation and National Guard officers at Versailles on August 25, the king again stood 
on his balcony, pleased to hear cries of “Vive le roi! Vive Louis XVI! Vive la famille 
royale!”421 The difference in the king’s appearance on the October Days was that the 
crowd was not completely satisfied with his initial speech.  
Events from earlier in the Revolution also dictated expressions of patriotic 
approval. As Bailly had presented the king with the new national cockade in July, so too 
did Lafayette extend his tricolor to the Body Guards to show the crowd his sign of 
approval.422 In addition, Bailly humbly offered the king keys to the city in July and he 
repeated this action of respect and honor at the end of the journée. Even the king’s parade 
into Paris on July 17, complete with carriages filled with National Assembly deputies 
with guards riding along side of them,423 foreshadowed his next return to Paris on 
October 6. 
Therefore, although the October Days was a popularly propelled movement 
whose immediate ignition was not premeditated, its themes and actions were not 
innovative. In this light, the October Days appears to be “the climax of… popular 
interventions” in 1789.424 If, in fact, the October Days had so much in common with 
events that came before them, what made them so different from the previous events of 
the revolution? Although demonstrations had taken place throughout the city, only 
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relatively small areas had been involved before the October Days. However, the marchers 
who spontaneously gathered on October 5 were from many different districts within the 
city. This was also the first major movement conducted by women during the Revolution. 
The sheer number of people who were quickly involved in the journée, either in Paris or 
in Versailles, was unprecedented during the Revolution itself. The intervening of the 
National Guard on the side of the people at the Hôtel de Ville added a legitimizing factor 
that had been lacking from previous demonstrations.425 Furthermore, the immediate 
consequences of the march had a far-reaching effect on the population of Paris, as well as 
the entire national government. 
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Section II: The Châtelet Investigation 
 [Jean Pelletier] testifies that everything he knows about the facts  
contained in the [denunciation] pieces which we just read to him,  
he learned of only by public rumors in the societies, promenades,   
clubs or cafes, without being able to recall from which people, about   
the different circumstances and anecdotes relative to the disastrous  
scenes of last October 5& 6... 426 
                First Deposition (December 11, 1789) 
As the Châtelet judges began their criminal investigation of the October Days, 
their very first witness, Jean Pelletier, graced them with his knowledge, or lack there 
of.427 The only information which Pelletier had to offer them was based solely on rumor 
and hearsay. Unfortunately, Pelletier’s sources were not unique and his deposition would 
come to characterize the tone of the investigation as a whole. Much of the testimony 
which the Châtelet judges recorded over the course of seven months was based upon 
rumor or indirect sources rather than the individual’s own experience during the October 
Days. However, the Châtelet investigation remains one of the most extensive and varied 
primary sources about the journée. Despite its questionable reliability, the Procédure 
criminelle has been hard for historians to dismiss, yet it has proven equally as difficult to 
embrace. 
 Although the Procédure criminelle is often cited by those who write about the 
October Days, no one has published a detailed, overarching study of the investigation. 
Moreover, when the investigation is cited, it is usually only in reference to a handful of 
                                                        
426 Procédure criminelle instruite au Châtelet de Paris, sur la dénunciation des faits arrivés à Versailles 
dans la journée du 6 Octobre 1789, 3 vols. (Paris: Chez Baudouin, 1790), I: 11.  Deposition I “[Jean 
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427 Despite his lack of direct knowledge, Pelletier continued to testify and speculate for seven pages. 
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testimonies at any given time. Since the testimonies greatly vary, this isolation of 
individual testimonies becomes greatly subjective and renders them insufficient pieces of 
historical evidence in many cases. For example, when the main Body Guard unit retired 
from its post at the Place d’Armes on October 5 shots were fired. One could argue with 
the support of Alexis Grincourt’s testimony that some Body Guards fired on the crowd 
which was heckling them.428 On the other hand, Antoine-François Leclerc’s deposition 
allows one to argue that although the crowd was booing the retiring Body Guards, the 
Versailles National Guards solely took the offensive by firing at Body Guards.429 Each of 
these two opposing testimonies could be misleading on its own; only when they are 
rooted within the entire context of the investigation and are compared with other 
testimonies can they become truly effective pieces of evidence.  
 Thus while conflicting viewpoints and multiple exaggerations are present in the 
Procédure criminelle, its deficiencies are still of historical value. Although the frequency 
of a contested fact within the many testimonies does not directly translate into complete 
reliability, it does offer keen insights into popularly accepted points of view. The use of 
these testimonies to separate absolute fact from fiction, however, remains a moot point 
without a thorough grounding of individual testimonies within the investigation as a 
whole to begin with. 
 In this section, I will attempt to provide this grounding for the Procédure 
criminelle. I will do so by examining the procedure used to solicit witness testimonies, 
noting plausible sources of error which resulted from the court’s methods, and 
statistically evaluating demographic information to give a picture of the witness pool. I 
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will also study how the witnesses interpreted the constraints of the denunciation in order 
to approach what the witnesses identified as linked to the “crime.”430 Since the entire 
investigation took place over the course of seven months, the areas of concentration 
within the witnesses’ offered testimony were by no means stagnant. Therefore, I will 
explore the perceptible shifts in the Procédure criminelle over time in order to 
characterize these changes. Using the information provided by the witnesses, I will 
attempt to see what light the Châtelet investigation can shed on key areas of historical 
dispute such as if there were men disguised as women in the October Days crowd and if 
someone bribed members of the crowd. Finally, I will examine what the investigation 
itself sought to examine, that is, the evidence which could link Orléans and Mirabeau 
with a conspiracy directing the journée.  
---------------------------------- 
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Chapter 5: The Formation of an Ambiguous Inquest 
The official name under which the National Assembly published the Châtelet 
inquiry is Procédure criminelle Instruite au Châtelet de Paris sur la Dénunciation des 
faits arrivés à Versailles dans la journée du 6 Octobre 1789 (Criminal Procedure 
Conducted by the Châtelet of Paris on the Denunciation of doings which took place at 
Versailles during the journée of October 6, 1789). The investigation consists of the 
testimonies of 395 witnesses, all but six of which were taken by the Châtelet judges in 
Paris.431 The Procédure criminelle is 570 pages long and was printed over a three volume 
span. 
The published investigation is prefaced by five related documents. The first is an 
“extrait du procès-verbal de l’Assemblée Nationale du 31 Août 1790” (extract from the 
National Assembly records of August 31, 1790). This piece orders the Comité des 
rapports to print the entire Châtelet investigation and in a gesture to the sensitivity of the 
issue ordered its “printer to take appropriate precautions to prevent counterfeiting.”432 
The second is entitled “Extrait des registres des délibérations de la compagnie de MM. 
Les Officiers du Châtelet” (Extract from the deliberation records of the Châtelet 
Officials) which details what was contained in the packets which the Châtelet 
investigation submitted to the Comité des rapports on August 9 (which is essentially 
everything printed thereafter in the Procédure criminelle).433 
                                                        
431 Some historians discount the six testimonies which the Châtelet ordered satellite judges to record in their 
final numbers. Most historians report that there are 394 testimonies, yet this is incorrect due to the fact that 
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depositions CCLXIX and CCLXX. So as not to reassign the official numbers, I will refer to Vinconot’s 
testimony as “CCLXIX b.” 
432 “Extrait du Procès-verbal de l’Assemblée Nationale du 31 Août 1790,” as reprinted in Procédure 
criminelle, I:2 (“son imprimeur de prendre les précautions convenables pour éviter la contrefaction”). 
433 “Extrait des registres des délibérations de la compagnie de MM. Les Officiers du Châtelet,” as reprinted 
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The remaining three documents deal with establishing the purpose of the 
investigation and what evidence should be solicited from the witnesses. The 
“Dénonciation Municipalité de Paris” (November 23, 1790) was written by the Parisian 
Comité des recherches whose job it was to pinpoint possible crimes of treason or 
conspiracy and then pass on the information to another group, in this case the Châtelet, 
for the actual investigation.434 In this document, the Comité des recherches qualified the 
event of the investigation as the crime 
which sullied the château of Versailles during the morning of Tuesday October 6, 
[and] only had as its instruments some bandits, who driven by clandestine 
maneuvers, mingled with and confused the citizens…. between five and 6:00 am 
on Tuesday morning, a group of armed bandits, accompanied by some women 
and men disguised as women, made, by way of the interior passages of the 
garden, suddenly burst into the château, forced the Body Guards on watch to the 
interior, forced in the doors, went towards the queen’s apartments, massacred 
some of the guards who were up keeping watch for her safety, and penetrated this 
apartment which her majesty barely had time to leave and flee to the king. 
 
The Comité praises the Parisian National Guard for arriving in good order at Versailles to 
protect the king and the National Assembly, and for stopping the violence of bandits on 
October 6.  They attribute the reestablishment of order to the “wise provisions of their 
commander.”435 Finally the Comité directly denounced “the attempts herein mentioned, 
as well as the authors, troublemakers and accomplices, and all those who by promises of 
                                                        
434 “Dénonciation Municipalité de Paris,” as reprinted in Procédure criminelle, I:5-7. 
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en femmes, fit, par des passages intérieurs du jardin, une irruption soudaine dans le château, força les 
gardes-du-corps en sentinelle dans l’intérieur, enforça les portes, se précipita vers les appartmens de la 
reine, massacra quelques-uns des gardes qui veilloient â sa sûreté, et pénétra dans cet appartement que sa 
majesté avoit à peine eu le temps de quitter pour se retirer auprès du roi.”; “dispositions sages de leur 
commandant”). 
 97
money or by other maneuvers excited and provoked them [the attempts].”436 The king’s 
prosecutor of the Châtelet also signed his approval on this denunciation. The fourth 
document is a brief letter from the Châtelet to the Commune reiterating the denunciation 
which it received from the Comité des recherches and informing the municipality that 
Michel-Eustache Ollivier and Antoine-Louis Olive de la Gastine were the judges 
nominated to oversee the investigation.437 The last document “Information, Conclusions 
et Décret” reiterates the denunciation, reiterates the National Assembly orders which the 
Châtelet was acting upon, and notes the additional presence of François-Gilles Boucher-
Durmont (a parliamentary lawyer and honorary counselor of the king), Jean-Baptiste 
Brion (the clerk of the Parlement of Paris), and unnamed Châtelet clerks. 438 
From the first testimony given on December 11, 1789, to the last testimony given 
on July 29, 1790, the court procedure at the beginning of each deposition at least 
remained the same. The judges recorded the name, age, occupation, and place of 
residence at the beginning of each deposition. This was followed by an oath “to say and 
present truth,” after which the witness would hand over his/her summons which the court 
bailiff Fayel had served him/her. The judges then read the witness “the decrees and 
indictment enunciated above, and the ordinance [of  December 1].” Finally before the 
witness testified, the clerk noted that he/she “declared to not be a relative, ally, servant 
nor domestic servant of the parties.”439 
                                                        
436 “Dénunciation Municipalité de Paris” as reprinted in Procédure criminelle, I:6-7 (“les attentats ci-
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438 “Information, Conclusions et Décret,” as reprinted in Procédure criminelle, I: 10. 
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From this point on, the testimony of the witness was recorded as a summary of the 
facts rendered. The clerks rarely quoted the witnesses and often only used quotation 
marks when the witness quoted something which someone else had said. Generally, the 
witnesses gave their accounts in chronological order and addressed different periods of 
time depending on their interpretation of the denunciation. Therefore, it appears that the 
judges did not ask the witnesses a list of predetermined questions. However, as the 
investigation progresses, some anachronisms and patterns appear in the testimonies 
which suggests that the Châtelet judges may have started asking questions or leading the 
depositions of some of the witnesses. This issue will be addressed later in this section. At 
the end of each testimony the witness affirmed that he/she gave all the information which 
he/she knew and the clerk read back his/her deposition. The witness then once again 
confirmed the truth of his/her testimony. Finally, the judges asked the witness if he/she 
“required compensation” and paid the witness for his/her time if he/she said yes.440 Then 
the judges, and clerks present signed the deposition along with the witness. 
This approach to recording the depositions introduces many opportunities for 
error. For example, since the denunciation does not name any suspects the witnesses 
could worry that their being at the scene of the crime could actually make themselves 
suspect. When people did give detailed depositions they often removed themselves from 
the action and assumed the position of a neutral onlooker or even an unwilling 
participant. This seems to be the case with the testimony of the few women who were 
interviewed who admit to even being part of the march from Paris. Out of the mere 31 
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women who were interviewed during the investigation,441 only eleven claim to have 
joined the marchers.442 Moreover, every one of these eleven women testified that they 
were forced to join the marchers against their will or better judgment. However, the 
testimony of some of these women contradicts the idea that they were coerced into 
joining the march. Jean Martin testifies that she was threatened into joining the women at 
the Louvre but later in the march became part of the twenty main women at the head of 
the entire column en route to Versailles.443 Similarly, Françoise Rolin says that she was 
forced to go to the Hôtel de Ville and then to Versailles by other women, yet she 
somehow wished to and managed to see the king with the other women on October 5.444 
Louise-Marguerite-Pierette Chabry (alias Louison), perhaps the most famous of the 
women who had “the honor of bringing the grievances about bread and subsistence” also 
claims that she did not go to Versailles of her own free will but by force.445 Marie-Rose 
Baré also testified that she was one of four women admitted to see the king.446 However, 
it does not make sense that individuals who were forced against their will by hundreds of 
people would be chosen as the primary representatives of their very captors.  
On the other hand, some women claimed to intervene on behalf of the “non-
criminals” in the investigation. Anne-Margueritte Andelle testifies that she tried to tell 
some women that killing the Body Guards and making threats against the queen were 
awful actions. While this is not hard to imagine, the rest of the testimony is. Andelle says 
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that at this point some women broke off from the group and guarded her as a threat until 
the king left for Paris, which would be the equivalent of four hours. By making herself 
one of the victims of the “crime,” Andelle clearly hoped to clear any suspicions which the 
Châtelet might have about her participation in the march.447 More drastically, Jeanne-
Antoine Beffous, a resident of Versailles, testifies that she went to the château on the 
morning of October 6 and literally saved the life of a Body Guard by throwing herself on 
him to protect him and that she helped the French Guards save others as well. Beffous’ 
testimony seems slightly too eager to please since she also manages to hit all the right 
targets which the Châtelet was looking for in her short deposition.448 Due to the 
ambiguous denunciation, there was certainly a factor of self preservation in many of the 
depositions which resulted in skewed and questionable testimony. Thus, the testimony 
which could have easily proven most valuable to open-minded judges was instead tainted 
by the methods of these judges. 
The quality of the remaining women’s testimonies is varied, but lacking. Besides 
the eleven marchers, four participated in the journée in some way other than marching 
(i.e. royal household employees),449 ten did not directly participate in the events but 
offered testimony based on observation, conversation, or rumors,450 and six claimed to 
have absolutely no knowledge.451 This reveals another problem in the investigation. 
There are an extremely small number of women who were questioned in comparison to 
number of people interviewed by the Châtelet and to the number of women who marched 
on Versailles. Even excluding the testimonies of the marchers, the quality of information 
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of at least ten of the remaining women is less than favorable as much of the information 
is second hand knowledge or based on observation from a distance while six women had 
no knowledge of the events to begin with. In short, the Procédure criminelle is severely 
deficient in quality and quantity of testimony provided by women. 
Role of Women Witnesses in the Journée 
Testified Role in the Journée Number of 
Women 
Marchers 11 
Participation by a means other than marching 4 
No direct participation but offered testimony 
based on observation, conversation, or rumors 
10 
Absolutely No Knowledge 6 
 
The entire witness pool of the inquest was not overly knowledgeable. Although 
one can surmise that each individual was summoned by the Châtelet because the judges 
believed that he/she could contribute valuable testimony, this is not consistently the case. 
Overall, the clerks recorded “he/she had no particular knowledge of the facts declared in 
the statements [read to him/her]” (or some variation of this phrase) for 137 of the 
witnesses.452 Of these witnesses, 57 only offered this statement or this phrase in 
conjunction to where they were during the journée.453 The remaining 80 witnesses 
included this statement in their testimony but did proceed to provide the Châtelet with 
additional testimony which he/she often felt was not directly related to the denunciation 
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or was based on indirect information such as rumors.454 Whatever their reason, 34.7 
percent of the witnesses felt obliged to include “aucune connoissance” somewhere in 
their deposition.455 This statistic alone attests to the failure of the Châtelet to gather 
sufficient information. 
The Châtelet seems to have recorded everything each witness said, even if it came 
from a source other than the witness. This poses a problem because it reveals a major 
source of error in the court proceedings and greatly dilutes the potency of much of the 
evidence which the Châtelet gathered. Overall, 83 of the witnesses (21 percent) in the 
investigation based at least part of their testimony on information from secondary sources 
in the sense of information beyond their personal observation.456 That is not to say that all 
of these testimonies should be dismissed as completely false; however, there are different 
degrees of plausible credibility based upon the secondary source itself and the extent to 
which it is relied upon in the deposition. 
The largest group (32) of these secondary source testimonies relies on rumor for 
part of the deposition and specifies the divide between “hearsay,” “heard,” or “rumors” 
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secondary sources. 
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and their own observations.457 There are fourteen testimonies which rely solely on rumor 
for the entirety of the deposition.458 A significant number of the secondary source 
testimonies attempt to provide the name or description of the specific individual who 
initially gave them their information. The Châtelet successfully subpoenaed several of 
these individuals later on to confirm this information. These specified secondary source 
testimonies are generally somewhat more credible than those based solely on rumor. 
Only five witnesses based their entire account on specified secondhand information, 459 
while 28 witnesses used this information as part of the deposition in addition to their own 
experiences.460 Four individuals testified using a mixture of rumor and specific second 
hand accounts.461 Despite the separation of these 83 secondary source testimonies into 
varying categories of credibility, the fact remains that the significant percentage of the 
witness pool which offered this kind of indirect testimony greatly increased the potential 
for error in conclusions incautiously drawn from the investigation. In this respect, Omer-
Gratien Zéphirin’s friend on the Comité des recherches appears justified in telling him 
that :  
the Châtelet tribunal was never able to judge this affair; that a tribunal vested with 
a higher authority was essential, and that if one was to render an exact justice in 
this affaire, it would have to take more than 10,000 people.462 
 
 
                                                        
457 I have qualified any secondary information without a specific source as rumor. V, XI, XV, XVII, XVIII, 
XXVII, XXXI, XLVII, XLIX, LXI, CV, CXXII, CLII, CLV, CLXI, CLXVIII, CLXXI, CLXXXVI, CXCI, 
CCXX, CCXXVI, CCXXXIII, CCXLI, CCXLII,  CCLI, CCLXXX, CCCVII, CCCIX, CCCXVI, 
CCCLXIX, CCCLXX, and CCCLXXIX. (“oui-dire”; “a entendu”; or “bruits publiques”). 
458 I, VI, X, XLVI, XLVII, LV, LXIII, LXXI, XCIV, XCV, CLXXXI, CXCIV, CCCXLIV, and CCCLVIII. 
459 XXXVI, CXLIV, CCXC, CCCLXXVI, and CCCLXXXX.  
460 XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, LIV, LVIII, CXVII, CXVIII, CXX, CXXXVI, CXXXVII, CXXXIX, CXL, 
CXLVIII, CLIII, CLIV, CLVI, CCLXVI, CCLXXVI, CCLXXVI, CCLXXVII, CCCXXI, CCCXXVIII , 
CCCXLVIII, CCCLI, CCCLXVIII, CCCLXXXXI, and CCCLXXXXI. 
461 CXXVI, CXLVII, CXLIX, and CCCXXX. 
462 CCXI (“le tribunal du Châtelet ne pouvoit jamais juger cette affaire-là; qu’il falloit un tribunal appuyé 
d’une plus grande autorité, & que si on rendoit une justice exacte dans cette affaire, il faudroit prendre plus 
de dix mille personnes.”). 
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Categories and Degrees of Secondary Source Testimony 
Source of Testimony Number of Witnesses 
Using Each Source 
Part rumor, part own 
observations 
32 
Solely based on rumor  14 
Solely based on information 
from a specified secondary 
source 
5 
Part specified secondary 
source, part own observations 
28 
Part specified secondary 
source, part rumor 
4 
 
The compensation which the Châtelet paid some witnesses also leaves room for 
error in the testimonies. The Châtelet does not specify anywhere in the investigation its 
method for calculating the stipend offered to each witness. We do know that the judges 
asked almost every single witness if they wished to receive any recompense and that it 
was up to the witness to accept or decline payment. It seems that it was common for 
investigation committees to pay individuals for their testimony. Anne-Marguerite Andelle 
told the Châtelet judges that the Comité des recherches de Paris gave her 6 francs “to 
indemnify her for the time that she had lost” while testifying and that a Cordelier District 
committee did the same.463 It is reasonable to assume that the Châtelet paid their 
witnesses for the same reason, and it is equally reasonable that the witnesses would 
expect to be offered this compensation. 
                                                        
463 CCXXXVI (“pour l’indemnifer du temps qu’elle avoit perdu”). 
 105
Slightly more than 38 percent of the Châtelet witnesses received some 
compensation for their deposition, but the range in compensation greatly varies.464 If the 
compensation was provided on the basis of what information the individual offered or if 
the witnesses even thought that their compensation was based on the value of their 
information, the effect on the content of the 151 compensated depositions would be 
detrimental. Other surmisable bases for the amount of recompense could include the 
amount of time the witness spent giving their deposition (which would be proportional to 
the length of their testimony), or the normal occupational salary of the witness (which 
would allow for a large variety of compensation amounts). 
It is clear that witness compensation was not calculated based on the time spent at 
the Châtelet. Although the judges needed three days of Maillard’s time to record his 
lengthy 15 page disposition, he was only paid 12 livres.465 On the other hand, François 
Basset’s deposition was only a page long and he also received 12 livres for his 
testimony.466 The length of the testimony or the amount of material in the testimony does 
not seem to make a difference for any of the paid depositions. Fortunately, the same is 
true for the content of the depositions. Sister Marie-Anne Favier saved the lives of 14 
                                                        
464XV, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVII, XXIX, XXXII, XXXIII, XXXIV, LI, LII, LVI, 
LVII, LVIII, LIX, LXII, LXIII, LXIV, LXV, LXVI, LXVII, LXVIII, LXXI, LXXIII, LXXIV, LXXV, 
LXXVI,LXXVIII, LXXXI, LXXXII, LXXXIII, LXXXV, LXXXVII, LXXXVIII, LXXXIX, XC, XCVII, 
XCVIII, XCIX, C, CII, CIII, CIV, CV, CVI, CVIII, CXVI, CXVII, CXVIII, CXXVIII, CXXIX, CXXX, 
CXXXI, CXXXII, CXXXIII, CXXXV, CXXXVII, CXLI, CXLIV, CLI, CLXXVIII, CLXXIX, CLXXX, 
CLXXXI, CLXXXIII, CLXXXVII, CC, CCVII, CCXVII, CCXXXI, CCXXXIII, CCXXXIV, CCXXXVI, 
CCXXXVII, CCXLIV, CCXLV, CCXLVIII, CCXLIX, CCL, CCLIV, CCLVI, CCLVII, CCLVIII, 
CCLIX, CCLX, CCLXI, CCLXII, CCLXXIII, CCLXXIV, CCLXXV, CCLXXVI, CCLXXVII, 
CCLXXXII, CCLXXXIII, CCLXXXIV, CCLXXXVIII, CCLXXIX, CCXCI, CCXCII, CCXCIII, 
CCXCIV, CCXCVI, CCXCVII, CCXCIX, CCCII, CCCIII, CCCVIII, CCCIX, CCCXI, CCCXIII, 
CCCXXII, CCCXXIIII, CCCXXIV, CCCXXV, CCCXXVIII, CCCXXIX, CCCXXX, CCCXXXI, 
CCCXXXII, CCCXXXIII, CCCXXXVII, CCCXXXVIII, CCCXXXIX, CCCXLIII, CCCXLIV, CCCXL, 
CCCLII, CCCLIII, CCCLIV,CCCLV, CCCLVIII, CCCLIX, CCCLXIII, CCCLXIV, CCCLXV, 
CCCLXVI, CCCLXIX, CCCLXXI, CCCLXXV, CCCLXXVII, CCCLXXXI, CCCLXXXII, 
CCCLXXXIII, CCCLXXXIV, CCCLXXXIX, CCCLXXXX, and CCCLXXXXIII. 
465 LXXXI. 
466 XIX. 
 106
Body Guards by sneaking them out of the royal infirmary on the morning of October 6 
and lying to the people who came to search for them.467 Yet, the heroic nun received 12 
livres, the same amount as Louis Gamain whose only line of testimony was “il n’a 
absolument aucune connoissance des faits.”468 Moreover, Benjamin Dardignac also “n’a 
absolument aucune connoissance des faits,” but the Châtelet only offered him 30 sols for 
the same exact line.469 
The guiding principal of the Châtelet’s compensation system appears to be based 
on occupational income, although it is handled haphazardly at times. The witnesses with 
the lowest incomes such as Jean-Baptiste Gaillard, a locksmith’s assistant, received the 
lowest compensation of 30 sols.470 The Châtelet provided the equivalent of Gaillard’s 
salary to several domestiques as well.471 A court messenger and a hunting assistant to the 
king each received 6 livres, 472 whereas a lawyer/municipal officer received 9 livres.473 
Even military troops were generally paid by rank. For example, the Châtelet paid most 
Flanders Regiment captains 12 livres,474 and offered military engineers from the same 
regiment only half that amount.475 Yet there are discrepancies in this system. Two valet 
de pieds de la reine offered testimony but one was paid 9 livres and the other was paid 3 
livres.476 Also, two Swiss guards had very similar testimonies but one earned 6 livres 
while the other only gained 3 livres.477 Among the rest of the witnesses however, the 
                                                        
467 LVI. 
468 CXVI. 
469 CLI. At the start of the Revolution, one livre equaled twenty sols. Colin Jones, The Longman 
Companion to the French Revolution (New York, NY: Longman, 1990), 236. 
470 LXXVIII (“compagnon serrurier”). 
471 For example: CXVIII, CXXXIII, and CXXXIV. 
472 CCXLIX and CCXXXI.  
473 CCCXXXIII. 
474 LIX, LXXXVIII, and LXXXIX. 
475 CCCXXIV and CCCXXV (“sapeurs”). 
476 XCIX and C. 
477 XXXII, and  XXXIII. 
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differences in compensation among people of similar economic status are relatively 
small.  
 Interestingly enough, the Châtelet seemed to financially favor different branches 
of the military as a whole in their compensation. The average remuneration for the 18 
Flanders troops was 10.2 livres,478 and the average remuneration for the 10 Versailles 
National Guard troops was 9.8 livres.479 However, the average compensation for the four 
Parisian National Guards was 3.5 livres despite the fact that both a captain and a corporal 
testified.480 Even the average compensation for the 25 women paid (excluding the one 
with a travel allowance) was higher that the Parisian National Guard average at 5.86 
livres.481 The Body Guards seem to be the winners of the groups with an average of 14.4 
livres for six individuals (even excluding the traveling troop and three mysterious 
anomalies [see below]). 482 Perhaps this is because the Body Guards were not militia 
volunteers, but then again, neither were the Swiss whose average salary of 3.8 livres 
barely passes that of the Parisian National Guards.483 There seems to be some clear 
favoritism of Versailles based troops (with the exception of the Swiss troops), and one 
cannot help but wonder if this propensity extended to an easier acceptance of their 
testimony on the part of the Châtelet judges as well. 
 
 
 
                                                        
478 LIX, LXIII, LXIV, LXV, LXVI, LXVII, LXVIII, LXXI, LXXXVII, LXXXVIII, LXXXIX, XCVII, 
XCVIII, CCXCI, CCXCIX, CCCXXIIII, CCCXXIV, and  CCCXXV. 
479 XV, XIX, CLXXXVIII, CCXXXIII, CCXLVIII, CCCIII, CCCIX, CCCXXX, CCCXXXIX, and 
CCCLXIV. 
480 CCCXII, CCCXXVIII, CCCLXIII, and CCCLXXXIII. 
481 XX, XXV, LVI, LXXXII, LXXXIII, LXXXV, XC, CII, CIII, CV, CVI, CVIII, CLXXIX, CLXXXIII, 
CLXXXVII, CCXXXVI, CCXLV, CCLXXIII, CCLXXXIV, CCCXLIV, CCCLVIII, CCCLXV, 
CCCLXVI, and CCCLXXXIV. 
482 XXIII, LVII, CCL, CCCXXXVII, CCCLXXV, and CCCLXXXXI. 
483 XXXII, XXXIII, XXXIV, CXXXI, and CCLXXVI. 
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Average Compensation in Livres/Group 
 
Not all of the stipends seem to clearly follow the occupational salary system. The 
judges justified the high compensation of five witnesses as compensation for “for the 
expense of travel, stay in Paris, and return.”484 While this seems reasonable for the two 
Body Guards who were paid 20 livres and 24 livres for this purpose,485 the price seems a 
bit more exorbitant for the three witnesses who received 300 livres, 230 livres, and 360 
livres for their travel.486 Once again, there was not anything special in length or content 
about these depositions. In fact, the Châtelet paid Jeanne-Louise-Constance d’Aumont 
(one of the travelers) 230 livres for her to vaguely tell them that she saw armed men and 
women enter the courts on the morning of Oct 6 and that beyond this information she 
“n’a aucune connoissance particulière des faits.”487  There are only three testimonies 
whose unjustified compensation causes great alarm. Three Body Guards were each paid 
                                                        
484 “pour frais de voyage, séjour à Paris & retour”. 
485 CCCLXXV and CCCLXXXXIII. 
486 CCLXXVII (maréchal-des-logis des Body Gurads), CCLXXXII (a duchess), and CCCLXXXI (Ancien 
officier au Régiment du Maréchal de Turenne) respectively.  
487 CCLXXXII. 
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150 livres for their ordinary depositions.488 One might guess that such an anomaly was 
the result of a typo at the press, but the printer spelled out the words “one-hundred-fifty 
livres” in one deposition and used the numbers “150” in the next.489  These Body Guards 
did not do anything more courageous than their other comrades, nor were they greatly 
injured as the result of the October Days. The Châtelet’s motivation for paying them such 
high amounts seems completely irrational, unless there was any foul play and some of 
their testimony was purposefully left unrecorded. 
 The only other anomalies in witness compensation appear to be caused by 
accidental omission. The investigation lists two witnesses as receiving a stipend while 
failing to specify the amount.490 These testimonies are not unordinary and neither are the 
two other testimonies in which no mention of a compensation offer, acceptance, or 
decline is mentioned.491 Additionally three other testimonies fit this same pattern but 
these discrepancies are likely due the interviewing of these witnesses by satellite judges 
and not the Châtelet.492 Also, Mounier was one of these witnesses and it may have 
appeared impolite to ask him if he would need compensation for his testimony. 
Compared to the entire group of 151 witnesses which the Châtelet paid, these few 
divergent examples are minor in the overall scheme of witness compensation. It still 
stands that occupation was the principle determining factor for compensation in most 
depositions. If the witnesses were aware of this approach, it would deprive them of 
motivation for giving false testimony in hopes of financial gain, thereby reducing the 
amount of falsehoods in the depositions.  
                                                        
488 CXXVIII, CXXIX, and CXXX. 
489 CXXIX and CXXX (“cent cinquante lives”). 
490 CCCLXXXII and CCCXXX. 
491 CCLXVI and CCCXXVII. 
492 CCCLXXXIX, CCCLXXXX, and CCCXXVII. 
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 Besides the allure of financial compensation and the witnesses’ biases, another 
wild card factor played an important role in shaping each individual testimony – the 
witness’ personal interpretation of the denunciation. Since most witnesses had little 
guidance after being read the denunciation which officially investigated the activities of 
October 6, they were responsible for choosing the boundaries of the information which 
they offered the Châtelet. Therefore, the time span of each witness’ account varies 
according to personal interpretation. The extreme endpoints of the collective testimony 
time span stretch from the winter of 1788/1789 to April 19, 1790.493 Only 58 individuals 
actually held fast to recounting only what they had witnessed on October 6.494 In fact, 
more depositions (71) only describe events on October 5495 than only October 6. But the 
most popular response, given by 107 witnesses, provided the Châtelet only with 
information about both October 5 and October 6.496 Some witnesses offered information 
                                                        
493 CLXXX (winter 88/89), and CXCI (April 19, 1790). 
494 V, XIII, XIV, XVI, XXXIII, XXXIV, XXXVI, XLVII, LVI, LVII, LXIV, LXXII, LXXXVIII, XCIX, C, 
CVII, CXXVIII, CXXXIII, CXXXVI, CXLI, CXLV, CLVI, CLII, CLXXIII, CLXXIV, CLXXVIII, 
CLXXXIX, CXC, CXCV, CXCVIII, CCII, CCV, CCXVII, CCXVIII, CCXXIX, CCLII, CCLV, CCLXVI, 
CCLXX, CCLXXIII, CCLXXV, CCLXXXII, CCLXXXIV, CCLXXXVII, CCXCVII, CCXCIX, CCCIII, 
CCCXV, CCCXXXV, CCCXLIV, CCCLIV, CCCLVII, CCCLXVII, CCCLXVIII, CCCLXXII, 
CCCLXXV, CCCLXXVIII, CCCLXXXIX, and CCCLXXXX. Eight other witnesses recounted the events 
of October 6 in addition to events from other time periods (besides October 5). They are: LXXXIX, CIX, 
CXVII, CXXXVII, CLVII, CLXXI, CCCLVIII, and CCCLXXXVI. 
495 II, XVII, XXI, XXII, XXVI, XXX, XXXVII, XXXVIII, XXXIX, XL, XLIII, XLIV, L, LII, LXVII, 
LXXVII, LXXXVII, XCII, XCVII, CIII, CVI, CX, CXXII, CXL, CXLIII, CLII, CLIII, CLXI, CLXVI, 
CLXVII, CLXXVI, CLXXXI, CLXXXIII, CLXXXVII, CLXXXVIII, CXCIX, CCIV, CCVI, CCVIII, 
CCIX, CCX, CCXIV, CCXXXI, CCXXXVII, CCXL, CCXLII, CCXLIX, CCLXV, CCLXVIII, CCLXIX, 
CCLXI, CCLXXIV, CCLXXIX, CCLXXXV, CCXC, CCXCI, CCXCIII, CCC, CCCV, CCCVI, CCCVII, 
CCCX, CCCXXXII, CCCXXXII, CCCXXXIV, CCCLIII, CCCLVI, CCCLX, CCCLXI, CCCLXIV,  and 
CCCLXXX. Seven other witnesses recounted the events of October 5 in addition to events from other time 
periods (besides October 6). They are: XXXV, CLIV, CLXXXVI, CXCI, CCXXIV, CCLXXX, and 
CCCXLI. 
496 VII, IX, XI, XII, XVIII, XIX, XXVIII, XXIX, XLIX, LIX, LX, LXI, LXIII, LXIX, LXXXIII, LXXIV, 
LXXV, LXXVI, LXXX, LXXXI, LXXXII, LXXXVI, XC, XCI, XCIV, XCVIII, CI, CII, CVIII, CXIV, 
CXV, CXVIII, CXXVII, CXXIX, CXXXI, CXXXII, CXXXIV, CXXIX, CXLIV, CXLVI, CXLVII, 
CXLVIII, CLV, CLVIII, CLXIII, CLXIV, CLXVII, CLXX, CLXXVII, CLXXIX, CXCII, CXCIV, 
CXCVII, CCI, CCIII, CCXI, CCXIII, CCXVI, CCXXI, CCXXV, CCXXVI, CCXXVII, CCXXVIII, 
CCXXX, CCXXXIII, CCXXXIV, CCXLI, CCXLVI, CCXLVII, CCXLVIII, CCL CCLIV, CCLVI, 
CCLVIII, CCLXII, CCLXIV, CCLXVII, CCLXXII, CCLXXVI, CCLXXXI, CCLXXXVI, CCXCIV, 
CCXCVI, CCXCVIII, CCCI, CCCIV, CCCIX, CCCXI, CCCXII, CCCXIII, CCCXIV, CCCXVIII, 
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about these days in addition to venturing beyond the time span of the journée. Exactly 
101 witnesses testified, at least in part, about events which took place before or after 
October 5 and 6.497 The time span which the depositions cover was crucial to those who 
believed that the journée was the result of a conspiracy. Politicians and judges who 
supported the conspiracy theory wanted to allow testimony about the summer which they 
hoped would link Orléans and/or Mirabeau to a long established plot. However, more 
liberal individuals sought to limit the testimony and any additional evidence strictly to the 
denunciations’ confines of October 6. 498  This became a major point of contention 
between left-leaning and right-leaning political groups during the course of the 
investigation and this issue will be more thoroughly addressed in the next chapter. 
Regardless of political implications, these figures reveal the most prevalent time periods 
touched upon by the witnesses and give a picture of the chronological breadth of the 
investigation.499 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
CCCXX, CCCXXII, CCCXXVI, CCCXXVIII, CCCXXX, CCCXXXI, CCCXXXVII, CCCXXXVII, 
CCCXL, CCCXLII, CCCXLIII, CCCXLV, CCCXLVII, , CCCLV, CCCLXII, CCCLXIII, CCCLXV, 
CCCLXIX, CCCLXX, CCCLXXIII, CCCLXXIV, CCCLXXVI, CCCLXXVII, CCCLXXXII, 
CCCLXXXIII, CCCLXXXXI, CCCLXXXXII, and CCCLXXXXIII. In addition, 19 other witnesses 
testified about both October 5 and 6 as well as events beyond this time period. They are: XV, XXIII, XXV, 
XXVII, LXXXV, CIV, CXI, CXLIX, CLV, CLXXVII, CLXXXV, CCXII, CCXX, CCXXXVI, CCXCV, 
CCCXI, CCCXXVII, CCCLXIX, and CCCLXXXXI. 
497 CXX, CLXXVII, CV, I, XX, XCIII, CXIX, CLXXXII, CXCIII, CCXXXII, CCLXXVII, CCCXVI, 
CCCXLVIII, CCCXLIX, CCCLXXXI, CCCLXXXVI, XLVIII, LXII, LXXI, CXXVI, CCXLIII, XV, XX, 
XXV, XXVII, XXXI, XXXV, LXII, LXXXV, CLXVIII, CLXXXV, CCXII, CCXX, CCLXXVII, 
CCLXXX, CCXCV, CCCXI, CCCXVI, CCCXLI, CCCLXII, CCCLXXXI, CCCLXXXVI, CCCLXXXXI, 
VIII, CLXXXVI, CCXCV, CCCXLI, CCCLXII, X, LVIII, CLXXI, CLXXXIV, XVII, XXII, XLIX, 
XLVIII, CLV, CCCLXXXXI, CLVII, CCLXI, CCCLI, LXXIX, XCV, CIV, CIX, CXX, CXXIV, CXXVI, 
CXL, CXLIX, CCCLI, CXX, CLXXX, CCCLI, XCIII, CXXI, CLXXI, CCXXXVI, CCXCV, CCCXVII, 
CCCLXXXI, XXIII, XXXI, LVIII, LXXXIX, CXVII, CXLVIII, CXXXVII, CLIV, CCXXIV, 
CCCXXVIII, CCCXLIV, CCXLVII, CCCLVIII, CCCLXVIII, CCCLXIX, IV, XXXI, CXI, CLXII, 
CLXXX, CXCI, CCVII, and CCXXXVI. 
498 For more details on this point of contention, see section 3. 
499 These numbers do not include witnesses whose only response was “aucune connoissance” or those 
whose testimony was so vague that it cannot be associated with a definite time period. 
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Percent of Testimony Touching Upon Each Period500 
Before June
1%
June-August
3% September
2%
Oct. 1-4
10%
After Oct. Days
3%
Oct. 6
39%
Oct. 5
42%
 
Vs. 
 
Percent of Witnesses Who Addressed Each Period501 
 
 
 Due to the variety of time spans covered, the great breadth of information offered, 
and the array of sources cited by the witnesses, it appears that most witnesses were given 
free reign to interpret the boundaries of the denunciation on their own. Yet, about 
two/thirds of the way through the depositions some anomalies begin to appear in the 
testimonies. Some of the depositions are unusually ordered, as if the witnesses were 
                                                        
500 These numbers do not include the above witnesses covered by the previous note. Also, this percentage is 
not based upon length of content; rather, it is indicative that the content was addressed in some fashion. For 
example, an individual who testified about events which occurred in September and on October 6 counts 
once in each category (making the divisor of the percentage > 395). Therefore, this chart most closely 
represents the percentage of deposition content relating to each time period. 
501 On the other hand, this chart reflects the percentage of witnesses who addressed each time span. Simply 
stated, number of witnesses/395 x 100 = percentage.  
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interrupted during their narratives. For example, up until deposition CCXLVII, all 
witnesses who responded with some form of “aucune connoissance” did so at the very 
beginning of their testimony; however, at this point in the investigation, some of the 
“aucune connoissance” responses occur at the middle or the end of the testimony, after 
the witnesses gave other information. This phrase is recorded at the end of nine 
depositions,502 in the middle of three depositions,503 and more than once in the testimony 
of two individuals504 as if a judge interrupted the witness to reiterate or more clearly 
specify the denunciation.  
It appears that the Châtelet judges began to grow a little impatient after six 
months of interviewing witnesses with a lot of ambiguous testimony and little evidence to 
offer regarding the “auteurs” of October 6.505 The anachronism of the “aucune 
connoissance” in the sixteen depositions suggests that the judges infringed upon these 
narrations. By interrupting the witnesses and redirecting their narratives, the judges may 
have pressured the witnesses to give more pertinent or specific information. Yet, twelve 
of these witnesses actually testified about events on October 5 or October 6 before 
“aucune connoissance” appeared in the testimony.506 So it appears that the latter 
explanation is correct, that the Châtelet judges became increasingly concerned with 
finding concrete evidence about a conspiracy as the investigation dragged on with little to 
show for their efforts. In fact, there is a perceptible shift in the all-encompassing 
secretaries’ recording of “aucune connoissance particulière des faits” to a very specific 
                                                        
502 CCXLVII, CCL, CCLII, CCLXX, CCXLVII, CCLXXXV, CCCXLI, CCCLXXX,  and 
CCCLXXXX(interviewed at Langres).  
503 CCLXXXIV, CCCXI, and CCCXVII. 
504 CCLXIII and CCCLXXVIII. 
505 Louis-Alexandre Bertheir, witness CCXLVII, testified on May 15, 1790. 
506 CCL, CCLII, CCLXX, CCXLVII, CCLXXXV, CCCXI, CCCXLI, CCCLXXXX, CCXLVII, CCCXVII, 
and CCLXXXIV. 
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“can not give us any information on the authors or accomplices [of the conspiracy]” (or 
something to that effect) in seven of the testimonies.507 Frustrated with the Comité des 
recherches’ refusal to release potential evidence from earlier in the summer, the Châtelet 
may have taken this matter into its own hands since these testimonies all occur after their 
mid April quarrel.508 
Additionally, the double affirmation of no knowledge in the depositions of 
Alexandre-Charles Beffon and Pierre-Rapheael Paillot raises the question of just how 
inquisitive the judges were.509 Paillot not only asserted that he had “aucune 
connoissance” but also that he did not know the authors of the insurrection, did not see 
any men disguised as women, and did not see anyone handing out money. It is rather 
suspicious that an individual who gave absolutely no testimony would name what exactly 
he did not know anything about.510  Jean-Nicolas Motte actually testified about several 
events before his deposition ended with “aucune connoissance particulière” and similarly 
iterated that he did not know the authors of a plot, did not see men disguised as women, 
and did not see anyone hand out money.511 It is highly unlikely that these two witnesses 
could name exactly what they had no knowledge of by chance and this seems to be 
another clue that the Châtelet began to ask the witnesses more specific questions rather 
than allowing them to interpret the denunciation alone. This, in conjunction with the 
other anachronisms involving “aucune connoissance,” makes it reasonable to conclude 
that the judges attempted to lead or pressure at least fourteen witnesses to some degree. 
                                                        
507 CCL, CCXLVII, CCCLXXX, CCXLVII, CCLXXXIV, CCLXIII, and CCCLXXVIII (“ne peut nous 
donner aucune renseignement sur les auteurs ou complices”). 
508 A more detailed discussion of this confrontation and division between the Comité des recherches and the 
Châtelet is given in the next section. Deposition CCXLVII was recorded on May 15, 1790. 
509 CCLXIII and CCCLXXVIII. 
510 CCCLXXVIII. 
511 CCCLXXX. 
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This is problematic especially if this kind of pressure was used to shape and perhaps taint 
the testimony of other witnesses as well. 
The demographic information about the witnesses is also an important factor 
when evaluating the investigation as a whole since it greatly influences what testimony 
the Châtelet was able to record. The vast majority of the witnesses lived in Paris or 
Versailles. At the time of their questioning, 108 individuals named Versailles as their 
place of residence.512 37 additional individuals clarified that Paris was now their place of 
residence, most implying that they had moved from Versailles.513 Therefore, it would not 
be surprising if some of the 225 witnesses who listed Paris or the faubourgs as their place 
of residence also recently moved with the National Assembly and the king from 
Versailles.514 Since the collection of testimony took place up until 9 months after the 
                                                        
512 XIV, XV, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXXII, XXXIV, LVII, LVIII, 
LIX, LXI, LXIII, LXIV, LXV, LXVI, LXVII, LXVIII, LXIX, LXXI, LXXIII, LXXIV, LXXV, LXXVI, 
LXXXVII, LXXXVIII, LXXXIX, XCVII, XCVIII, CI, CVII, CXVI, CXXXI, CXLI, CLXIV, CLXXVIII, 
CLXXIX, CCXVII, CCXXXI, CCXXXIII, CCXXXIV, CCXXXVII, CCXLVII, CCXLVIII, CCXLIX, 
CCL, CCLXIX, CCLXXXVIII, CCXCI, CCXCIII, CCXCIV, CCXCVI, CCXCVII, CCXCIX, CCC, 
CCCII, CCCIII, CCCVII, CCCVIII, CCCIX, CCCX, CCCXI, CCCXII, CCCXXII, CCCXXIII, 
CCCXXIV, CCCXXV, CCCXXVII, CCCXXIX, CCCXXX, CCCXXXI, CCCXXXII, CCCXXXIII, 
CCCXXXVII, CCCXXXVII, CCCXXXIX, CCCXL, CCCXLI, CCCXLII, CCCXLV, CCCXLVII, 
CCCLI, CCCLII, CCCLIII, CCCLIV, CCCLV, CCCLVI, CCCLIX, CCCLX, CCCLXIV, CCCLXV, 
CCCLXVI, CCCLXVII, CCCLXVIII, CCCLXX, CCCLXXI, CCCLXXVII, CCCLXXVIII, CCCLXXIX, 
CCCLXXX, CCCLXXXIV, CCCLXXXVI, and CCCLXXXVI.  
513 CX, CXIII, CXIX, CXXVI, CXXVII, CXXVIII, CXXIX, CXXX, CXXII, CXXXIII, CXXXIV, CXLV, 
CXLVII, CXLVIII, CXLIX, CLIII, LCIV, CLV, CLVII,  CLXIX, CLXXVI, CLXXXVI, CXCI, CXCVII, 
CXCIX, CCXIV, CCXIX, CCXX, CCXXIII, CCXXX, CCLXXXV, CCCXVI, CCCXXXVI, CCCL, 
CCCLXIX, CCCLXXV, and CCCLXXXVI. 
514 I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII (Saint-Antoine), VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XXIX, XXX, 
XXXI, XXVIII (saint-Honoré), XXIX, XXX, XXI, XXXIII, XXXV, XXXVI, XXXVII, XXXVIII, 
XXXIX, XL, XLI, XLII, XLIII, XLIV, XLV, XLVI, XLVII, XLVIII, XLIX, L, LI, LII, LIII, LIV, LV, LVI 
(faubourg), LX, LXII, LXX, LXXVII, LXXVIII, LXXIX, LXXX (Saint-Antoine), LXXXXI, LXXXIV, 
LXXXV, LXXXVI, XC, XCI, XCII (Saint-Antoine), XCV, XCIX, C, CII, CIII, CIV, CV, CVI, CVIII, 
CIX, CIX, CXII, CIV, CXV, CXVII, CXVIII, CXX, CXXI, CXXIII, CXXIV, CXXV, CXXXV, CXXXVI, 
CXXXVII, CXXXIX, CXL, CXLIII, CXLIV,  CXLVI, CL, CLI, CLII, CLVI, CLVIII, CLIX, CLX, CLXI, 
CLXII, CLXIII, CLXV, CLXVI, CLXVII, CLXIX, CLXX, CLXXI, CLXXII, CLXXXIII, CLXXIV, 
CLXXV, CLXXX, CLXXXI, CLXXXIII, CLXXXIV, CLXXXV, CLXXXVII, CLXXXVIII, CLXXXIX, 
CXC, CXCII, CXCIII, CXCIV, CXCV, CXCVI, CXCVIII, CC, CCI, CCII, CCIII, CIV, CCV (Faubourg 
Saint Germain), CCVIII, CCIX, CCX, CCXI, CCXII, CCXIII, CCXV, CCXVI, CCXVIII, CCXXI, 
CCXXII, CCXXIV, CCXXIV, CCXXV, CCXXVI, CCXXVII, CCXXVIII, CCXXIX, CCXXXII, 
CCXXXV, CCXXXVI, CCXXXVIII, CCXXXIX, CCXL, CCXLI, CCXLII, CCXLIII, CCXLIV 
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journée, some individuals probably felt reestablished enough not to have to specify that 
they moved. Of course, the residency of the witnesses plays a crucial part in the 
testimony as it may reveal prejudices. For example, Versailles inhabitants probably 
regretted that their town was invaded by masses of Parisians and deprived of its pride and 
livelihood (the king and royal government), whereas Parisians most likely looked 
favorably on the events as a way of removing the king from potentially bad influences 
and protecting him in the capital. Only fourteen other towns and cities are cited as places 
of residence in the entire investigation.515 Since almost all the witnesses lived in 
Versailles or Paris, all had something at stake and were affected by the journée in some 
manner. Not to mention, the political ramifications of the journée greatly contributed to 
personal biases. In the Châtelet investigation, there were no objective witnesses. 
 The occupations of the witnesses also provide valuable background information 
which often affected their various points of view and directed the role which they played 
in the October Days. A large portion of the witnesses were part of some military group. 
124 of the witnesses were connected to royal military troops. 31 of these witnesses were 
Body Guards or worked with these troops,516 22 were members of the Flanders 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(Belleville), CCXLV (Belleville), CCXLVI, CCLI, CCLII, CCLIII, CCLIV, CCLV, CCLVI, CCLVIII, 
CCLIX, CCLXIII, CCLIX, CCXV, CCLXV, CCLXVI, CCLXVII, CCLXVIII, CCLXIXb (Bellevue) 
CCLXX, CCLXI, CCLXXII, CCLXXIII, CCLXXIV, CCLXXVI, CCLXXVI, CCLXXVII, CCLXXX, 
CCLXXXI, CCLXXXII, CCLXXXIII, CCLXXXIV, CCLXXXVI, CCLXXXVII, CCLXXIX, CCXC, 
CCXCV, CCXCVIII, CCCI, CCCIV, CCCV, CCCVI, CCCXIII, CCCXIV, CCCXV, CCCXVII, 
CCCXVIII, CCCXIX, CCCXX, CCCXXI, CCCXXVI, CCCXXVIII, CCCXXXV, CCCXLIII, CCCXLIV, 
CCCXLVII, CCXLVIII, CCCXLIX, CCCLXII, CCCLXI, CCCLXII, CCCLXIII, CCCLXXII, 
CCCLXXIII, CCCLXXIV, CCCLXXVI, CCCLXXXII, CCCLXXIII, and CCCLXXXV. 
515 Limousin: CCCLXXXI ; Langres: CCCLXXXIX, CCCLXXXX ; Pont-Audemer: CCCLXXXXI ; 
Charlieu (near Annonay): CCCLXXXXII ; Montheaux: CCCLXXXXIII ; Genève: CCCLXXXXI ; Passy: 
CCCLVIII ; Sèvres: CCLXXIX ; Nanterre: CCXCII; Paris and Rouen: CLXXVII; Grenoble and Paris: 
CXXII; Paris and Chartres: CXLII; Fontainebleu: CLXXXII; Clermont and Paris: CCCXXXIV. 
516 Some witnesses listed more than one occupation and are therefore counted in more than one group. X, 
XVI, XVIII, CXIV, CXXVIII, CXXIX, CXXX, CXXXVIII, CLVIII, CLXXIII, CCXII, CCXIV, CCXVI, 
CCXXV, CCL, CCLXXVII, CCLXXXI, CCCIII, CCCXXVI, CCCXXXVII, CCCXL, CCCXLII, 
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Regiment,517 and 7 were members of the Swiss Guard.518 The remaining 64 individuals 
were from a variety of royal military positions including the dragoons, chevaliers, 
chasseurs, troops from other regions, and those who were given the honorary title of 
chevalier de Saint Louis.519 Including the 26 members Parisian National Guard520 and 16 
members of the Versailles National Guard who testified521, 166 witnesses or 42 percent 
of the witness pool had some kind of military affiliation. 
Distribution of Military Witnesses Interviewed: 
 
 
 
 The Châtelet interviewed several governmental officials about the journée. Sixty 
National Assembly deputies offered depositions and several not only testified not only 
about the events which took place at the National Assembly, but also portrayed a variety 
of deputy concerns, personal experiences, and atmospheres making the depositions a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
CCCXLIX, CCCLXI, CCCLXII, CCCLXVIII, CCCLXIX, CCCLXXV, CCCLXXXXI, CCCLXXXXII, 
and CCCLXXXXIII. 
517 XXXVIII, LIX, LXIII, LXIV, LXV, LXVI, LXVII, LXVIII, LXIX, LXXI, LXXXVII, LXXXVIII, 
LXXXIX, XCVII, XCVIII, CLXXXII, CCXL, CCXCI, CCXCIX, CCCXXIII, CCCXXIV, and CCCXXV. 
518 XXXII, XXXIII, XXXIV, CXXXI, CCLXVII, CCLXI, and CCLXXVI. 
519 VI, XVII, XXII, XXXVIII, XLVIII, LXI, LXX, LXVV, LXXVII, LXXIX, LXXXIV, CI, CVII, CXIII, 
CXV, CXX, CXXIII, CXXIV, CXXXIV, CXL, CXLVI, CL, CLVI, CLXI, CLXIV, CLXIX, CLXXII, 
CLXXVI, CLXXXV, CXCVIII, CCIV, CCXXI, CCXXVI, CCXXXII, CCXXXIX, CCXLVI, CCLXIV, 
CCLXV, CCLXVI, CCLXXII, CCXCIV, CCI, CCCIV, CCCV, CCCVII, CCCVIII, CCCX, CCCX, 
CCCXII, CCCXII, CCCXVI, CCCXVII, CCCXVIII, CCCXX, CCCXXX, CCCXXXV, CCCXLI, 
CCCXLVIII, CCCXLIX, CCCLVI, CCCLXVII, CCCLXX, CCCLXXIX, and CCCLXXXI. 
520 XII, XXVIII, LX, LXX, LXXX, LXXXI(Volontaires de la Bastille), CIX, CLX, CLXVII, CLXXXIX, 
CXCIII, CCIX, CCXXII, CCXLIV, CCLII, CCLXII, CCLXXXVI, CCLXXXVII, CCXCV, CCXCVIII, 
CCCXIV, CCCXV, CCCXIX, CCCXXVIII, CCCLXIII, and CCCLXXXIII. 
521 XIV, XV, XIX, CLVII, CLXXVIII, CCXXXIII, CCXLVII, CCXLVIII, CCC, CCCIII, CCCIX, 
CCCXXX, CCCXXXIX, CCCLXIV, and CCCLXXXIV. 
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valuable resource for fleshing out the account left behind in the National Assembly 
records.522 The Châtelet did not ignore governmental employees on a municipal level and 
summoned five Versailles Municipal Employees523 and 34 individuals connected with the 
Commune and Parlement de Paris.524 These testimonies afford the reader insights as to 
how the respective municipalities dealt with the journée. 
 Several individuals of royal nonmilitary positions also testified to the Châtelet. Of 
the king’s employees, 26 of his counselors or employees with professional positions gave 
their version of the October Days to the judges.525 Valets, pages, and other 
nonprofessional employees of the royal household and family accounted for 41 additional 
depositions.526 Squires without specified employment and courtiers present at Versailles 
contributed seven depositions.527 
 These numbers do not leave much room for nonaffiliated groups of people – that 
is general members of the populace; only 112 of the witnesses held positions outside of 
the above groups. The Châtelet interviewed 26 bourgeois with jobs outside of the 
                                                        
522 IV, XIII, XCIII, CX, CXIII, CXIX, CXX, CXXII, CXXVI, CXXVII, CXXXIX, CXL, CXLII, CXLIII, 
CXLV, CXLVI, CXLVII, CXLVIII, CXLIX, CLIII, CLIV, CLV, CLXI, CLXVIII, CLXX, CLXXI, 
CLXXVI, CLXXVII, CLXXXV, CLXXXVI, CXC, CXCI, CXCII, CXCIII, CXCVII, CXCIX, CCI, CCIV, 
CCXIII, CCXIX, CCXXI, CCXXIII, CCXXIV, CCXXVII, CCXXIX, CCXXX, CCXXXII, CCXLI, 
CCXLII, CCXLVI, CCLXIV, CCLXXXV, CCCXX, CCCXXXIV, CCCXXXV, CCCXXXVI, CCXLVIII, 
CCCL, CCCLXXIII, and CCCLXXXIV. 
523 CCXXXVII, CCCXXIX, CCCXXXII, CCCXXXIII, and CCCLXXX. 
524 II, XI, XII, XIII, XXX, XXXV, XXXIX, XL, XLI, XLIII, XLIV, XLIX, L, LX, LXXIX, CLII, CLXII, 
CLXIII, CLXV, CLXX, CLXXV, CLXXXIX, CXCII, CXCIV, CCX, CCXV, CCXXXVIII, CCLIII, 
CCLV, CCLXXXVIII, CCCXV, CCCXLVII, and CCCLVII. 
525 XXXVIII, XXXIX, XL, CXX, CXXVI, CXLIX, CLV, CLXXVII, CLXXXVIII, CCII, CCVI, CCIX, 
CCXX, CCXXIII, CCXXVIII, CCXLIII, CCXLIV, CCLII, CCLXIII, CCLXXIX, CCLXXXIII, CCCXI, 
CCCXLV, CCCLX, CCCLXXIV, and CCCLXXXXI. 
526 III, VIII, XV, XXII, XXIV, XXVI, XLVII, L, LII, LVI, LVIII, LXII, LXXII, LXXXVI, XCIV, XCIX, 
CXVI, CXXXIX, CLXVI, CXCV, CCVII, CCXVIII, CCXXXI, CCXXXIII, CCXXXIV, CCXXXIX, 
CCXLIX, CCLXIX, CCXCV, CCCVI, CCCXXI, CCCXXVII, CCCXXXVII, CCCXLVII, CCCLI, 
CCCLIII, CCCLXXVII, CCCLXXXII, CCCLXXXVI,  CCCLXXXVII, and CCCLXXXVIII. 
527 IX, LXX, CCXI, CCXCII, CCCVII, CCCX, and CCCXII. 
 119
government and employment by the royal household.528 Approximately 83 individuals 
had a social standing below that of bourgeois and no connection to the government and 
royal household (several also served in the militia).529 
In total, 198 witnesses owed their employment to the royal military or the royal 
household, and therefore had at least some reason to view the invasion of royal grounds 
and the manipulation of the king with contempt. Additionally, the 21 clergy members 
interviewed, including the acolyte and the nun, were probably aware of and averse to the 
anticlerical attitude espoused by several individuals of the crowd inside the National 
Assembly on the evening of October 5 (many of these clergy members were in fact 
deputies as well).530 With these statistics in mind, the witness pool takes on a politically 
conservative inclination solely on the basis of occupational statistics. Moreover, this 
occupational evaluation reveals a discrepancy in the background of the witness pool in 
comparison to the background of the actual participant pool of the journée. In reality, the 
                                                        
528 Academia: II, VI, XXXI, XLII, LV, XCI, XCII, CCIII, CCLI, CCXC, CCCXIV; Lawyer (Avocat): 
CCVIII, CCCXXXIII; Doctor of Law: CLXXIV; Doctor: XXVIII, CCXC; Bourgeois: V, XLV, XC; Big 
merchant (Négociant): I, CXLI, CCCXXXIX, CCCLXIV, CCCLXXXV; Clerk: CCLXVIII 
529 Master Glazier (Maître vitrier): CCLXXIX ; Master Scribe (Maître d’écriture): CCCII ; (Master of Arts 
in Ironworks) Maître-és-arts en fonte de fer: CC ; Master of the Horse Post at Versailles (Maître des Postes 
aux chevaux à Versailles) : CCCXXXI ; Master Apothecary (Maître en pharmacie) : CCCLIV ; Master 
Joiner (Maître Menuisier): CCCLIII ; Master Locksmith (Maître Serrurier): CCCLXIII ; Master Carpenter 
(Maître Charpentier): CCCLXXI ; Master Harpiste (Maître de Harpe): CCCLXXVI ; Master Wigmaker 
(Maître Perruquier): CCCLXXXX ; Master Fonder (Maître Fondeur) : CLXXX ; Master Baker (Maître 
Boulanger): CCCLIX ; Master Cobbler (Maître Cordonier): CLI ; Master Seamstress: LXXXV ; 
(Merchant) Marchand: XIV, XIX, XX, XXI, LVII, LXXIII, LXXVI, CII, CIII, CXXXV, CLXXXI, 
CCXCVI, CCCXXIX, CCCLV ; Domestic Servant (Domestique): CXVIII, CXXXII, CXXXIII, CXXXVI, 
CXLIV, CCV, CCLIV, CCLVI, CCLXXIII, CCLXXIV, CCLXXV, CCCXXII ; Machiniste (Machinist): 
LXXIV; Innkeeper (Aubergiste): CCXCII; Store Worker: XXV, CVI, CVIII; Flower Seller: CLXXXVII; 
Locksmith : LXXVIII, CIV, CIX; Clothes Cleaner and Dyer : CV; Tapissier: CCXVII; Wigmaker 
(Perruquier): XXVII, CCXCVII; Geographic Engineer: XXIX; Barrières guard: LI; Farm Worker: LIII, 
CXXI (wife); Worker: CCXXXVI, CCCXLIII; Housekeeper (Gouvernante): CCCXLIV ; Home Nurse 
(Garde-malades): LXXXII ; House Cleaner: LXXXIII; Widow: LIV, CCLXXXIV, CCCLXXXIV; 
Unemployed Wife : CXXV, CLX, CLXXIX, CLXXXIV, CCXXXV, CCXLV, CCLXXXII, CCCLVIII, 
CCCLXV, CCCLXVI; Artist: XCV, CLXXXIII, CCCLXXXIII; Day Laborer (Journalier): CCLIX ; Pastry 
Chef (Pâtissier): CCLX ; Doorman (Portier) : CCLXI ; Gardner (Jardinier): CCLVII ; Landlord of 
Furnished Rooms (Logeur en chambres garnies): CXXXVII. 
530 Clergy: XXXVI, XLVI, XLVII, XCI, XCII, XCIII, CX, CXI, CXII, CXLII, CXCIX, CCIII, CCXIX, 
CCLI, CCLXIXb, CCCVI, CCCXXXIV, CCCLX, CCCLXXXIX; Acolyte: CCLXXX; Nun: XCVI. 
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thousands of Parisian women, men, and National Guards far outnumbered the royal 
troops present in Versailles, but their testimonial voice is lacking in comparison. The 
most striking example of this is the deficiency of women marchers interviewed. These 
proportional flaws in the number and kinds of people summoned taint the overall picture 
of the journée given by the Châtelet as more unfavorable than it may have been actually 
viewed by many of the participants. In short, the combination of a conservatively inclined 
witness pool and a conservative court predictably resulted in conservative conclusions 
which cast suspicion on the susceptibility of the populace to be driven by conspiracy or 
other devious intentions. 
Witness Employment Distribution 
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Chapter 6: An Analysis of Testimony For and Against Conspiracy 
 
Indeed over 20 percent of the witnesses not only understood that the Châtelet was 
looking for information about the “auteurs” of the crime in regards to a potential 
conspiracy, but they also successfully took the hint to mention Orléans and Mirabeau in 
their testimony.531 Although 61 individuals testified about Orléans532 and 33 witnesses 
gave information concerning Mirabeau,533 not all of the information actually links them 
to a conspiracy. In this respect, some individuals seem to have taken the denunciation 
read to them as a request to give the judges all their knowledge of the October Days 
along with any type of knowledge that they had of Orléans and Mirabeau whatsoever. 
When the content of these 84 depositions is broken down, the result is a much weaker 
case against Orléans and Mirabeau than the Châtelet and many conservative National 
Assembly deputies had hoped for.534  
Even though the denunciation asked for information about October 6, some 
individuals volunteered information about Orléans before the October Days. Most of the 
testimony of these witnesses centered around two issues: the popular parading of 
                                                        
531 It is important to recall that Shapiro argues that although the “auteurs” were not named in the October 
Days denunciation, it was common knowledge that the officials had Orléans and Mirabeau specifically in 
mind. 
532 I, IV, VI, XVII, XXXI, XXXVI, XLVI, XLVIII, XLIX, XLVII, XLVIII, LV, LXXIX, LXXXII, 
LXXXVII, XCV, CIV, CVII, CXI, CXIX, CXXIV, CXXVI, CXXXII, CXXXIII, CXXXV, CXL, CXLIX, 
CLV, CLXII, CXLVII, CLXVIII, CLXXI, CLXXVII, CLXXX, CXCV, CCII, CCV, CCVII, CCXI, 
CCXIV, CCXVII, CCXXVI, CCXLIII, CCXLVI, CCLIV, CCLVI, CCLXXII, CCXC, CCCXVII, 
CCCXLIV, CCCLVII, CCCLXV, CCCLXXIV, CCCLXXVI, CCCLXXVII, CCCLXXXI, and 
CCCLXXXIII. 
533 I, IV, XVIII, XXII, XXIV, XXXVII, XLIX, LIV, LV, LXXI, XC, CXI, XCI, CXL, CXLVII,  CXLIX, 
CLIV, CLVII, CLXIV, CLXVIII, CLXX, CLXXI,  CLXXVII, CCIV, CCXI,  CCXX, CCXXIV, CCXXVI, 
CCXXX, CCCXVII, CCCXLV, and CCCLXXXXIV. 
534 In an effort to thoroughly analyze the portrayal of Orléans and Mirabeau in the Procédure Criminelle, I 
have counted every deposition in which either is specifically mentioned, regardless of the context of the 
testimony. This will give the most conclusive picture of the kind of evidence offered for and against them. 
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Orléans’ and Necker’s busts on July 12535 and the manufacture of lead plaques which 
read “Vive Orléans” during the winter of 1788-1789.536 One individual offered the 
observation that he saw some men talking to the police commissionaire on July 13 and 14 
and that he saw these men lead 2,000 armed men across the Pont Royal. He loosely 
linked this vague event to Orléans by saying that he believed the leaders of the armed 
men to be Orléans’ jockeys.537 François-Henri de Virieu observed that the people wanted 
to make Orléans the lieutenant-général du royaume (the dauphin’s regent) which reveals 
the duke’s popularity in mid July.538 An additional witness said that he had worked to 
make 600 pikes during July in the facilities of Faure, who was Orléans’ locksmith.539 The 
witnesses merely shared this information because it encompassed questionable behavior 
linked in some way to Orléans. The events which the individuals described are not linked 
to a conspiracy behind the October Days. 
Four witnesses came slightly closer to the denunciation by testifying about events 
immediately preceding the journée. One witness saw one of Orléans' servants in the 
Palais Royal shouting angrily about the Body Guard banquet, but this kind of speech was 
not unique due to the great public agitation over the event.540 Two witnesses expressed 
their suspicion that Orléans had supported the placards encouraging people to take an 
oath to defend the National Assembly and calling them to arms.541  One of these 
witnesses also heard a rumor that Orléans dropped off 16,000 livres at the hotel de la 
reine on Oct 4 and told someone “that in less than a few hours one would see some things 
                                                        
535 XCV, CXXIV, and CCXXIV. 
536 CLXXX, and CCVII. 
537 LXXIX. Although the primary definition of jockey is a coachman, nearly all the witnesses who use the 
term use it to describe a messenger, often on horseback. 
538 CXL. 
539 CIV. 
540 XLIX. 
541 XLVIII and CXXVI. 
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clearly.”542 Interestingly, no one else makes this claim. The most curious of the pre-
October Days testimony comes from an old officer of the royal military whose rationality 
and level-headedness shines throughout most of his deposition. He said that after the 
October 1 banquet he encountered a distressed chasseur de Trois-Evêchés who tried to 
kill himself after vaguely telling him “Our good king, this king’s brave household, I am a 
big rogue! What do these monsters want from me?” When the witness asked him who the 
monsters were, the chasseur replied “these scoundrels of Commandant and of Orléans” 
and then fell on his sword.543 This portion of his testimony seems absurd but is plausible. 
However, the testimony of these four witnesses provides no conclusive evidence of 
Orléans’ direct involvement in a conspiracy. 
The October 5 sightings of Orléans are equally as weak as evidence of Orléans’ 
involvement in a conspiracy. One Body Guard testified that he saw Orléans leave the 
National Assembly and head off in the direction of Paris around 1:00 pm. The same 
witness is the only one to testify that he saw Orléans among the armed people that night 
and that the people were making threats against the king and voicing their opinion that 
Orléans should be king instead.544 One witness testified that he saw Orléans dressed 
without distinction and alone in Paris,545 while another witness “heard it said, without 
being able to certify it,” that La Clos was at Saint-Denis waiting to leave for Versailles 
                                                        
542 XLVIII (“que sous peu d’heures on verroit bien des choses”). 
543 CCCLXXXI (“Notre bon Roi, cette brave Maison du Roi, je suis un grand gueux! Les monsters 
qu’exigent-ils de moi?”; “ces jean-foutres de Commandant & d’Orléans”) The chasseur is refering to 
Lafayette as “Commandant.” This appears to be a true incident since the witness then gives a detailed 
account of the rescue attempt and efforts to stop the bleeding. While doing so he specifically names some 
of the individuals who were involved in the incident. He also says that they wanted to keep the chasseur 
alive so that they could gain more details about his confession. 
544 CCXIV. 
545 CXIX. 
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with Orléans.546 Just as much attention was focused on Orléans’ employees on October 5 
as on Orléans himself. One witness described how he had seen Orléans talk to his jockeys 
(who had sabers) in the Bois de Boulogne, and that after this conversation, the jockeys 
galloped off in the direction of Paris.547 Another witness said that he had heard from a 
specific individual that one of Orléans’ jockeys had passed through the barrière on 
October 5,548 while the queen’s gardener testified that he saw several couriers in front of 
the château, including one who worked for Orléans.549 However, Orléans’ interaction 
with his employees who were doing their jobs as messengers can hardly be anything out 
of the ordinary. 
Many witnesses thought that it was appropriate to comment on the people’s 
general attachment to Orléans in their deposition. Two witnesses referred to Orléans’ 
paternal position among the people who told them Orléans was their “père”550 while 
another witness referred to the crowd metaphorically as Orléans’ “enfants.”551 One 
witness spoke of the people’s devotion to Orléans when describing a speech given in the 
Palais Royal on October 4 during which the speaker said the people would make Orléans 
the lieutenant-général instead of Lafayette.552 Yet, popularity does not imply guilt (take 
Lafayette’s position for example). 
More relevant to a conspiracy are the sources which attempt to implicate Orléans 
in bribery of the Flanders Regiment. Yet, only two witnesses testify that Orléans directly 
interacted with the Flanders Regiment. One witness said he heard someone encouraging 
                                                        
546 VI (“a entendu dire, sans pouvoir le certifier”). 
547 CCXXVI. 
548 CCXC. 
549LXXXII. 
550 CCCLXXVII and CCXXVI. 
551 CCII. 
552 CCXLIII. 
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the Regiment against the Body Guards, but wasn’t sure if the man was Ganache or 
Orléans.553 In addition, the other witness testified that someone else told him about the 
bribery and he did not directly see it.554 
The depositions which most strongly seem to implicate Orléans in a scheme are 
those concerning the activities on the morning of October 6. A total of 25 witnesses 
discussed Orléans’ actions on October 6. Orléans was accused of directing the conspiracy 
by many of his contemporaries. However, only 5 witnesses testified that they saw 
Orléans in the courts of the château before 8:00 am.555 Of these five, only two individuals 
testified that they saw Orléans in the middle of the people who were flooding the 
courtyards and directing their actions.556 The remaining three witnesses based their 
information on secondary sources.557 Two other sources do not give times for their 
observation, but the events they describe also took place during the chaos. A royal 
brigadier said that he heard a rumor that a man was pointing the way up the stairs to the 
queen’s apartments and that the man was Orléans.558 Another witness testified that a 
rumor was spreading that Orléans had encouraged his “children” from a terrace during 
the violence saying “allez, allez, continuez votre chemin.”559 It important to note the 
division between the testimony which refers to events before and after 8:00 a.m. since 
this was the time at which calm was reestablished in the château and the courtyards.560 
Therefore, if Orléans did have hand in directing the violence, this would have to have 
occurred before 8:00 a.m. 
                                                        
553 XVLIII. 
554 CXLVII. 
555 CCCLXXXIII, CCCLXXVI, CCLVI, CCCLXV, and LXXXVII. 
556 CCLVI and CCCLXV. 
557 CCCLXXXIII, CCCLXXXVI, and LXXXVII. 
558 CCXXVI. 
559 CCCXLIV (“enfants”). 
560 See Chapter 3. 
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Witnesses and reliable sources for spotting Orléans before 8:00 a.m. are clearly 
lacking in the Procédure criminelle and cannot be used to reasonably prove Orléans’ 
involvement in a conspiracy. Moreover, Mathiez argues that “it is beyond doubt that he 
did not arrive at Versailles before 8:00 in the morning.” Mathiez reached this conclusion 
after studying a letter written by Orléans and using a deposition given to the police of 
Gros-Callin in which “the national guards at the Point-du-Jour post affirm the have seen 
the duke of Orléans pass, October 6, 1789, at 7:30 in the morning, going in the direction 
of Versailles.”561 This evidence combined with the lack of convincing testimony makes it 
nearly impossible to directly link Orléans with the “crimes” of October 6.  
Skeptics would point out that eleven other testimonies report that Orléans was 
among the people on the morning of October 6. However, four of these testimonies 
specify that their sighting occurred at sometime after 8:00 a.m.562 In addition, four of the 
remaining witnesses testified that they saw Orléans surrounded by people crying “Vive le 
duc d’Orléans” or something to that effect563 which is exactly what three of the four post-
8:00 a.m. witnesses reported seeing as well which allows these sightings to be classified 
in the same post-8:00 am time frame.564 One of the witnesses specifically testified that he 
saw the crowd of people following Orléans when the chaos was calming down and the 
king appeared on the balcony.565 Another witness heard of Orléans’ presence in the courts 
                                                        
561 Albert Mathiez, “Étude critique sur les journées des 5 & 6 octobre,”Revue Historique, vol. 68 (1898): 
276. This letter was published in the collection “Correspondance de Philippe d’Orléans” and the deposition 
was recorded in Archives parlementaire, vol 19, p. 392 (“il est hors de doute qu’il n’arriva pas à Versailles 
avant 8 heures de matin”; “les gardes nationaux de poste du Point-du-Jour affirment avoir vu passer le duc 
d’Orléans, le 6 octobre 1789, à sept heures et demi du matin, se rendant à Versailles”). 
562 CXXXIII, CCLIV, CXCV, and CCCLXXIV. 
563 CLXXVIII, CCXVII, CXXVII, and CXXXII. 
564 CXXXIII, CCLIV, and CXCV. 
565 CCV. 
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but this deposition is too ambiguous to classify chronologically.566 The final witness in 
this group of eleven merely recounted what one of the other eleven witnesses had told 
him.567  
The remaining seven testimonies describe events which happened after order had 
been established on October 6. Most note Orléans’ presence in the king’s apartments and 
National Assembly, and others list people with whom Orléans was talking.568 Two 
depositions describe Orléans’ mood when the king left for Paris, but one claimed that he 
appeared content while the other testified that he looked unhappy.569 
Orléans’ relationship with politically influential people and the National 
Assembly as a whole were also scrutinized by the witnesses. Some witnesses reported 
rumors that Orléans was trying to corrupt members of the National Assembly and that he 
had been working with other deputies to get the king to flee from Versailles so that 
Orléans could become regent. They also discussed the relationship between Orléans and 
Mirabeau. One witness suggested that Orléans was fed up with Mirabeau who oscillated 
between correspondence with and denunciations against him.570 Two other witnesses 
reported that a deputy had told them that Orléans and La Touche were lamenting about 
failing to win over Estaing and their misfortune that he was appointed the leader of the 
Versailles National Guard.571 Two others cast suspicion on Orléans by testifying that he 
was tied to England, the contemporary and counter-revolutionary rival of France. Edme-
Thomas Garnier Dwall, a secretary of Prince Edward (son of George III), testified that a 
                                                        
566 CXLIX. 
567 CXXXV. 
568 CXI, CVII, CCXLVI, CCLXXII, and CLXVIII.  
569 CCXI and  XLVII. 
570 I and LV. 
571 XXXVI and XLVI. 
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friend had told him that Orléans was loaning Prince Edward money.572 In addition, a 
former member of the Comité des recherches of Paris said that the Comité had come into 
possession of a letter from London in the summer with Orléans’ seal on it, but that they 
were not permitted to open it and examine its contents.573 
Testimony Mentioning Orléans 
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Two witnesses responded to the insinuating “auteurs” referred to in the 
denunciation by actually giving their own rationale to exonerate Orléans. Nicholas 
Bergasse, a National Assembly deputy, postulated that “[Orléans] n’a été que le prête-
nom de beaucoup de gens qui vouloient se server de son credit pour assurer le success de 
leurs intrigues.”574 A professor and doctor of medicine also testified that he heard 
supporters of Orléans say that they could make him regent but that he also believed that if 
the king took flight to Metz, it would help Orléans with his plan.575 In his Etude Critique, 
Mathiez skillfully uses both of these points to argue that Orléans was not directly 
involved in a conspiracy. Even with 395 witnesses, the Procédure criminelle failed to 
                                                        
572 CCCXVII. 
573 CLV. It is not clear who forbade them from opening the letter, but it was probably the Commune or the 
National Assembly. 
574 IV. 
575 XXXI. 
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gather any substantial evidence linking Orléans to a conspiracy behind the journée. The 
investigation appears to implicate Orléans through the 61 testimonies, but in reality, the 
investigation merely succeeded in getting the witnesses to realize that Orléans was a 
suspected “auteur” and to mention any first or second-hand knowledge they had of him in 
their depositions. 
The 33 depositions which mentioned Mirabeau are equally laced with suspicion 
but are full of ambiguity. Only six depositions refer to Mirabeau before the October 
Days. Two of these accounts refer to Mirabeau’s opinion on the monarchy. One National 
Assembly deputy testified that Mirabeau had said that he was in favor of a king, but he 
didn’t care if it was Louis XVI or Louis XVII.576 Malouet, another deputy, said that he 
discussed the Spanish Bourbons’ rights to the French throne with Mirabeau, and 
Mirabeau seemed to favor that if the French line became extinct the crown should move 
to Orléans and that it could happen in a blink of an eye.577 Given Mirabeau’s outspoken 
personality and knack for ominous rhetoric, it would not be out of character for Mirabeau 
to say either of these things. However, two other depositions which mention Mirabeau 
before the journée do not provide any strong links to a plot. One refers to a speech given 
by Desmoulins in the Café de Foy in which he urged the people to protect Mirabeau, and 
the other vaguely mentions a July letter from Mirabeau to Mounier which the witness 
believed might have contained information about a conspiracy.578 The remaining two 
witnesses testified that, at least 12 days before the journée, Mirabeau had warned three 
secretaries that something was going to happen at Versailles but that good citizens should 
                                                        
576 IV. 
577 CXL. 
578 CCCXVII and CXLVII. It is obvious that Mounier was not involved in a conspiracy in any way since he 
abhorred the consequences of the journée. Therefore, it is not logical that Mirabeau would reveal a plot of 
this nature to the individual who would be most opposed to it. 
 130
not be afraid.579 Yet, no other witnesses mention Mirabeau’s actions in connection to a 
plot before the October Days.  
Only 14 witnesses mentioned Mirabeau’s actions on October 5. Half of these 
individuals merely reported Mirabeau’s actions in the National Assembly such as that he 
approached Mounier to report that the Parisians were coming, denounced the Body Guard 
banquet, convinced Mounier to suspend the assembly to go see the king, and complained 
about the endless disruptions the women caused in the session.580 One individual added 
that after Mirabeau said that the king should be the only person untouchable to 
denunciations, rumor had it that he muttered the queen and the duc de Guiche should be 
denounced.581 The other witnesses testified that Mirabeau was armed with a saber (some 
said near the Flanders Regiment),582 and one said that he had heard by rumor that 
Mirabeau talked to Valfond (the head of the regiment) who later gave a woman who 
asked him for bread some money instead.583 Only one individual said that he had heard 
from two other people that Mirabeau was among the ranks of the Flanders Regiment 
encouraging their defection and exciting the people.584 The remaining witnesses who 
recount the events of October 5 only mention the people’s association with Mirabeau and 
that some of the women in the National Assembly had said “Where is our Count 
Mirabeau; we want to see our Count Mirabeau.”585 
                                                        
579 XXII and  XXIV. The first witness said that his friend overheard this alleged conversation but the 
second witness said he directly heard the conversation. 
580 CCCLXXXXIV, XC, CXI, CLXVIII, CLXXVII, CCIV, CCXX, and CCXXIV. 
581 CLXVIII. 
582 XXXVII and CLXIV. 
583 LXXI. 
584 CXLIX. 
585 CCCXLV and CLIV (“Où est notre comte de Mirabeau; nous voulons voir notre comte de Mirabeau.”). 
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Only eight witnesses make any mention of Mirabeau on October 6. Four of the 
testimonies say that Mirabeau was among the Flanders Regiment or the people,586 but 
only one of these individuals said he directly witnessed these actions, and testified that 
Orléans was telling people “courage, my children, liberty” on the Place d’Armes.587 The 
other half of the witnesses correctly recounted the opinions of Mirabeau in the National 
Assembly that afternoon regarding the convening of the National Assembly, the 
deputation to be sent with the king, and the message sent to the provinces about the 
recent developments.588 
As for any mention of Mirabeau after the journée, there is the witness who 
asserted that Mirabeau alternated correspondence with and denunciation of Orléans.589 
Anne Pottevin gave a rather round about account insinuating Mirabeau’s connection in a 
plot. Pottevin testified that she had known Mirabeau for 19 years and that he had not yet 
paid her back for his wedding garments despite her reminders, but when she recently 
mentioned the debt he said he would be a minister and paid her back a few days after the 
king came to Paris.590 
Testimonies Mentioning Mirabeau 
                                                        
586 XVIII, CCXXVI, and CCXXX. 
587 CLVII (“courage, mes enfans, la liberté”). 
588 CLXXI, XCI, CLXX, and CCXI. The testimony of these witnesses is confirmed by the Procès-verbal as 
recorded in the Archives Parlementaires. 
589 LV. 
590 LIV. 
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At first glance, the fact that over 20 percent of the witnesses mentioned Orléans or 
Mirabeau seems to imply that the Châtelet was able to gather much evidence linking 
them to a conspiracy. However, upon a detailed analysis, one can conclude that the 
majority of individuals who mentioned Orléans and Mirabeau did just that – merely 
mentioned them. Most of the witnesses only cited Orléans and Mirabeau in reference to 
any observations they had of them whatsoever. The majority of these observations which 
are even applicable to the conspiracy theory are not highly incriminating, and no 
exceptionally solid evidence arose out of these 84 testimonies. Moreover, if one takes 
into account the fact that the Châtelet interviewed an over-represented portion of 
governmental and military officials in comparison to the total number of people involved 
in the journée, and that if a conspiracy really was organized from above the individuals in 
these positions would have been the most likely to hear about it, the Procédure criminelle 
actually weakens the argument that the journée was a result of a grand plot. In addition, 
the Châtelet had the power to summon individuals whom witnesses cited as their source 
of information. Yet, little concrete evidence or even a great number of similarly 
incriminating observations against Mirabeau and Orléans surfaces in the testimonies. The 
Châtelet investigation miserably fails as a foundation for any argument maintaining that 
Orléans and Mirabeau planned and directed a conspiracy during the October Days.   
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Proponents of the conspiracy theory would be quick to argue that just because 
Orléans and Mirabeau did not direct a plot that does not mean that one did not exist since 
some witnesses talk about bribes which the people received. However, these testimonies 
are even less numerous than those implicating Mirabeau and Orléans.591 Only 14 
depositions concern a potential or stated exchange of money during the October Days. 
Five of the witnesses said that they talked to people who were given money or who had 
been offered money during the journée.592 One of these witnesses specified that the 
troops were offered money to bring the king and the National Assembly to Paris. Two 
witnesses said that they witnessed people directly handing out money,593 and only one 
witness said she was offered 6 to 12 livres by a person from the Palais Royal to go to 
Versailles.594 Four other witnesses said they heard only by rumor that someone paid the 
Flanders Regiment and the people for their actions.595 Two women specifically testified 
that they had not received money. Louise-Marguerite-Pierette Chabry was part of the 
deputation to see the king and she swore to the crowd that she did not receive any money 
from him.596 The second individual was aware of the bribery rumors and she actually 
attempted to dismiss them by testifying that a little girl had seen a man give a woman 
some money in the National Assembly and so the little girl ran off shouting that the 
women were paid, thereby beginning the rumor.597 
                                                        
591 Only 26 witnesses mention the exchange of money or people with money. They are: XX, LXXXVII, 
CCCXXX, CCCLXXXIV, CXX, CCCLXXIII, CLXXXII, XLV, CCXXXVI, CLXXXIII, XXXV, 
LXXXVIII, CX, CXLIV, LVI, LXXXII, CCXCIV, CCLXXX, CLXXVIII, CLXXIX, CCXXXV, CCLI, 
CCLXI, CCCXVII, XCIII, and CCCLXVII. 
592 XX, LXXXVII, CCCXXX, CCCLXXXIV, and CXX. 
593 CCCLXXIII and CLXXXII. 
594 XLV. 
595 XXXV, LXXXVIII, CX, and CXLIV. 
596 CLXXXIII. 
597 CCXXXVI. 
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Similar to the tendency with Orléans and Mirabeau, some witnesses divulged 
knowledge of suspicious payment which actually occurred before or after the October 
Days, while others spoke of people who seemed to have a lot of money during the 
journée. Six witnesses refer to people gesturing to their pockets, showing them money, or 
being in possession of more money than is usual for their socio-economic station, but 
made no mention of why they had money.598 Five other witnesses spoke of money being 
handed out in the months and weeks before the October Days, three at the Palais-
Royal,599 one at Passy,600 and one at an undisclosed location.601 One witness even took 
the opportunity to say that someone had told her that the queen gave the Body Guards 
three louis each after the journée “to prevent the Millers from grinding, and the Bakers 
from cooking.”602 
The deficiency of testimony describing bribery or exchange of money among the 
people also weakens the conspiracy argument. It appears that at least the majority of 
people were not paid for their actions, or there would have been more testimony to that 
effect. Once again we return to the conclusion that the march was spontaneous and 
popularly motivated. Many more witnesses actually discussed the intentions of le peuple 
rather than the payment of them. The testimony provided by 41 witnesses directly states 
the intentions of the people in some way, as opposed to merely implying their 
motivations. These 41 observations further support the conclusion that the journée was a 
popularly based movement. 
                                                        
598 LVI, LXXXII, CCXCIV, CCLXXX, CLXXVIII, and CLXXIX. 
599 CCLI, CCLXI, and CCCXVII. 
600 XCIII. 
601 CCXXXV. 
602 CCCLXVIII (“pour empêcher les Moulins de moudre, & les Boulanders (sic) de cuire”).   
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Of these 41 witnesses, 28 cited bread alone as the driving force behind the 
women’s actions.603 These witnesses determined what the women wanted through a 
variety of means: some directly asked the women, some heard the women voicing their 
demands to others, some referred to slogans which the women shouted as a group, and 
others wove the demand into their narrative as the motivation for the women’s actions 
(i.e. the women came into the National Assembly or went to see the king to ask for 
bread). A lieutenant in the Flanders Regiment emphasized this one dimensional focus 
when he recounted the women telling him “it’s not money which you must give us, it’s 
bread.”604 Similarly, a Parisian woman said the other women in the crowd told two Body 
Guards who inquired about their intentions that “they came to ask for some bread, 
because one can hardly get any for two livres, while spending half the day at the door of 
the bakers.”605 These observations concerning subsistence as motivation span the entire 
timeline of October 5 from the initial shouting at Les Halles to the Hôtel de Ville, and 
from the march to the deputation formed to see the king. Only three of these testimonies 
mention any intention of using violence, and it is mentioned as a last resort only if the 
women could not get bread.606 
 Eight additional witnesses testified that the women intended to procure bread 
through their actions, but that they had other motivations as well.607 Three of the 
witnesses also stated that one of the women’s goals was to bring the king back to Paris.608 
                                                        
603 XXXVII, XLIII, XLIX, LXXXII, XC, XCIII, CV, CVI, CXI, CXIV, CXVI, CXXXVI, CLXV, 
CLXXXIII, CCXI, CCXX, CCXXXVII, CCXVI, CCLXIX, CCLXXII, CCLXXIV, CCCXII, CCCXX, 
CCCXLIII, CCCLXXXVI, CCCLXXXXI, CCVCI, and CCCLXXXII. 
604 XXXVII (“ce n’est pas de l’argent qu’il nous faut, c’est du pain”). 
605 CV (“elles voient demander du pain, parce qu’a peine pouvoit-on en avoir deux livres, en passant une 
demi-journée à la porte des boulangers”). 
606 CCVCI, CCCLXXXII, and CCXXXVII. 
607 CXL, CLIV, CCXXI, CLV, CLXXVII, CCCLXXXXIV, XXX, and LXXXI. 
608 CCXXI, CLV, and CCCLXXXXIV. 
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Two witnesses told the Châtelet that the women came to the National Assembly to 
complain about the behavior of the Body Guards,609 and Mounier also noted that this was 
one of the issues taken up by the women.610 Two other witnesses said that the women 
wanted to punish “the authors of the famine” and “to ask for justice” in addition to asking 
for bread.611 One deposition asserts that the women demanded the pure and simple 
acceptance of the constitution along with the bread.612 
Only five of the 41 witnesses who directly stated the motivations of the women 
did not mention bread at all. Each of the five depositions which do not mention bread as a 
motivation state that the women arrived with the intention of harming the Body Guards 
and the royal family. A Body Guard named Charles-François Bernardy made the most 
scathing assessment of the women’s goals. He testified that a woman told him on the 
evening of October 5: “It’s certainly not bread that we demand; it’s blood that you must 
give us, you are all rogues; your queen is a coquin, and we want her skin so that we can 
make district ribbons with it.”613 
Nonetheless, these figures attest that the primary motivation for the women’s 
march was to procure bread. When the 41 testimonies which directly state the women’s 
motivations are sifted from those others which only insinuate their intentions, 28 mention 
bread as the sole goal, 8 mention bread in addition to another motivation, and only 5 state 
that the women had purely malicious and violent intentions. This evidence, in 
conjunction with the lack of reliable testimony concerning bribery, confirms that the 
                                                        
609 CXL and CLIV. 
610 CCCLXXXXIV. 
611 XXX and LXXXI (“les auteurs de la famine”; “demander justice”).  
612 CLXXVII. 
613 CCXXV (“Ce n’est point du pain que nous demandons; c’est du sang qu’il nous faut; vous êtes tous des 
gueux; votre reine est une coquine, & nous voulons sa peau pour en faire des rubans de districts.”). 
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march to Versailles was a popularly driven movement principally motivated by the 
Parisian bread crisis.   
Another historical dispute which the Châtelet investigation sheds light on is the 
issue of men disguised as women. Some historians dismiss this idea altogether as 
exaggeration, while others refer to it as part of a conspiracy which shaped the October 
Days. Certainly the Châtelet judges viewed this testimony in the latter light. Yet another 
option must be considered. Could there have been men disguised as women even if there 
was no conspiracy? Although this situation may seem counterintuitive, the investigation 
reveals some startling numbers. Of the 395 witnesses who testified before the Châtelet, 
47 assert that there were men disguised as women.614  Three of these claims were made 
by women, none of whom actually participated in the march.615 Even with the 
conservatively skewed demographic of people interviewed, a claim which is made by 
11.9 percent of the witnesses cannot easily be dismissed.  
 In order to effectively analyze these claims, one must look again at the role 
gender played in the events of the journée. As has already been noted, the issue which 
catalyzed the October Days involved general subsistence, or more specifically bread. 
This is why so many accounts detail the separation of women and men in the initial 
action at the Hôtel de Ville. The women clearly felt that this issue was within their 
domain and actively turned away men who sought to interfere or even help their cause. 
This of course did not stop men from participating in the journée. From Maillard’s 
account, we know that some men marched with the women to Versailles, but they 
                                                        
614 The following testimonies purport the idea of men disguised as women: I, V, VII, XI, XVII, XXXIII, 
XLIV, XLIX, LIX, LXXXI, XCVII, XCVIII, CX, CXX, CXXV, CXXX, CXXXVI, CXXXVIII, CXXXIX, 
CXLV, CXLVIII, CLXI, CLXII, CLXIII, CLXX, CLXXVIII, CLXXIX, CLXXXII, CLXXXV, CCI, 
CCIII, CCXXV, CCXXVI, CCXXXIII, CCXXXVII, CCXL, CCXLVI, CCLXX, CCLXXII, CCXCIV, 
CCCVII, CCCXVI, CCXLVII, CCCLVI, CCCLXV, CCCLXXIII, and CCCLXXXVI.  
615 CXXV, CLXXIX, and CCCLXV. 
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remained segregated from the women at the end of the column.616 Therefore, men could 
and did participate without a disguise. Moreover, those men in the National Guard were 
able to play a highly active role in the journée as well. 
 So why would men dress as women, disregarding the conspiracy argument? 
Primarily it could be an issue of safety. The National Guards at the Hôtel de Ville were 
hesitant to fight and control the crowd in part because the crowd was composed of 
women. If a man wished to secure the safety of his being and was wise enough to 
consider the implications of his gender, he would realize that he would be exposed to less 
brutal resistance as a woman than as a man. (There are other close examples in French 
history of men disguising themselves as women while confronting higher powers. In 
1774, 1765, and 1783 men in the Beaujolais, Vivarais, and Franche-Comté respectively 
dressed as women while revolting against figures of authority. The War of the 
Demoiselles, which began in 1829, used this device extensively for three years.617) 
Active men would not only come into conflict with the National Guards but would also 
come into conflict with the women who wanted to maintain the division of the sexes. So 
men who dressed as women could also be disguised from the very women they joined in 
order to be accepted into the group.  
The next question which must be addressed is the capability of men to find a 
disguise during the rather spontaneous start of the journée. All accounts within the 
investigation which mention men disguised as women only testify their presence at the 
Hôtel de Ville or later events. There is absolutely no mention of men disguised as women 
                                                        
616 LXXXI. 
617 Peter Sahlins, Forest Rites: The War of the Demoiselles in Nineteenth-Century France, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1994), 25. 
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during the initial commotion at Les Halles. The previous chapters have illustrated that 
although the demonstration was popular and spontaneous, the women did not leave for 
Versailles immediately. In fact, they were stalled for several hours at the Hôtel de Ville 
while waiting for Bailly, Lafayette, and the Commune deputies to appear and address 
their grievances. The women who did enter the Hôtel de Ville were inside for a 
considerable length of time before some men forced their way inside. Even by a 
conservative estimate, at least three hours passed between the initial disturbance at Les 
Halles and the entrance of the men into the Hôtel de Ville. Logistically, this would have 
given the men enough time to first be rejected by the women’s movement, and then find 
an impromptu disguise of women’s clothing.  
The weight of the 47 testimonies becomes more serious when viewed in light of 
the contemporary cultural perception of clothing. The way one dressed during both the 
Old Regime and the Revolution revealed key elements about his/her social and even 
political identity. The average French citizen was strongly aware of these demarcations 
and the entirety of the Procédure criminelle emphasizes this consciousness. The vast 
majority of the testimonies within the investigation refer to the color and types of clothes 
different people were wearing. In this visual society, these descriptions provide strong 
clues about the intent of a person. Many witnesses suspected that people who were 
dressed outside of their social station had dubious intentions. For example, many 
individuals who claim to have seen Orléans during the October Days describe his “grey 
frock coat without any distinguishing marks”618 and note the “large cockade on his 
hat.”619 In other words, they make this distinction of dress to illustrate that they believe 
                                                        
618  CXIX (“redingote grise, sans aucune marque distinctive”). 
619 CXXVII and CXXXII (“une grosse cocarde à son chapeau”). 
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Orléans was up to something devious since he was not properly clothed according to his 
role as an aristocrat and a National Assembly deputy. The importance of clothing as 
denoting a political station or intent becomes all the more obvious if one considers the 
entire upheaval over the Body Guards wearing the white cockade rather than the national 
cockade. French society did not take a person’s manner of dress lightly and it was 
therefore reasonable for witnesses to conclude that men who disguised themselves as 
women and transgressed their gendered appearance must be part of dubious plot. 
In order to access the reliability of these testimonies, one must also consider the 
justifications which the witnesses provide to distinguish the men disguised as women 
from the actual women. Of the 47 witnesses who claimed to have seen men disguised as 
women, only 20 actually give one or more reasons for this identification. Nine of the 
witnesses say that they were tipped off by the “women’s” beards.620  The next leading 
clue was sound of voice which five individuals cited.621 Three individuals claim to have 
heard about the presence of men disguised as women through rumor or a secondary 
source.622 Two witnesses said that they became suspicious because of the unnatural way 
the “women” carried themselves and their clothing623 while two other witnesses said they 
saw men’s garments underneath the disguises of some men.624 One witness insisted on 
knowing the true male identities of some individuals because he recognized them as 
deputies and National Guards.625 Another witness referred to the amazing strength of an 
individual who was pulling a canon as the way in which he identified the individual as 
                                                        
620 The following testimonies mention men disguised as women who had beards: XCVII, CXXXVI, 
CLXXVIII, CLXXIX, CLXXXII, CCXXXIII, CCXXXVII, CCLXXII, and CCCLVI. 
621 XXXIII, LXXXI, XCVII, CX, and CCXXXIII.  
622 XI, XVII, and CXLV.  
623 XXXIII and CCCXVI. 
624 CCI and CCXXIII. 
625 CCXXVI. 
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truly a man. One witness believed a “woman” to be a man since he had a National Guard 
sword at his side.626 Finally, another witness attributed his conviction to the sight of an 
indiscreet hairy chest which was not fully covered by the man’s dress.627 While some of 
these indicators are more subjective than others, they do show that these twenty witnesses 
felt inclined to offer support for their argument. Many of their assumptions that they saw 
men disguised as women are based on sound logic. 
Witness Justifications Revealing Men Disguised as Women 
Reason for Claim of Men  
Disguised as Women 
Number of Witnesses 
Using Each Reason 
Beard 9 
Sound of Voice 5 
Rumor or Secondary Source 3 
Body Carriage/Clothing 3 
Men’s Garments Underneath 2 
Knew True Identities 1 
Strength 1 
National Guard Sword 1 
Hairy Chest 1 
 
However in such a politically charged investigation, the issue of witness bias 
challenges the actual validity of the testimonies. Of course each account is ultra 
subjective due to the very nature of the investigation. It is, after all, an attempt to reveal a 
devious conspiracy. Since the authors of this conspiracy remain officially unnamed in the 
denunciation read to the witnesses, everyone is fair game for suspicion including the 
witnesses themselves. This no doubt led some witnesses to testify what they thought the 
conservative judges would like to hear, in order to clear themselves of suspicion. 
                                                        
626 CXXXVI. 
627 CCCLXV. 
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Evidence of men disguised as women, especially if it insinuated conspiracy would be 
well received by those hoping to find the “auteurs” behind the “crimes” of October 6. 628  
In an effort to sort through the layers of these biases and contemplate what effect 
they may have had on witnesses testifying to seeing men disguised as women, I have 
created a system of ranking these biases. I read the 47 accounts while paying attention to 
the strength of descriptive language of the witness, their attitude towards the crowd, and 
the extremity of their accusations in comparison with all the other witnesses in the 
Procédure. I then proceeded to rank each deposition on a scale of one to seven. A one 
constitutes a strongly unfavorable attitude towards the events which the witness 
described, two an unfavorable attitude, three a somewhat unfavorable attitude, four a 
neutral attitude, five a somewhat favorable attitude, six a favorable attitude, and seven a 
very favorable attitude. Yet this assessment also poses a problem. Witnesses clearly could 
not act in favor of things the government called “crimes.” Even proactive participants like 
Maillard end up appearing neutral (4) at best with a just-the-facts rendition void of much 
qualitative description. No more than perhaps a half dozen witnesses in the entire 
investigation could actually exceed the rank of 4.  
Nevertheless, the nuances in attitude from 1-4 still give an informative picture. 
These rankings are distributed as follows: 14 ranked “1”,629 12 ranked “2”,630 14 ranked 
                                                        
628 “Information, conclusions et décret,” Procédure criminelle, 9. and  “Dénonciation Municipalité de 
Paris,” Procédure criminelle, 6. Peter Sahlins also argues that authorities traditionally believed that groups 
of men disguised as women not only hid individual identities but revealed the presence of an “association” 
of devious individuals. Peter Sahlins, Forest Rites: The War of the Demoiselles in Nineteenth-Century 
France, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 21-22. 
629 Ranked 1: XLIV, XLIX, CX, CXXXIX, CLXX, CLXXXII, CCI, CCXXV, CCXXVI, CCCVII, 
CCCXVI, CCCLXV, CCCLXXIII, and CCCLXXXVI.   
630 Ranked 2: I, XCVIII, CXXXVI, CXXXVIII, CLXIII, CCXXXIII, CCXXXVII, CCXL, CCLXXII, 
CCXCIV, CCXLVII, and CCCLVI. 
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“3”,631 and 7 ranked “4.”632 Although these rankings fall somewhat lopsidedly in the 
lower end of the ranking spectrum, they are not overwhelmingly “strongly unfavorable.” 
Moreover within the context of the range of biases people displayed in the Procédure 
criminelle, these biases are not strikingly polarized. The majority of the witnesses who 
testified seeing men disguised as women did not portray the actions of the crowd or 
supposed members of a conspiracy in a violently hostile manner. Therefore we can be 
reasonably assured that over half of the 47 witnesses did not make up a story of men 
disguised as women out of the malicious intent of creating fake evidence to support the 
conspiracy theory.  
Attitude of Witnesses who testified that Men were disguised as Women 
Rank of Attitude Number of Witnesses 
Receiving Rank 
One 14 
Two 12 
Three 14 
Four 7 
 
All biases considered it is possible to assume that around 30 individuals (or about 
7.6 percent of the witnesses) probably were honestly convinced that they saw men 
disguised as women. These figures compounded with the strong societal emphasis on 
attention to clothing and the testimony of the witnesses who logically indicated their 
reasoning for gender indication reveal that it is plausible that some men were disguised as 
women during the journée. Not only is this cross-dressing plausible, but it is also 
logistically possible as has been illustrated by the timeline of the events on the morning 
of October 5. Moreover, it is important to note that men could have disguised themselves 
                                                        
631 Ranked 3: V, XI, XVII, XXXIII, XCVII, CXX, CXXX, CXLV, CXLVIII, CLXI, CLXII, CLXXVIII, 
CLXXIX, and CCXLVI. 
632 Ranked 4: VII, LIX, LXXXI, CXXV, CLXXXV, CCIII, and CCLXX. 
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as women without being part of a conspiracy because of the aforementioned other 
plausible motives for this action. 
One could argue that some of the witnesses from Versailles were perhaps not 
accustomed to seeing some of the rougher poissardes of Les Halles and mistook their 
gritty appearance for men disguised as women. However, the extensive traditional rights 
and recent trips of les dames des Halles out to Versailles provided its inhabitants and the 
court with several occasions to come in contact with these women. Moreover, many of 
les dames des Halles, even the poissardes, made a substantial profit which allowed some 
of them to buy jewelry.633 These were not unrecognizable women dressed in rags. Their 
importance in the public and political sphere made them a visible and recognizable group. 
The multiple sightings of men disguised as women could not all be mistaken observations 
based on some naivety of the Versailles witnesses.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that there were men disguised as women 
during the journée. However, the evidence at hand suggests that this was a small minority 
of the men and that such a small number of men were not part of an all encompassing 
conspiracy. In fact, four witnesses testified point blank that they did not see any men 
disguised as women634 while the remaining 344 witnesses did not make any mention of 
men disguised as women at all. This myth-like issue on which many historians and 
contemporaries of the Revolution are divided appears to be true on a small scale. The 
problem in reconciling these accounts of cross-dressers is that the presence or lack of a 
conspiracy is often hinged on the acceptance or rejection of the presence of men 
disguised as women. It is imperative that in revisiting the history of the October Days, 
                                                        
633 Jehanne d’Orliac. Les Dames de la Halle, 1181-1939. (Paris: Fantino et Crie, 1946) 19-21.  
634 LXXXIII, CCVIII, CCLXXVIII, and CCCLXXX. 
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one realizes that the existence of men disguised as women and the existence of a 
conspiracy are not necessarily contingent upon each other.   
 It is essential that historians only consider the testimony of individual witnesses in 
the Procédure criminelle within the context of the investigation as a whole. To make 
generalizations about the journée based on the depositions of two or three of 395 
witnesses is misleading since the testimony of each individual is highly subjective given 
the loose structure of the Châtelet’s court methods. The testimony of each witness is 
affected by individual biases of varying degrees, along with other collective factors such 
as their occupation, place of residency, sex, and interpretation of the denunciation. The 
substantial presence of information obtained by second hand knowledge adds to the 
uncertainty of the evidence contained in the testimonies. Moreover, the groups of people 
represented within the witness pool are not proportional to those who participated in the 
journée. This witness pool puts the investigation’s picture of the October Days in a 
disproportionately conservative light. The denunciation itself acts upon the presumption 
that the journée was the result of a conspiracy and searches for the authors of a plot, 
rather than first questioning if a plot actually existed.635 However, it is possible to draw 
meaningful conclusions from several testimonies if they are viewed against the 
background of the investigation as a whole. By evaluating all of the pertinent testimony 
without losing awareness of the others not represented, one can use the investigation to 
conclude that there was a small minority of men disguised as women during the journée. 
Also, the testimony which the Châtelet gathered in hope of supporting the conspiracy 
                                                        
635 See David Andress, “Nation, People, and Mob: Political Mythology and Social Prejudice in the French 
Revolution,” (paper presented to the York Conference in Cultural History, “Imagining Nations, 1995), 2. 
http://userweb.port.ac.uk/~andressd/myth.htm (accessed September 2006). 
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theory actually reveals instead that there is little significant evidence linking Orléans and 
Mirabeau to any conspiracy thereby aiding the case to exonerate them. It is only through 
a thorough awareness of the entire investigation and a grounding of each testimony in 
relation to the 394 others that some significant historical insights can be made from the 
often contradicting testimonies of the investigation.  
The National Assembly deputies, the Commune representatives, the Châtelet 
judges and the general populace confronted these same issues from the end of the 
October Days until the National Assembly’s final judgment of the Procédure criminelle a 
year later. The issues and debates connected with the investigation and the methods of the 
investigation itself were to contribute gradually to the polarization of the political elite, 
while reinforcing a rallying cry increasingly exalted by le peuple – that they were the 
legitimate source of authority and power for la Nation. 
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Section III: Chapter 7: Diverging positions: Popular Pressure and the 
Political Response to the Procédure criminelle 
The information [in the Procédure criminelle] that we examined, isn’t this 
itself a plot? Someone said that the Châtelet was putting the Revolution on 
trial: This remark was perhaps a great truth.636 
Charles Chabroud, in his Report on 
the Châtelet’s Procédure criminelle 
 
 
 On September 30 and October 1, 1790, Charles Chabroud presented the Comité 
des rapports’ final evaluation of the Châtelet October Days investigation to the National 
Assembly. In doing so, he not only renounced the investigation’s weak evidence against 
Mirabeau and Orléans, but he completely turned the Procédure criminelle on its head by 
insinuating that the investigation itself was driven by unpatriotic forces. How did this 
investigation, whose denunciation was formed by the Commune’s own Comité des 
recherches and whose court was entrusted with the temporary power to try crimes of lèse-
nation (treason) by the National Assembly itself, become the object of such vehement 
denunciations only a year later? 
 The answer, in part, lies in the increased political pressure placed upon the 
Commune and National Assembly representatives by a strong segment of le peuple as 
voiced by the majority of the Parisian districts and left-leaning press.637 As popular forces 
continued to doubt the legitimacy of the Châtelet’s judicial powers and its loyalty to the 
                                                        
636 Archive Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860; recueil complet des débats legislatifs & politiques des 
chambres francaises, vol. XIX (Paris: Kraus Reprint, 1969), 364 (“L’information [in the Procédure 
criminelle] que nous avons examinée, n’est elle pas elle-même un complot? Quelqu’un a dit que le Châtelet 
faisait le procès à la Révolution : Cette remarque fût peut-être une grande vérité.”).  
637 Jack Censer’s detailed analysis of the radical press illustrates the close relationship between these 
newspapers and the most vocal districts and reveals the very powerful extent to which the two functioned 
as the voice of le peuple. Jack Richard Censer, Prelude to Power: The Parisian Radical Press, 1789-1791, 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
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Revolution, the Commune and National Assembly were forced to respond to the criticism 
as early as the spring of 1790.638 This popular sentiment continued to contribute to the 
polarization of the political elites over the issue, when in June an unrelated incident led 
the National Assembly to decree that any deputies accused of political crimes could only 
be judged by the National Assembly itself. Therefore the Châtelet was forced to surrender 
its information to the Comité des rapports in early August after it had finished gathering 
the testimonies. When the National Assembly opened la tribune for discussion of the 
Procédure and the accusations against Orléans and Mirabeau on October 2, the extent of 
the great division which the October Days and its investigation had made among the 
representatives became perfectly clear. The National Assembly swiftly rejected the 
seven-month labor of the Châtelet while supporting the innocence of two of their most 
popular deputies. Moreover, it seemed that le peuple once again successfully 
demonstrated the influential power of their popular demands, reinforcing, as several 
hundred women had in October 1789, the reality of their sovereignty.  
---------------------------------- 
As the initial decrees concerning the formation of the judicial investigation of the 
Châtelet moved slowly from one governmental body to another in October and 
November 1789, the public did not seem greatly concerned that so much responsibility 
for the investigation was being assigned to the Châtelet since the Commune’s own 
Comité des recherches had laid out its judicial orders. Even the objections of the radical 
Cordeliers district were minimal. Although the Cordeliers were suspicious of the Old 
Regime powerhouse, the October 28 issue of Journal de la Municipalité et des districts 
                                                        
638 Shapiro, Revolutionary Justice in Paris, 1789-1790, 9-10. Shapiro argues that “the People… would 
constitute the most significant force opposing the indulgent [judicial] inclinations of the early revolutionary 
authorities,” 9-10. 
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de Paris printed that “The Cordeliers district decided to ask that the judges of the 
Châtelet be required to take the oath to the nation before the Mayor and the 
Representatives of the Commune, and named some deputies to give news of their vow to 
the Commune.”639  
In fact the Châtelet investigation was kept under wraps in the beginning stages 
and when the denunciation was finished on November 30, the National Assembly 
decreed that “it isn’t yet time to unveil it to the public.”640 In the early months of 1790, it 
was overshadowed by more immediate problems (judicial and non-judicial) which Paris 
and the National Assembly had to confront. However, an early April meeting between the 
Comité des recherches and the Châtelet which revealed that the Châtelet was collecting 
information about the march of October 5 and other periods as well, thrust the issue into 
the public spotlight once again. 
On April 26, the Comité des recherches appeared before the representatives of the 
Commune to officially complain that the Châtelet “today gave place to a sort of 
fermentation that could become dangerous, if your Comité did not prevent this error, by 
recalling and stressing the limits that, in its opinion, it placed on the denunciation.”641 In 
fact, in late February, the Châtelet had already asked the Comité des recherches to extend 
its original denunciation to a plot determined to corrupt patriotic elements that had been 
in place since July 1789 (obviously of the Orléanist nature), but the Comité had 
                                                        
639 Sigismond Lacroix, ed., Actes de la Commune de Paris pendant la Révolution, series I, vol II (New 
York: AMS Press, 1974), 413 (“Le district des Cordeliers a arrêté de demander que les juges du Châtelet 
fussent tenus de prêter serment à la nation devant le Maire et les Représentants de la Commune, et a 
nommé des députés pour faire part de son vœu à la Commune.”). 
640 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, III: 81 (“Il n’est pas encore temps de les dévoiler au public”). 
641 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 134 (“donne aujourd’hui lieu à une espèce de fermentation qui 
pourrait devenir dangereuse, si votre Comité ne prévenait cette erreur, en rappelant et marquant les bornes 
que, dans son avis, il a posées à la dénonciation”). 
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refused.642 The Comité complained to the Commune that its original denunciation only 
concerned the violence and activities of the morning of October 6, and that without this 
public clarification “one could cast suspicion on its [the Comité’s] patriotism.”643 Thus, 
the Comité des recherches had taken a huge step to distance itself from the Châtelet in the 
hopes of sparing its own public reputation when it asked the Commune to publish its 
declaration.644 
As a response to the Comité des recherches’ declaration, the Assemblée des 
représentants once again sent a message to the National Assembly urging them to 
quicken their reform of the judicial system.645 The popular reaction to the Comité’s 
appearance was more violent, however. Public opinion exploded and radical newspapers 
and district representatives proclaimed that the Châtelet’s actions and even the entire 
court itself was counter-revolutionary.646 One citizen articulated this general suspicion in 
the April 20 Cordeliers’ meeting when he asserted that in surpassing the boundaries of the 
denunciation, the Châtelet “devotes itself to being the instrument of vengeance or 
aristocratic and ministerial maneuvers.” 647 As a result, the Cordeliers released a decree 
that if a new judicial system was not yet ready, the Châtelet should be replaced by 
another provisional court whose members were chosen from the different Paris 
sections.648 The Cordeliers district also protested the secrecy of the Châtelet investigation 
                                                        
642 Shapiro, Revolutionary Justice in Paris, 1789-1790, 194-196. 
643 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 134-135 (“on pourrait jeter des doutes sur son [the Comité’s] 
patriotisme”). 
644 Shapiro, Revolutionary Justice in Raris, 1789-1790, 189. Shapiro also argues that this budding 
separation between the Comité des recherches and the Châtelet, which lasted into the fall, led to the internal 
collapse of the entire Fayettist regime. Shapiro, Revolutionary Justice in Paris, 1789-1790, 16. 
645 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 135. 
646 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 140. Lacroix’s footnotes and endnotes are especially helpful in 
tracing the mobilization of public opinion which the districts and newspapers undertook. 
647 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 140 (“se dévoue à être l’instrument des vengeances ou des 
manoeuvres aristocratiques et ministérielles”). 
648 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 141. 
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as opposed to holding public proceedings.649 Finally, it called upon the other 59 districts 
to address the subject as well.650 
Similar opinions were voiced in many Parisian publications such as the April 19 
issue of the Moniteur which exclaimed, “the Châtelet must appear to our enemies as an 
infallible way to destroy all which has been accomplished and to reestablish the ancient 
despotism upon the ruins of the nascent liberty.”651 Many of the districts directly 
published their own decrees rather than waiting for the newspapers to report them. The 
Oratoire district proclaimed that “the said Châtelet would be denounced, as the enemy of 
the actual regeneration, to the National Assembly.”652  The Petit Saint-Antoine district 
demanded that the National Assembly turn the case and information which the Châtelet 
had collected so far over to one of their other comités.653 Not surprisingly, the Jacobins 
Saint-Honoré district proclaimed that “the Châtelet lost the public’s confidence, without 
which it can not inspire the necessary respect towards its judgments.”654 The Carmélites 
district contrasted the Châtelet with the “good citizens” and asked the National Assembly 
to forbid the Châtelet any knowledge of lèse-nation crimes and to form another High 
Court.655 The Saint-Eustache district also asked for a new tribunal to be established.656 
Additionally, the Petits Augustins and the Saint-Etienne du Mont districts publicly threw 
their support behind the Cordeliers’ demands.657 
                                                        
649 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 142. 
650 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 146. 
651 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune,  V: 145 (“le Châtelet doit paraître à nos ennemis un moyen infaillible de 
détruire tout ce qui a été fait, et de rétablir l’ancien despotisme sur les ruines de la liberté naissante”). 
652 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune,  V: 146 (“ledit Châtelet serait dénoncé, comme ennemi de la 
régénération actuelle, à l’Assemblée nationale”). 
653 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 148. 
654 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 149 (“le Châtelet a perdu la confiance publique, sans laquelle il ne 
peut inspirer le respect dû à ses jugements”). 
655 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 150 (“bons citoyens”). 
656 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 149. 
657 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 147. 
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After a fevered and prolific exchange of decrees, 42 of the 60 districts announced 
their support of the Cordeliers’ initial propositions and the representatives of this district 
presented their grievances to the National Assembly on May 14.658 The Châtelet 
responded to this attack by going on the offensive itself. Its own deputation appeared in 
the National Assembly the next day to claim that the Comité des recherches was 
withholding important evidence from them which was relevant to the investigation. What 
they truly meant was that they wanted the Comité des recherches to turn over the 
unopened letters addressed to Orléans from England which had come up in one of the 
witness depositions.659 For obvious reasons, this request was not enthusiastically acted 
upon and the Comité des recherches did not feel themselves inclined to respond until the 
Châtelet’s procureur du roi (royal prosecutor) directly contacted them in mid June.660  
After months of coyly avoiding the issue, a deputation from the Comité des 
recherches appeared before the National Assembly in early August and said that they had 
given the Châtelet all the information they had relative to the denunciation which 
concerned October 6. Technically, since the Comité des recherches had not opened the 
English letters, they were not “aware” of any evidence in their possession directly 
relating to October 6. Moreover, the Comité des rapports raised the stakes and claimed 
that “the prosecutor of the Commune elicited one instruction and the Châtelet followed 
another,” especially since April.661 Months of increasing popular pressure had led to the 
polarization of the Comité des recherches and the Châtelet; the political gloves had come 
off. 
                                                        
658 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 156. 
659 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 157. 
660 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 157. 
661 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 160 (“le procureur de la Commune a provoqué une instruction et que 
le Châtelet en poursuive une autre”). 
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 Due to the impending prosecution of another member of the National Assembly, 
the deputies had decreed on June 26 that only the representatives themselves could pass 
final criminal judgment on one of their own. Therefore, by mid August the Châtelet was 
forced to turn over all of its information to the National Assembly who in turn gave the 
evidence to its Comité des rapports to examine and report back to the National Assembly. 
On August 31, the Comité des rapports asked the National Assembly to publish the 
Procédure criminelle “to enlighten and focus the discussions” among the deputies.662 
However, it is more likely that they published the Procédure weeks before their report to 
the National Assembly in order to rally popular opinion against the investigation and 
weaken the position of its defenders on the right. However, the public had already trained 
its eye upon the affair – among the 6 most prominent radical newspapers, nine articles 
had appeared about the case during the week of August 10-16 alone.663 One pamphlet 
cried out: 
French citizens, do you grin and bear in silence the winding path of the Châtelet, 
its actions over the past 10 months, does its actions not sufficiently lift the veil 
from your eyes which covers the counterrevolution? 664 
 
The left had adequately armed itself for the final chapter of the October Days saga.  
The Comité des rapports announced that its review of the Procédure criminelle 
was complete on September 22. However, in a gesture to the magnitude and potential 
volatility of the situation, Chabroud requested to present their report in the morning 
                                                        
662 Lacroix, Actes de la Commune, V: 158, 162 (“pour éclairer et abréger les discussions”). 
663 Censer, Prelude to Power : The Parisian Radical Press, 1789-1791, 140-143.  The six newspapers are: 
Journal Universel, Révolutions de Paris, Ami du Peuple, Mecure National, Révolutions de France et de 
Brabant, and Orateur du Peuple. 
664 “Le Châtelet dévoilé ou Réponse à la procédure… sur l’affaire du 5 et 6 octobre 1789.” Labatte, 1789. 
Microform #S88/5181. nºFRBNF36302858. Bibliothèque Nationale Française (Français sousrirez-vous en 
silence la marche du Châtelet contours, ses actions depuis dix mois ne lévent-ils pas suffisamment à vos 
yeux le voile qui couvre la contre-révolution ?).  
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session to allow for time for an evening discussion as well. At this point he estimated that 
it would take him two and a half hours to detail the Comité des rapports’ findings before 
the deputies could even begin to discuss the matter and draw conclusions.665 Therefore, 
the National Assembly waited to finish its most pressing issues before making 
Chabroud’s report l’ordre du jour for the morning and evening sessions on September 30 
and October 1. 
In his opening remarks, Chabroud briefly recounted the events of the afternoon of 
October 5 and October 6 before quickly alluding to the several suspicions, prejudices, 
and potential libel which formed the atmosphere in which the Châtelet heard testimony 
concerning journée. 666 Then he revisited the Châtelet’s recommendation to the Comité 
des rapports which stated: 
Considering that MM. Louis-Philippe-Joseph d’Orléans and de Mirabeau the 
elder deputies at the National Assembly appear to be involved the case being 
discussed, [we] say that the consignment of the present information… will be 
brought to the National Assembly conforming with the decree of last June 26 
which was sanctioned by the king. 
 
However, instead of immediately accepting this suggestion, Chabroud emphasized that it 
was first necessary for the National Assembly to reconsider the causes of the journée. 
Therefore, he outlined his intentions on behalf of the Comité des rapports: 
1° To examine the near and distanced causes of the insurrection of the people, and 
of their excesses which followed.  
2° To research if M. de Mirabeau and M. d’Orléans had any part in the causes and 
effects ;  
3° To summarize the evidence, pose the assumptions, and finally conclude. 667 
                                                        
665 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 139. 
666 Archive Parlementaires, XIX : 338  
667 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 339 (“Attendu que MM. Louis-Philippe-Joseph d’Orléans et de Mirabeau 
l’aîné députés à l’Assemblée nationale, paraissent être dans le cas d’être décrétés, disons que des 
expéditions de la présente information… seront portées à l’Assemblée nationale conformément au décret 
du 26 juin dernier sanctionné par roi.”; “1° Examiner les causes éloignées ou prochains de l’insurrection du 
peuple, et des excès qui en furent la suite. 2° Rechercher si M. de Mirabeau et M. d’Orléans ont eu part aux 
causes et aux effets; 3° Résumer les preuves, poser les principes, et enfin conclure.”). 
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 Chabroud first challenged the theory that there was even a plot to begin with by 
citing several testimonies which only speak of a plot based on “vague and contradictory” 
rumors,668 including those that stated the king should be moved to Paris or that Orléans 
wanted to become regent. After these ambiguous bruits, he moved on to things which 
might be considered closer to “fact,” that is to say, direct observations or statements 
which witnesses directly heard which might indicate the presence of a plot.669 He 
continued to pick apart these individual testimonies by comparing them to contradictory 
accounts given by the same witnesses to other comités. He also revealed that some of the 
observations may have been in reference to a different plot, rather than the one which 
may have triggered the October Days. For example, Chabroud insists that Mirabeau and 
others’ various ominous remarks about something happening soon at Versailles or the 
king’s possible departure most likely refer to the September 1789 fear that the king would 
be taken to Metz by an aristocratic plot.670 Chabroud then briefly addressed the accounts 
concerning the manufacture of Orléans’ lead signs and his letters from England which 
were never opened but did not venture beyond this summary since he only wanted to see 
if it was possible that a plot existed.671 After addressing some of the testimony which 
recounts insidious conversations with drunken individuals (including that of the suicidal 
chasseur at the banquet),672 he recounted the testimony of Diot and Baras who both had 
testified that on the night of October 5, they heard men talking about the possibility of 
receiving 50 louis each, payable through an Orléanist agent, in exchange for killing the 
                                                        
668 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: rumors covered from p 339 to 341 (“vagues et contradictories”). 
669 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 341 (“fait”). 
670 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 342. 
671  Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 343. 
672 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 344-345. 
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Body Guards and the queen. In a skillful sidestep, Chabroud asked why these men had 
not made a greater effort to warn the château about these plans in advance and even went 
as far as saying “I must attribute to their guilty heedlessness all the crimes which were 
planned before them.”673 Using information from several of the testimonies, Chabroud 
concluded that although he wished there were more specific details, he hesitantly 
believed that some of the participants, including soldiers had been paid before and during 
the journée, although he added that “a formal conclusion would be… hazardous.”674 
 Next, Chabroud addressed what he called the “natural causes of the insurrection 
of Paris.”675 He discerned that these established themes and ideas played an important 
role in forming an environment which was inherently conducive to the king’s return to 
Paris. For example, he touched upon the famine which threatened the city and the 
common belief that the food shortages would be solved if the king moved to Paris.676 
Chabroud also reminded the deputies that the general populace was greatly concerned 
that there were counter-revolutionary forces in the royal court which had the potential to 
ultimately deprive le peuple of their king by moving him farther away from the capital.677 
He revisited the fears of civil war which the arrival of the Flanders regiment sparked 
anew678 as well as the banquets during which it was believed that the national cockade 
was insulted and Chabroud claims that the toast to la nation was intentionally omitted.679 
Since relocating the king to Paris was seen as the cure-all for these “natural causes,” 
                                                        
673 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 346 (“je dois imputer à leur coupable insouciance tous les crimes qui 
étaient médités devant eux”). 
674 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 348. Here is another example of the traditional inclination of the political 
elite to believe that le peuple never acted entirely of their own accord. (“une conclusion formelle serait… 
hasardeuse”). 
675 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 348 (“causes naturelles de l’insurrection de Paris”). 
676 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 348, 349. 
677 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 348, 349. 
678 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 349. 
679Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 350. 
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Chabroud concluded that the crowd’s October 6 demand “was not due to the chance of 
the moment.”680 
 After outlining rumors of plots and bribery and comparing and contrasting their 
effect with the “natural causes,” Chabroud analyzed the major events which unfolded at 
Versailles during the evening of October 5 and the morning of October 6. He compared 
the testimonies which spoke of the shooting of Savonières on the Places d’Armes and 
concluded that Charpentier was the one who fired the shot without sufficient 
provocation.681 Chabroud also concluded that the Versailles National Guard was initially 
fired upon by the Body Guards who were leaving the Place d’Armes but does not 
mention the jeering which caused the end of the Body Guard column to react in this 
manner.682 Chabroud noted that this last scuffle was followed by the orderly arrival of the 
Parisian National Guard and a calm which endured the entire night, and he suggested that 
this period of peace actually argues against the presence of a plot.683 As for the events of 
the next morning, Chabroud insisted that the Body Guards must have first shot a citizen 
in the court to inspire such a sudden rush of violence which was born out of the urge for 
revenge.684 Moreover he argued that outside the queen’s apartments “an excessive rage 
dissipated all of a sudden, when the Body Guards being retired and removed, the band 
which was following them could no longer reach the object of its anger.”685 As for 
establishing if there was a plot or not, Chabroud said that the Comité had presented the 
evidence so that the National Assembly deputies could decide for themselves. However, 
                                                        
680 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 351 (“ne fut pas due au hazard du moment”). 
681 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 352. 
682 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 353. 
683Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 352-353. 
684Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 353. 
685 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 353 (“une rage excessive se dissipe tout à coup, lorsque les gardes du roi 
étant retirés et retranchés, la troupe que les poursuivait, ne peut plus atteindre l’objet de sa colère”). 
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he did add : “I do not want to conclude from this that there was no plot, but I say that the 
event does not present me with any vestiges of it, and even I believe to have deduced at 
least some reasons to doubt in it.”686  
 Chabroud then turned to the Comité des rapports’ second task, to see if Mirabeau 
and Orléans were the “causes” of the “crimes.” He started by presenting the evidence 
against Mirabeau. This was comprised of witness testimony which placed him in the 
courtyards with a naked saber on October 6, recounted some ominous statements, noted 
that he warned Mounier in the National Assembly that the Parisians were coming, and 
observed that Mirabeau had tried to convince Orléans not to leave France in the days 
following the journée. However, Chabroud revealed that the description of the man 
suspiciously walking among the troops was not close to Mirabeau’s height; that Mirabeau 
had received news of the uprising from others and was just passing this information onto 
Mounier out of courtesy; and that Mirabeau had told Orléans not to go to England 
because his flight would seem like proof against them when there was no suspicious 
evidence to begin with.687 Once again, Chabroud stopped short of passing a final 
judgment while noting that most of the incriminating evidence against Mirabeau was 
hearsay and that the accusations against him were “seemed very light at first glance.”688 
 On the other hand, there was more incriminating evidence against Orléans in the 
Procédure criminelle. Chabroud confronted the testimonies which discuss the exchange 
of money at the Palais Royal by stating: “If the great sums were distributed, I do not see 
                                                        
686 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 354. (“je ne veux pas conclure de là qu’il n’y a point eu de complot, mais 
je dis que l’événement ne m’en présente aucun vestige, et même je crois avoir déduit au moins quelques 
raisons d’en douter.”).  
687 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 354-356 (“Je ne veux pas conclure de là qu’il n’y a point eu de complot, 
mais je dis que l’événement ne m’en présente aucun vestige, et même je crois avoir déduit au moins 
quelques raisons d’en douter.”). 
688 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 356 (“très légères à mon sens et au premier coup d’oeil”). 
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that they had been distributed by him [Orléans], and the information at hand, I must think 
perhaps that these doings had nothing to do with him.”689 Then Chabroud tried to follow 
the specific actions of Orléans on the morning of October 6. By gathering more 
information from witnesses and documents outside of the Procédure criminelle, 
Chabroud asserted that Orléans could not have been present at Versailles at the start of 
the violence.690 Like the Châtelet testimonies which give Orléans’ whereabouts on 
October 5, those concerning October 6 also say that Orléans was in different places at the 
same time.691 Moreover, those who accuse him of being among the people during the 
violence all gave different descriptions of his dress and conflict with one another. 
Chabroud even went as far as to discredit one of the main witnesses who claimed to have 
seen Orléans in the queen’s stairway during the attack. The witness was a National 
Guard, so Chabroud astutely observed that he could not have been inside the château at 
the start of the violence because the National Guards were only in charge of the outposts 
and later moved into the courtyards in response to the chaos.692 In response to the 
numerous testimonies which said that portions of the crowd shouted “Vive le duc 
d’Orléans” (or something to that effect), Chabroud brushed them aside claiming that they 
were nothing but “some acclamations, testimonies of love, flattering homage of the 
people whose very openness precludes any suspicion.”693 Nevertheless, in his final 
summary of the charges which the witnesses brought against Orléans, Chabroud seemed 
a bit more suspicious of his actions than those of Mirabeau by ordering the deputies “to 
                                                        
689 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 356 (“Si de grandes sommes ont été distribuées, je ne vois pas qu’elles 
aient été répandues par lui [Orléans], et l’information à la main, je doive penser peut-être que ces faits lui 
sont étrangers.”). 
690 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 357. 
691 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 357.  
692 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 360. 
693 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 359 (“des acclamations, témoignages d’amour, homage flatteur du peuple 
à qui sa publicité ne permet pas d’être suspect.”). 
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search in a general review the motives of the conclusion at which you must finally draw 
the line,” thereby implying that there were motives to explore.694 
 Finally, Chabroud arrived at the Comité des rapports’ third aim – a conclusion 
concerning the accusations against Mirabeau and Orléans and a suggestion as to how to 
proceed. He once again considered the basis of the suspicions of a plot, reiterating that 
the evidence was mostly based on hearsay and rumors, and also reiterated that he could 
not separate the contemporary grievances of the people (such as the lack of bread) from 
the journée.695 However, instead of then concentrating on his final assessment of the role 
of Orléans and Mirabeau, he diverted the deputies’ attention to what the Châtelet’s 
conclusions were. He summarized their sentiments by asserting that “the judges of the 
Châtelet do not have any doubt; it’s in virtue of your decree of June 26 that they had 
resorted to you ; and if M. de Mirabeau and M. d’Orléans had not been members of the 
National Assembly, already the accusation would exist .”696 Yet contrary to his prior 
feigned indecisiveness, Chabroud started to significantly distance himself from the 
Châtelet’s position. He began to outline their “errors” by arguing that the Châtelet 
assumed that accusation and judgment (in this case of Orléans and Mirabeau) were one 
and the same. Then he forcefully separated the integrity National Assembly’s processes 
from what he viewed as the inferior work of the Châtelet: 
The jurisprudence of our [the National Assembly’s provisional] tribunals, which 
makes accusation easy but conviction difficult, saves all its spines for the 
judgment. Here [in the National Assembly] one asks for proof, there [at the 
Châtelet] one knows other ways and other rules, where soon one knows nothing; 
the law is silent; thick books had been written in which the arbitrary has been 
                                                        
694 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 361 (“chercher dans un résumé general les motifs de la conclusion à 
laquelle vous devez enfin vous arrêter”). 
695 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 362. 
696Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 363 (“les juges du Châtelet n’ont pas doute; c’est en vertu de votre décret 
du 26 juin qu’ils ont eu recours à vous; et si M. de Mirabeau and M. d’Orléans n’eussent pas été membres 
de l’Assemblée national, déjà l’accusation existerait”). 
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raised to a type of art. The judges were abandoned to themselves, to the caprices 
of their suspicions, and the decrees were like a spontaneous production in the vast 
latitude of clues.697 
 
Chabroud argued that the Châtelet only sought out witnesses who would aid its malicious 
“mission” of accusing Orléans and Mirabeau, rather than searching for the truth.698 He 
accurately accused the Châtelet of interviewing some individuals for the sole purpose of 
seeking information outside of the investigation, such as the activities of July. Moreover, 
Chabroud revealed that the Comité des recherches had provided the Châtelet with a list of 
witnesses, including Estaing and Le Cointre, important officers of the Versailles National 
Guard.699 However, the Châtelet neglected to interview these witnesses who obviously 
would have key testimony and instead sought out other witnesses for information even 
unrelated to October 6. 700 
 After hours of speaking and pages of evidence, Chabroud turned the tables. 
Orléans and Mirabeau were no longer under attack, but the Châtelet and consequentially 
its right wing supporters came under direct assault. In a bold move, Chabroud decreed 
that the constitution had always been opposed by a “faction always vanquished, but 
                                                        
697Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 363 (“errements”; “La jurisprudence de nos [National Assembly’s] 
tribunaux, facile pour l’accusation, réservait toutes ses épines pour le jugement. Ici [in the National 
Assembly] on demandait les preuves, là [at the Châtelet] on connassait d’autes moyens et d’autres règles, 
ou plutôt on ne connaissait rien ; la loi se taisait ; de gros livres avaient été faits, où l’arbitraire était érigé en 
une espèce d’art. Les juges étaient abandonnés à eux-mêmes, aux caprices de leurs soupçons, et les décrets 
étaient comme une production spontanée dans la vaste latitude des indices.”). 
698Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 363. 
699 After Chabroud’s report, the National Assembly ordered that his “Pieces Justificatives du Rapport de la 
Procédure du Châtelet sur les affaires des 5 et 6 octobre” be published. This collection contained 18 
documents which were procured outside of the Châtelet’s information and used by the Comité des Rapports 
in forming their decision. There are letters, declarations, and government documents which were written 
before and after the October Days. For example, it included Le Cointre’s lengthy declaration made on 
December 11, 1789 concerning the events of the journée. Jean-Baptiste Charles Chabroud, “Pieces 
Justificatives du Rapport de la Procédure du Châtelet sur les affaires des 5 et 6 octobre,” (Paris: Chez 
Baudouin, October 8 1790),  from “The Maclure Collection of French Revolutionary Materials.”  
700 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 363. 
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always in rebellion” which now opposed it in secret. 701 “There is the malady,” Chabroud 
exclaimed, “and this grand [criminal] procedure which attracts all the regards, is only 
perhaps a passing fever that it produced, and that it is going to explain to us.”702 Later he 
continued, “The information [the Procédure criminelle] that we have examined, isn’t it 
itself a plot?”703  
With one last violent tirade, Chabroud shifted the blame entirely from “these pure 
days where the good citizens only have one soul” to a “conspiracy… A league has 
formed on the debris of the ancient regime, in order to attempt the overthrow of the new 
regime.”704 At the conclusion of the October Days saga, one “plot” had been replaced by 
another. The Procédure whose initial intent was to find the “auteurs” of the journée 
became viewed as a political plot and vehicle of the right to thwart “the friends of 
liberty.”705 Before leaving the podium, Chabroud announced the Comité des rapports’ 
final proposed decree – that there was no place for any accusation against Orléans and 
Mirabeau.706 
 After Chabroud stepped down from the tribune, only one deputy had a chance to 
speak and the general discussion of the Comité des rapport’s suggestions was postponed 
until the next session convened on October 2. Bonnay was first to speak and he tried to 
insist that the only evidence that was legal to use in the decision-making process was the 
                                                        
701 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 364 (“faction toujours vaincue, mais toujours révoltée”). 
702 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 354 (“Voila la maladie originaire,” Chabroud exclaimed, “et cette grande 
procédure [criminelle] qui attire tous les régards, n’est peut-être qu’une fièvre éphémère qu’elle a produite, 
et qu’elle va nous expliquer.”). 
703 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 364 (“L’information que nous avons examinée, n’est elle pas elle-même 
un complot ?”). 
704 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 367. See the appendix for his full final accusation against this “ligue” and 
his absolution of Orléans and Mirabeau. (“ces jours purs où les bon citoyens n’avaient qu’une âme” to a 
“conspiration… Une ligue s’est formée sur les débris de l’ancien régime, pour tenter le renversement du 
régime nouveau.”). 
705 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 366 (“des amis de la liberté”). 
706 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 367. 
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original information collected by the Châtelet. The right applauded his speech.707 
However, the right was already on the defensive and carefully qualified its statements 
which supported the Châtelet so as not to appear unpatriotic. This was a weak resistance 
to the left who already had the ball in their court with Chabroud’s report. Members of the 
left continued to side with the people. Mirabeau spoke of “the fears that it [the 
Procédure] gave to the friends of liberty and the hope that it lavished upon its 
enemies”708 and Chabroud even read a letter written the day before by a Parisian National 
Guard who asked why the Châtelet took so many depositions of people who were not 
even at Versailles during the journée.709 Mirabeau invoked the image of “the most false 
appearances” that “the enemies of public good want to find in popular movements,” 
thereby giving le peuple a stake of their own in the investigation.710 
 The right, led by Maury, attempted to at least salvage an accusation against 
Orléans since they were quickly losing ground in the case against Mirabeau. Maury 
maintained that there was a plot against the queen and that he was prepared to revisit the 
Châtelet’s evidence to that effect if necessary.711 Montlosier rose to approach the tribune 
amidst murmurs and complained that the deputies were rushing into a decision and that 
Chabroud’s report should first be distributed for review.712 Yet, the unabashed rhetoric of 
the left overshadowed their conservative colleagues. Barnave asked for “the most 
                                                        
707 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 393. 
708 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 400 (“les craintes qu’elle [la procédure] a données aux amis du liberté, et 
les espérances qu’elle a prodiguées à ses ennemis”). 
709 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 397. 
710 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 400 (“les apparences plus fausses” that “les ennemis du bien public 
voulaient trouver dans les mouvements populaires”). 
711 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 399. 
712 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 404. 
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profound scorn for this [criminal] procedure, [and] for those who directed it.”713 The 
most scathing attack directly against the right came once again from Mirabeau who 
surpassed Barnave’s insinuations in exclaiming, “Yes, the secret of this infernal 
procedure is finally exposed: it is there in its entirety (M. de Mirabeau designated the 
right side).”714 
 Within a year, the nearly accused had become the denunciator and the room filled 
with applause and then another encore of clapping from the left and spectators. Maury 
acknowledged the defeat of the right at this point and informed the National Assembly 
that “we,” as in the right, “cannot participate in the deliberation.”715 After some members 
of the right completely retired from the room, the Assembly closed the discussion and 
decreed that neither Orléans nor Mirabeau were to be accused of a crime based on the 
information which the Châtelet collected.716 The atmosphere in the National Assembly 
had entirely changed since the year before; the October Days increased the divide 
between the political elites. Moreover, the left was looking increasingly towards popular 
justification for their actions, and this effort to maintain power through appeasement led 
to the polarization of the National Assembly.717 Thus, in the grand scheme of the early 
Revolution, the political reaction to the October Days investigation strongly reinforces  
 
                                                        
713 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 404 (“le plus profond mépris pour cette procédure [criminelle], [et] pour 
ceux qui l’ont instruité”). 
714 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 403 (“Oui, le secret de cette infernale procédure est enfin découvert : il 
est là tout entier (M. de Mirabeau désigne le côté droit).”). 
715 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 404 (“nous,” as in the right, “ne pouvons participer à la deliberation”). 
716 Archive Parlementaires, XIX: 404. 
717 This is argument which Shapiro advances as the main reason for the 1789 to 1791 breakdown between 
the left leaning and right leaning components of the Fayettist judicial machine. Also Timothy Tackett offers 
an excellent analysis of the polarization of the National Assembly and the factions which were created in 
Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a 
Revolutionary Culture (1789-1790), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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Tackett’s argument that: 
the ideological choices that emerged most dominant in the course of the 
Revolution developed, above all, as a function of specific political contingencies 
and social interactions within the Assembly and between the Assembly and the 
population as a whole.718 
 
                                                        
718 Tackett, Becoming a Revolutionary, 76. 
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Conclusion 
Only a year passed between the “crimes” of October 6, 1789, and the October 2, 
1790, dismissal not only of the criminal investigation, but of the Châtelet itself. The 
viewpoint of a significant number of deputies had changed in regard to the origins of the 
journée, due in part to the vocal objections of le peuple. However, the deputies of the left 
seem to have primarily renounced one hypothesis as a way to divert blame to a rival 
faction, and were more concerned with the journée’s political ramifications than judicial 
integrity. 
 In reframing this reappearing issue of the origins of the October Days, I have 
argued that the journée can be thought of as both spontaneous and premeditated. It was a 
continuation of themes and assumptions from the early Revolution and even before; it 
was born not only out of recent events but out of gradually developing tensions. At the 
same time, this type of premeditation does not necessarily imply that there was an 
overarching political conspiracy. On the contrary, this analysis has shown that the 
journée was popularly fueled and was, for the most part, spontaneous, beginning with the 
chaos at Les Halles.  
 The Châtelet investigation, even in attempting to prove there was a conspiracy, 
does not reveal any substantial evidence that there actually was a master plot behind the 
journée. Equally as important, I have argued that the Châtelet witness pool is not a well-
rounded representation of those who observed the events of and participated in the 
October Days. Therefore, it is critical that the evidence collected in these individual 
depositions be viewed within the context of the investigation as a whole. Only then can it 
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be effectively and accurately used to answer questions about the spontaneous or 
premeditated nature of the journée. 
 Additionally, the growing gap between the left and right’s positions on the 
journée became a large chasm by the time Chabroud reported to the National Assembly. 
Ultimately, the right supported the Châtelet while the left sided with popular opinion. It is 
evident that the left used the final verdict on the case as a political tool. Instead of 
discussing the investigation, the left only allowed cursory comments after the Comité des 
rapports gave its conclusion. Wasting no time, the left dismissed the investigation while 
accusing the Châtelet of its own counter-revolutionary conspiracy, therefore indirectly 
implicating some of its right wing supporters.   
 The pervasiveness of this question of the spontaneous or conspiratorial origins of 
the October Days and other journées corresponds closely with the development of the 
identity of le peuple. Although the Declaration of the Rights of Man endowed the Nation, 
composed of le peuple, with absolute sovereignty, government representatives were not 
always adept at listening to the voice of the citizens. As le peuple voiced their grievances 
through demonstrations such as the October Days, the authenticity of their demands were 
sometimes brushed aside by representatives who did not believe that le peuple were 
capable of carrying out such movements on their own. Instead, officials assumed that 
popularly propelled movements such as the October Days could only be a result of a 
political plot. Between October 1789 and October 1790, le peuple clearly continued the 
struggle to reinforce the sovereignty with which it had been endowed. The reactions to 
the journée and the ensuing investigation revealed the increasing conviction of le peuple 
that the government should be responsive to their demands. In this case, the districts, 
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along with many popular newspapers, became more active and vocal in April 1790, 
ultimately forcing the National Assembly to divide over the issue of the Châtelet 
investigation by October 1790.  
As the left increasingly justified their positions as being beneficial to le peuple or 
les bons citoyens, they set up a precedent which every dominant party would thereafter 
claim as their own in order to maintain power. The October Days were merely one step in 
this process; nonetheless, the women who initiated the march, along with the militia and 
others who encouraged it, revealed that le peuple would not wait long for their grievances 
to be addressed. Le peuple was an active revolutionary force of its own accord, and not 
one which the political elites could ignore. 
Additionally, the leading role which women played during the October Days was 
highly praised by the general populace and helped to set the tone for their future 
revolutionary endeavors. These hundreds of “Mariannes” proved that they were active 
and valuable citoyennes, who, in seeking to provide for their family and la nation, were 
also good patriotic mothers. By 1791, some women organized on a higher political scale 
through their own revolutionary clubs, yet these were unfortunately outlawed by late 
1793.719 However, a discussion of the degree to which women achieved a political voice 
throughout the Revolution extends beyond the confines of this thesis. 
On a judicial level, the October Days investigation crippled the Châtelet and 
finally forced the National Assembly to quicken its reform of the judicial and criminal 
system which the Commune had been demanding since the summer of 1789. Shortly after 
                                                        
719 For a discussion of how these women continued to draw strength from their traditional roles to expand 
into organized public politics, and the reaction of their male counterparts see Suzanne Desan, 
“Constitutional Amazons: Jacobin Women's Clubs in the French Revolution,” in Re-Creating Authority in 
Revolutionary France, eds. B. T. Ragan Jr. and E. A. Williams (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 
1992), 11-35. 
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the dismissal of the Procédure criminelle, the National Assembly held elections for six 
new tribunals to take over judicial responsibilities. In the early months of 1791 this new 
set of tribunals and procedures was implemented to replace the defunct Châtelet and 
other provisional courts.720  
One of the difficulties in analyzing the origins of the October Days and the 
subsequential reaction is the sheer number of factors which must be taken into 
consideration. Since the journée was a reaction to both short term and long term stresses 
applied in a constantly evolving environment, it is difficult to determine the exact degree 
to which each factor influenced the journée. Also the great number of people, 
governmental bodies, and troops involved in the October Days all had different 
perspectives which frequently merged and diverged over the course of 24 hours. This 
wide range of considerations obviously exposes the limitation of any analysis which 
attempts to define and categorize these variables. So many factors appear to be 
synthesized within the journée that it is doubtful if even the participants were completely 
aware of the divisions within their motivations. Furthermore, the October Days and the 
ensuing reaction all unfolded over a revolutionary and consequently unstable 
background. Not only were the opinions of different groups shifting, but they were 
evolving in an environment of constant change, without the trusty historical markers 
provided by a more permanent government and society. The structure of the Commune, 
national government, and legal system underwent constant revision and changes 
frequently occurred on a day to day basis.  
However historically challenging this plethora of considerations may be, it is what 
makes the Revolution such a fascinating topic to study. The attempted journey to 
                                                        
720 Shapiro, Revolutionary Justice in Paris, 1789-1790, 217-218. 
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synthesize the popular and the political, the social and the economic, the ideological and 
the practical, and the traditional and the contemporary into a workable mold was just as 
difficult for the revolutionaries to navigate as it is for historians to trace their path. The 
duality of the spontaneous and premeditated nature of the October Days and the ensuing 
political and judicial response remains bound in these paradoxes, although it has been the 
intent of this thesis that they emerge somewhat more defined. 
 
 171
Appendix: 
Differing Perspectives on the October Days: A Summary of Secondary Source 
Arguments 
 
Henri Leclercq’s account of the October Days is the most conservative among the 
works I consulted. His heavy reliance on conservative sources such as the Châtelet 
investigation and a collection of letters from aristocrats, many of whom became émigrés, 
may help explain his conservative analysis of the events. Leclercq strongly believes in the 
participation of Orléanist agents in the October Days. He also suggests that Mirabeau was 
his fellow party member, which Leclercq implies fits in with Mirabeau’s ambitions to 
become a minister. In an attempt to support a long term Orléanist agitation plot, Leclercq 
asserts that “money was literally thrown from the windows of the Palais-Royal” on a 
regular basis.721 He places Orléans at the chateau in the morning hours of October 6 and 
recounts a scene in the National Assembly where “the Viscount of Mirabeau caresses the 
throats of the prettiest [marchers].”722 Although Leclercq does not believe that Lafayette 
was part of a plot and absolves him from responsibility for bringing the Parisian National 
Guard to Versailles, he remarks that Lafayette should have personally stayed closer to the 
king during the night. 
 It is obvious that Leclercq does not sympathize with the crowd although he does 
make the distinction between women marchers and brigands. He describes the crowd in 
the court yard on the morning of October 6 as “a crowd of women nearly naked, some 
men armed with pikes menacing the windows with their awful cries.”723 Nonetheless, his 
                                                        
721 Leclercq, Dom H. Les Journées d’octobre et la fin de l’année 1789. Paris : Libriarie Letouzey et Ane, 
1924, 39 (“l’argent fut littéralement jété par les fenêtres au Palais-Royal”). 
722 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 73 (“le vicomte de Mirabeau caresse la 
gorge des plus jolies [marchers]”). 
723 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 130 (“une foule de femmes presque nues, 
des hommes armés de piques menaçaient les fenêtres avec des cris affreux”). 
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detailed account of troop and crowd movement is especially helpful in explaining the 
infiltration of the château. Ultimately, he gives credit to Lafayette for controlling the 
crowd and easing tensions between the Body Guard and the National Guard troops. As 
for the scene at the Hôtel de Ville later that day, Leclercq writes that “This sinister 
Tuesday was one of these dazzling days of autumn which embellish the Ile de France.”724 
Marc de Villiers tries to examine the “legends” of the October Days through a 
detailed chronological account of the events of the journée which he maintains were 
greatly influenced by a leftist plot. De Villiers believes that about 100 women and men 
within the crowd were paid agents of the duc d’Orléans and an ambiguous patriot party. 
De Villiers believes that this idea of premeditation explains how some men were 
disguised as women since men would only have a chance to disguise themselves quickly 
if they were waiting for such an opportunity. As for the rest of the original 500 citizen 
marchers, de Villiers asserts that they were really marching with the intent of getting 
bread and if the king came back to Paris, it would be a fringe benefit for them. Although 
some aspects of the movement were left uncertain because of the degree of popular 
participation, de Villiers argues that agents were always present at key turning points 
during the October Days, and urged the crowd in their preferred direction. He maintains 
that the patriots really organized most of the secret agitators but that they used the money 
and rallying name of Orléans. De Villiers describes the patriots as people who eventually 
wanted to get rid of the French monarchy entirely, but who would be willing to take the 
first step towards popular rule through a provisional and temporary Orléans throne. De 
                                                        
724 Leclercq, Les journées d’octobre et de la fin de l’année 1789, 150 (“Ce sinistre mardi était une de ces 
radieuses journées d’automne qui embellissent l’Ile de France”). 
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Villiers also argues that the timing of the march with the National Assembly’s push to get 
August decrees passed was not coincidental. 
De Villiers also attempts to trace the movements of various people and discern 
their intentions on the morning of October 6. He separates the swelling crowd into 
bandits, paid marchers/agitators, and unaware citizens. While the bandits attempted to 
plunder insider and outside the chateau, de Villiers stresses the conciliatory actions of the 
citizens towards some Body Guards in the Place d’Armes to show that not all were ill-
intentioned. He dismisses the alleged initial shooting of the 17 year-old Parisian boy by 
the Body Guards and concludes that the story of the shooting was altered after the 
journée by people who needed to give the crowd a justifiable motive for their violent 
actions. De Villiers maintains that agents among the crowd were able to lead a group to 
the queen’s apartments but that the conflicts in the courtyard were smaller and more 
random incidents. By revealing the internal structure of the château, de Villiers greatly 
clarifies the movement of the king, queen, and Body Guards during the invasion. 
Unlike Leclercq and de Villiers, George Lefebvre does not concentrate solely on 
the October Days but views it within the context of pre-Revolutionary patterns and the 
early events Revolution. Therefore, he gives a detailed discussion of the state of the grain 
market before and during the early months of the Revolution and points out that problems 
in the grain market had been traditionally attributed to aristocratic and even royal 
conspiracy. He also notes that Paris and other big cities were unique in the fact that they 
bought bread from bakers instead of buying a week’s supply of grain to make their own. 
It can be assumed then, that the inhabitants of Paris were even more vulnerable to sudden 
changes in the food supply. Despite his account of the distressed state of the bread supply 
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in Paris, Lefebvre attributes the start of the October Days mainly to a political reaction 
since the king had refused to sanction the constitutional decrees which would limit his 
veto power. Lefebvre insinuates that Orléans and Mirabeau did have a small scale plot to 
organize the march, but that the women would have gone regardless of their participation 
or not. Additionally, he hints that the “agitators” of Paris probably had an agreement with 
some left leaning National Assembly deputies. Retrospectively returning to the food 
crisis, Lefebvre stresses that the journée did not solve the bread crisis by citing the high 
bread prices of mid-October. 
In his book, Les Femmes de la Revolution, Michelet devotes one chapter to an 
account of the journée. On a whole, his work is written in a very romantic style and 
consequently, his ideas also tend to follow the same trend. Michelet cites a general fear 
that foreign troops were going to start a war, and the general hunger and bread shortage 
as factors in the initial formation of the march. He follows the women from the Hôtel de 
Ville through the dramatic conflict with the guards at the Tuileries gardens, to Maillard’s 
heroic efforts to find food for the women at Sèvres, and finally to the National Assembly 
where he emphasizes the women’s admiration for Mirabeau. Michelet concludes that the 
women entered the château the next morning because some men had agitated them in this 
direction. Michelet's final assessment is optimistic: “The revolution of October 6, 
necessary, natural and legitimate if there ever was one, all spontaneous, unsolicited, truly 
popular, belonged above all to the women, like that of July 14 to the men” and foresees 
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the implications of the women's actions with an exuberant cry of “adieu, old 
monarchy!”725 
The aim of Louis Gottschalk and his student Margaret Maddox’s work is to give a 
detailed account of Lafayette’s life, and in this case, his actions in the French Revolution. 
Of special interest to this discussion are the two chapters on October 5 and 6, but 
Gottschalk and Maddox also skillfully weave the journée within the context of the events 
of the prior months as well. For example, they stress Lafayette’s actions on August 30 
which prevented the Palais Royal from marching on Versailles and other more minor 
incidents of September during which Parisians wanted to go to Versailles in order to 
remove the king from aristocratic and counter-revolutionary influences. The chapters on 
the October Days give nearly an hour by hour break down of all of Lafayette’s 
movements as well as the movements of the crowd and other troops in relation to keeping 
or breaking the peace. Gottschalk and Maddox draw several conclusions about both the 
involvement of Lafayette and his troops during the journée. While they prove that 
Lafayette attributed the many crowd agitations in Paris from mid-July until the October 
Days to Orléanist conspiracy, these historians do not actually assert that there was an 
overarching October Days conspiracy to begin with.  Additionally, they reveal that 
Lafayette even curiously believed that Mirabeau was manipulating Orléans’ alleged 
conspiracies and resources for his own end.  
In this work, Lafayette is completely cleared of any scheming of his own during 
the summer and early fall. Gottschalk and Maddox refer to Lafayette’s frequent near loss 
of control over situations before and during the October Days as convincing supporting 
                                                        
725 “La révolution du 6 octobre nécessaire naturelle et légitime s'il en fut jamais, tout spontanée, imprévue, 
vraiment populaire, appartient surtout aux femmes, comme celle du 14 juillet aux hommes”; “adieu, vielle 
monarchie!”. 
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evidence to this claim. The frequent oaths of loyalty to king, city, and nation which 
Lafayette made his troops repeat during the summer also support this conclusion. Above 
all it appears that Lafayette was interested in building a reliable militia and maintaining 
order as his primary duty. This explains the slow and cautious pace at which Lafayette 
and his troops approached Versailles. Lafayette’s deference to both royal and municipal 
authority suggests that Lafayette did not have any malicious plans in mind. Rather 
Gottschalk and Maddox insist that he sought to maintain the peace, ensure the security of 
Paris, and reconcile the crowd with the king and royal troops after the chaos of the early 
hours of October 6. Thus Gottschalk and Maddox’s assessment of the journée begins and 
ends by removing any blame from the hero of their study. 
Barry Shapiro studies the October Days within the context of the judicial 
investigations of the early Revolution. As for his thesis, he argues that revolutionary 
leaders wished to preserve Enlightenment ideals of judicial leniency as long as possible 
and were only forced to take extreme action when public opinion turned against them. In 
other words, the Terror was not the inherent outcome of early revolutionary justice. 
Therefore, Shapiro mainly demonstrates that revolutionary politicians were willing to use 
cases like the Châtelet October Days investigation as political bargaining chips of a 
centrist oriented municipal regime. Nonetheless, Shapiro does address the march itself. 
He cites the Saint-Huruge march attempt as a precursor to the journée. In making this 
link, he also emphasizes the political motives of each march as being linked to objectives 
of the political left. He casts only a cursory glance upon the bread problem as he refers to 
the artificial and aristocratically imposed scarcity cited by some members of the press. 
Shapiro maintains that the crowd went to the Hôtel de Ville of their own accord and that 
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most of its members wanted to burn the building and wreak havoc. He argues that the 
idea to march on Versailles was only a distraction. Shapiro concludes “it can be 
suggested that the October Days began as a revolt against the Fayettist municipal regime 
but that the regime was somehow able to… ‘seize’ the movement and re-focus its 
energies onto national rather than local issues” which turned the crowd to Versailles. He 
presents Lafayette as an opportunist who did not plan the uprising but led the Commune 
to take advantage of it once it began by redirecting it at Versailles. In keeping with his 
politically oriented perspective, Shapiro maintains that Lafayette benefited the most from 
the march since he finally controlled the crowd, controlled the National Guards, and 
moved the king into his Parisian arena. Yet in his final analysis, Shapiro concludes that 
the schism which formed between the Comité des recherches and the Châtelet, especially 
on the subject of the October Days, started the ultimate collapse and failure of the 
juggling Fayettist governing machine. 
 Albert Mathiez’s masterful study of the October Days is often regarded as the best 
secondary account of the journée. In his three articles published from 1898 to 1899, 
Mathiez addresses the question of the origins of the October Days as the result of a 
spontaneous popular movement or a preconceived conspiracy. Mathiez concludes that the 
women of Paris started the movement and were not joined by any men until 11:00 am at 
the Hôtel de Ville and that it was a generally spontaneous movement. However, Mathiez 
also concedes that while the demonstration itself was spontaneous, the ideas of the 
movement (including grievances and proposed solutions) were not new or sudden but had 
developed over the summer. These ideas were often supported by popular newspapers 
and Mathiez believes that the left of the National Assembly was in close communication 
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with Parisian radicals by the end of the summer. Mathiez attributes the beginning of 
rising tensions to the reluctance of the king to accept the constitutional decrees and feudal 
reforms of August 4 and his subsequent calling of foreign troops to Versailles and the 
Parisian area. The people were unsure where the loyalty of the Flanders regiment lay 
(with the nation or counter-revolutionary aristocratic forces) and their fears seemed to be 
confirmed by the reported degradation of national symbols at the October 1 banquet 
hosted at Versailles. Therefore, Mathiez maintains that the women began the 
demonstration with the twofold intention of remedying the bread crisis and seeking 
revenge on the unpatriotic actions of troops at Versailles. 
 Mathiez also concludes that the relocation of the king in Paris would not have 
benefited Orléans (if his ambitions were for the throne) since the king’s flight would have 
been more beneficial than trapping him in Paris. However, Mathiez does believe that 
Orléans did hand out money to encourage popular unrest prior to the journée, but that the 
participants of the journée were not paid by him, although many of the participants 
admired him. Mathiez also briefly discusses Mirabeau’s actions in the demonstration and 
concludes that he was not responsible for a conspiracy plot either. His conclusion about 
Mirabeau’s involvement is the same as that of Orléans “Even if the duke d’Orléans had 
not existed we would have probably seen the same scenes” and that “the course of events 
would not have been changed.”726 Nor does Mathiez believe that Lafayette had a hand in 
arranging events since he is portrayed as being reluctantly forced to march on Versailles 
by the threats of his troops. Yet, Mathiez does point out that Lafayette encouraged the 
                                                        
726 Mathiez, Albert. “Étude Critique sur les Journées de 5 & 6 Octobre.” Revue historique. Vol 68 (1898), 
279. “Quand mêmes le duc d’Orléans n’aurait pas existé nous aurions vu probablement les mêmes scènes” 
and that “le cours des choses n’en aurait pas été changé.” 
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court not to resist the demands of the crowd on October 6. Mathiez ultimately concludes 
that the whole movement could not have been orchestrated through bribes or other 
conspiratorial means. Therefore, Mathiez is able to carefully balance the paradox that the 
journée was of popularly based spontaneous origins while its themes and ideas were 
premeditated.     
 George Rudé’s work addresses the motivation, composition, and actions of 
revolutionary crowds and he uses several important revolutionary events, including the 
October Days, as specific examples. Rudé reveals that most spontaneous revolutionary 
activity led by the menu peuple was motivated by food problems. He refers to pre-
revolutionary examples of popular unrest concerning bread problems and reinforces the 
traditional myths of the pacte de famine. Rudé argues that this mentality was maintained 
during the Revolution and reveals that the idea that popular demonstrations could solve 
revolutionary grievances was reinforced through a decrease in bread prices following the 
fall of the Bastille and the early August demonstrations at the Hôtel de Ville. 
 Therefore, it is not surprising that Rudé draws on these trends to explain the 
October Days. He argues that before the involvement of the National Guard, the early 
events of October 5 “seemed no more than a continuation of similar demonstrations 
during September” and were linked to the traditional assumptions and responses of the 
menu peuple.  Besides the ubiquitous spring and summer references to statements 
supporting a move of the king from Versailles to Paris, Rudé illustrates that pressure and 
motivations for the eventual march greatly accumulated in September, starting with the 
guards who were placed in bakers’ shops for the first 16 days of September. Rudé points 
to the September 13 Versailles bread riot in which the king came out “pour calmer les 
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esprits,” the September 15 efforts of Parisian women to bring grain carts into the city, and 
the September 17 women’s complaint of the exploitation of le peuple by the bakers. Rudé 
also reveals that a man was arrested in September for shouting that the people must bring 
the king to Paris. Thus, Rudé concludes that the ideas of the October Days were in no 
way new themes. Rudé also seems to excuse the violence and confusion of members of 
the crowd on October 6 by arguing with the help of municipal burial records, that it is 
probable that a Body Guard shot a 17 year-old boy in the courtyard, spurring the chaos. 
Rudé has little confidence in the testimony of the ensuing Châtelet investigation 
and notes that “the venality of the masses was taken for granted and the remedy for 
popular insurrection was sought in the tracking down of presumed conspirators rather 
than in the removal of social grievances.” He asserts that the investigation was used to 
shift blame for actions from the masses in order to maintain the popularity of political 
leaders who needed someone to take the responsibility. Therefore, Rudé does not believe 
that the march was the result of a plot. 
 Olwen Hufton’s study concerns the divide between the women’s world and the 
men’s world at the start of the Revolution and how these gender roles directed the 
participation of women during the Revolution. Although women were excluded from 
citizenship, the division of spheres allowed their opinions and actions to be felt 
throughout the Revolution in situations regarding bread and religion. Therefore, their lack 
of citizenship did not prevent them from taking part in journées such as the October 
Days. 
 Hufton insists that 800-2000 women deliberately met at the Hôtel de Ville on 
October 5. However, she fails to explain how exactly arrangements were made to do so 
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and insists that the journée was not the result of a plot. Hufton frequently divides the 
roles in the journée along gender lines. She argues that the women wished to keep the 
men out of the Hôtel de Ville because they did not want their demonstration to become 
violent and they wanted to voice their opinions on the bread crisis alone. Hufton also 
attributes the “uglier mood” which led to the rush of the queen’s bedroom to the arrival of 
men late on the night of October 5. She also offers an explanation of why the market 
women in particular would be hostile to Marie Antoinette. Maria Leczinska, wife of 
Louis XV, had indulged the poissardes of Paris with visits to Versailles and courtly 
attention whereas Marie Antoinette abhorred them. Hufton also explains that women in 
revolutionary crowds, such as the one which marched on Versailles, were either over the 
age of 50 or young and childless, because mothers, for the sake of their children, rarely 
put themselves in danger. Therefore, the action of the women in the journée was 
predetermined by the obligations and constraints of their gendered world, yet the 
movement was popularly based and, for the most part, spontaneous. 
 Like Olwen Hufton, David Garrioch emphasizes the women’s allocation of the 
domestic sphere via gender roles as the main socially enabling factor for the march on 
Versailles. He also illustrates that most of the events which took place on October 5 had 
occurred in slightly different and in a more isolated manner before the October Days. 
This would include religious processions organized by women, the trips which les dames 
des Halles made to Versailles, and the recent “flour wars” in which women rebelled 
against merchants and the government over price inflation. 
 Garrioch surmises that women were more likely to act on domestic issues than 
men because home life was their only identity whereas men were recognized by trade and 
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skills. Yet, the domestic work which they were charged with did not isolate women, but 
forced them to go about the community daily to gather supplies and sell their wares. 
Thus, women were most likely to organize on a neighborhood basis, rather than by trade 
like men. However, Garrioch documents the relatively recent inter-district trade trend 
which was spreading throughout Paris in order to account for the cooperation between 
faubourgs on the October Days. It is not surprising then that les dames Halles were the 
both the most vocal of the October Days participants and the main suppliers of the 
satellite markets spread throughout the city. Garrioch portrays the October Days as the 
sum of the women’s past activities and connections implemented on a new and larger 
scale. 
As Mirabeau’s biographer, Barbara Luttrell addresses the October Days insomuch 
as they affected Mirabeau. The main point of Luttrell’s argument is a defense of 
Mirabeau as someone with ambition, yet with enough willpower and ideological 
conviction to put la nation before himself. Luttrell maintains that Mirabeau was not 
involved in any October Days conspiracy and in fact, its outcome was not in his favor. 
Since Mirabeau believed that keeping the monarchy would provide a Montesquieu-like 
system of checks and balances, moving the king closer to the pressure of the 
revolutionary crowds would not have served his interests. Luttrell also argues that the 
October Days violate Mirabeau’s ever-present goal of stability and order. Moreover, a 
joint conspiracy between Orléans and Mirabeau does not fit either since a coup d’état 
would reinforce the idea that the throne was a political “prize” to be won rather than a 
traditionally strong executive branch. Since Luttrell maintains that Mirabeau was not 
involved in a plot, she explores the reasons why the blame was immediately shifted to 
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him. Luttrell contends that Lafayette saw him as a rival for power and did not want to see 
him rise to the position of minister. Once the entire October Days investigation and 
consequently Mirabeau was handed over to the Châtelet, Luttrell argues that the royal 
court was all too willing to inhibit the political career of a vocal representative who 
detested the rights of the nobility, and had voted the Church property over to the State. 
Thus by default, Luttrell argues that the journée was not the result of a plot, but rather 
popularly propelled. 
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The Comité des Rapports’ Conclusion Concerning the Châtelet Investigation 
as Delivered by Chabroud in the National Assembly on October 1, 1789 
(Recorded in Archives Parlementaires, Vol XIX, p. 367) 
 
Chabroud : Je ne vois plus qu’une conspiration, celle qui a été ourdie contre la 
Constitution. Une ligue s’est formée sur les débris de l’ancien régime, pour tenter le 
renversement du régime nouveau. 
 Elle a fit : la force est unie contre nous à la justice, nous avons développé 
d’inutiles efforts ; ployons pour nous relever ; opposons l’intrigue à la force, et l’artifice à 
la justice. 
 Agissant ensuite dans l’ombre, elle a marqué un but dont elle ne s’écarte pas ; 
déconcertée, elle substitue une mesure à une mesure nouvelle, et son art est de se 
reproduire sous toutes les formes. 
 Elle avait appelé cette armée qui devait envahir Paris et la liberté naissante, elle a 
suscité, elle a nourri cette procédure, monstrueuse, cette guerre de greffe, passez-moi 
l’expression, dont le prétexte n’a pu dérober à nos yeux la prétention secrète. 
 Je m’abuse peut-être, mais partout je crois voir son influence. 
 Je l’accuse de la tiédeur dans laquelle le patriotisme semble s’engourdir, et de 
cette sécurité dangereuse qui a pris la place d’une sage et nécessaire réserve. 
 Je l’accuse des nuages qui ont obscurci ces jours purs où les bons citoyens 
n’avaient qu’une âme et ne formaient qu’un vœu. 
 Je l’accuse des vains démêlés où cette milice généreuse qui, de la capitale, donna 
à tout l’Empire un si noble exemple, ne craint pas d’exposer enfin le fruit de ses travaux. 
 Je l’accuse de l’inconcevable illusion dont nous somme frappés ; et où germe, 
entre les vrais serviteurs de la patrie, cette défiance qu’ils devaient garder pour ses 
ennemis. 
 Je l’accuse de la division cruelle qui se propage entre nous et dans la sein de 
l’Assemblée nationale, alors même que la liberté est l’objet commun de notre culte ; 
comme si les dogmes de cette religion étaient à la merci des tristes disputes qui enfantent 
les sectes ! 
 Ainsi l’on nous égare pour nous surprendre, et l’on nous divise pour nous 
vaincre ; et lorsque nous allons échapper à une embûche, d’autres plus dangereuses peut-
être sont dressées, où nous sommes attendus, que dis-je ?... où nous semblons courir de 
nous-mêmes. 
 Citoyens, vous êtes les maîtres de votre sort. Abjurez de funestes débats ; que les 
soupçons, que la défiance n’habitent plus parmi vous. Serrez-vous, continuez de former 
cette masse imposante qui doit repousser tous les assauts. Vous n’avez pas acquitté votre 
dette envers la patrie ; elle est toujours menacée, Le temps viendra, mais il n’est pas 
encore, où, délivrés d’alarmes, vous n’aurez plus qu’à recueillir, dans le bonheur du 
peuple et la prospérité de l’Empire, la récompense digne de vous, qui vous est promise. 
 Et quant aux malheurs du 6 octobre (car il faut enfin ne plus voir que d’horribles 
malheurs dans cette journée fatale) ; nous les livrerons à l’histoire éclairée pour 
l’instruction des races futures ; le tableau fidèle qu’elle en conservera fournira une leçon 
utile aux rois, aux courtisans et aux peuples. 
 Voici le décret que le comité vous propose : 
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 L’Assemblée nationale, après avoir ouï le compte, que lui a rendu son comité des 
rapports, de l’information faite à la requête du procureur du roi au Châtelet, les 11 
décembre 1789 et jours suivants, et des charges concernant M. de Mirabeau l’aîné et M. 
Louis-Philippe-Joseph d’Orléans. 
 A déclaré et décrété qu’il n’y a pas lieu à accusation. 
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